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The Tammorra Displaced:[1]
Music and Body Politics from Churchyards to Glocal Arenas in the Neapolitan Area

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Abstract
This article analyzes a Southern Italian dance and music called tammurriata*. The origin of the name comes from the principal instrument used during the performances, a frame drum locally called* tammorra*. I study the displacement of the* tammurriata *from its original venues (churchyards, since the practice is very connected with Catholic devotions to the Madonna) to completely different arenas, such as stages and youth clubs. The process of displacement suggests different forms of body politics, from forms of prayer to political approaches to global issues.*

The *tammurriata* (plural: *tammurriate*) dance and music was a kind of performance spread throughout the Vesuvian area around Naples,[2] indissolubly connected to Catholic religious devotions, mostly for the Madonna, that were venerated in several shrines.[3] These shrines were the destination of pilgrimages that performed a particular form of bodily atonement—a penitential behavior connected to the mechanism of the "*votum fecit gratia accepit*," the votive offering—from throughout the entire Campania region and, in some cases, from all over Southern Italy (such as the pilgrimage for Madonna dell'Arco in the village of Sant'Anastasia).[4] Sometimes this journey toward the shrine and, symbolically, toward God was made by walking. Marco L., a Neapolitan tammurriata singer and dancer very well known in the area stated to me:

> *Augu', ogni anno i' agg'a i' a Montevergine. Nonnema me riceva che quanne ere guaglione i' steve malate assaie. E se mettettere a pria 'a Maronna e Essa m'ha sarvato! Ra allora pozze sta male comm'a che ma vache 'o santuario. Prima ce iev'a pere, ma mo so vecchierelle, nun c'a facce. Vache c''o sciaraballo, cu l'ate vecchierelle. Pero' ancora abballamme!*
> Augu', every year I have to go to Montevergine.[5] My grandma told me that when I was a kid I was so sick that they prayed to the Madonna to save me, and She did it! Since then I can be sick as hell but I will go to the sanctuary. I used to walk there, but now I am getting old, I cannot do anymore. So I take the cart, with the other old folks. But we still dance![6]

Some pilgrims used to walk to the sanctuary, but more often the journey was made on a ritual float once hauled by oxen or horses adorned with palm branches and flowers (today, many use tractors). The dialectal name of the ritual float is *sciaraballo*

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and comes from the French *char a bal*, which means cart for dance. On the *sciaraballo*, pilgrims began to play and perform the tammurriata, based on the pulsing rhythm of a frame drum: the *tammorra*. What happened on the float would happen at the sacred place of the sanctuary and it would happen again when the group (the dialectal term is *paranza*) came back.[7] In other words, the ritual behavior of tammurriata crossed the entire festive institute. Clearly the tammurriata was not an accessory, but a fundamental component of the ritual.

Etymologically speaking, the term tammurriata comes from *tammorra*, the hand drum that is the main instrument of the performance. The term simultaneously indicates the rhythm, the dance, and the song on the drum. Thus, tammurriata can be defined as a complex musical, choral, and symbolic performance. It is simultaneously a song, a dance, and a prayer; a sound, a rhythm, and symbolically, an ecstasy, defined by Falassi (1985) as a "time out of time." All these aspects were indissolubly bound to each other and, also, they were indissolubly bound with the ceremonial and ritual times of specific religious Catholic feasts. Historically, the tammurriata was an important component of the complex ritual connected with pilgrimages to the local sanctuaries. Only in recent time has the tammurriata witnessed a displacement toward other social arenas: from the churchyards of Catholic sanctuaries were it was performed as a form of vernacular prayer, to secular stages where it became political symbols for subaltern classes, and then a commodity for folk consumers.

Tammurriata: the Drum, the Dance, and the Song

The tammorra, as a frame drum, is made from a wrap of wood shaped in a circle and covered with a goatskin, which is stretched very tightly. The only way to stretch the skin is to warm up the drum on heat sources. It is not unusual to see people coming to the feast with candles and matches: they are not heroin addicts, but only members of the *paranza* ready to perform a tammurriata.

The circular wraps of wood have between six to ten holes, plus one for the grip. The number of holes depends on the dimensions of the *tammorra* and on the depth of sonority that the musician wants to obtain. Here they will place the cymbals, which are made from cutting tin boxes. One of most famous constructors of *tammorre* was a fisherman, Tatonno ' o' Baccalaiuolo, (his nickname is 'Tony the Stock Fish'). His *tammorre* were, and still are, recognizable for their great quality and for their colors: blue, red, and white—the colors of the Madonna. But they were, and still are, recognizable also for the smell, because Tatonno used the boxes of conserved fish to make cymbals. Every musician changes the disposition, the number and the shape of these cymbals, depending on the sonority that he or she wants to obtain. We can also have the *tammorra muta* (silent tammorra), very similar to the Irish *bodhran*, or the *tammorre* loaded with cymbals like the Brazilian *pandeiro*.[8] The closest relationship seems to be the *bendir* of Arabic culture.[9]

The technique used to play the *tammorra* is complex despite appearances. The musician handles the *tammorra* with the left hand and beats the skin with the right. This way to play is called the "male way," while the grip with the right is called the

"female way."[10] The hand that grips the *tammorra* has a constant movement of the wrist; the other hand alternates beats on the middle of skin for full sound and with beats on the skin near the edge for metallic sound. Additionally, beats with the tip of the fingers and beats with the full palm or complete spins of the hand are part of the technical skills. Just as every *tammorra* has its own sound, every player has his or her own style.

The rhythmical figures of the tammurriata are exclusively binary, usually in 4/4, and this fact constitutes an important difference with another local popular dance *tarantella*, which is faster and consists of different scansions (triplets), usually in 6/8.[11] Another difference is the choreographic moment: the tammurriata is a couples dance, whereas the *tarantella* is a single or processional dance. This can be still seen in two villages not far from Naples, Piazza di Pandola and, above all, Montemarano, during Carnival time.[12] The greatest difference is in the social dimension: the tammurriata is a product of subaltern social classes. The *tarantella* may have the same remote origin, but it developed in an urban and hegemonic social classes. The example of lithographer Giovan Battista Gatti and engraver Gaetano Dura is famous. In 1834 they printed a book, *Tarantella– Ballo Napolitano*, in which they illustrated and codified the steps for Neapolitan court use.

On the binary rhythm of the drum and on the proposal of the song, begins the dance. Someone grips the *castagnette* (castanets) and beats time.[13] They start the dance staying still, with only a circular movement of the wrist and the hand, towards the inside, then towards the outside, first down, then up.

Once this beating rhythm begins, those who want to dance look for a partner. They form the couple—whether man/woman, man/man, woman/woman, regardless of age—and the dance begins. In the first phase, the couple is far apart and they make very few movements, almost exclusively with the arms. This distance is reduced with circular movements when one of the two assumes a more aggressive behavior and begins to approach the other partner. This behavior can be a courting or a challenge. The partner can refuse by withdrawing or can accept the courtship or duel. This phase culminates in the so-called *votata*, emphasized by very strong beats on the drum. In this phase the two dancers are now very close and their bodies are touching in various configurations: flank to flank, knees and shoulders, back against back. This is a moment of temporal suspension. The *tammorra* underlines the downbeats, the voice sings an extended note with melismatic course or adds short and always rhythmical lyrics on the beat, following the movement of the dancers. They turn, attached. They interlace knees, arms, or—back against back—head on shoulder. When the *votata* is finished, the couple extends the distance, ready to start again.

It is important to note that there exist many geographic varieties of the tammurriata: the *paganese*, which includes more hopping and is therefore similar to the *tarantella*; the *avvocata*, played with a great number of *tammorre*; the *scafatese*, the most popular variation, with soft and fluid movements, very sensual; and, finally, the *giuglianese*, the most energetic and aggressive. In fact, while the tammurriata in general can be seen as a courtship dance, the *giuglianese* resembles more of a duel. In the past, specific

tammurriata was performed only during a specific pilgrimage and for a specific saint; nowadays every sanctuary is the theater for the various tammurriata. This is perhaps not only a sign of weakened devotion, but also a sign of improved cultural circulation. Territorial boundaries are becoming malleable and negotiable. Dancers may still suggest local distinctions, suggesting a negotiation of identities, as suggested by Reed (1988), Taylor (1998) and Wulff (2007).[14] Yet now they learn more than one style, a clear sign of the decline of bounded tradition.[15] J.C., a dancer from a village near Naples called Scafati, clarifies this point:

> *Quann'ere guagliona ieveme sul'a Maronn'e ll'Arco. Abbiaveme a balla' 'ncopp'o carro e steveme semp'abballa'. Sule quanne evem'a trasi' rint'a chiesa ce fermaveme …chille e' prievete nun vulevene …. Mo iamm'a tutt'e parte, chille po' a Maronna e' semp'a stessa. E po' che fa…. A nuie ce piace abballa'.*
> When I was young we used to go only to the sanctuary of Madonna dell'Arco. We started to dance on the cart and we were continuously dancing. We could stop only when we were ready to go inside the church, and the priests did not want that. Now we go everywhere, the Madonna is always the same. And …it doesn't matter…we like to dance.

The tammurriata, distinct from the tarantella, always expects a song, which belongs to the traditional repertory, not much different from what was reported by some of the great positivists at the end of nineteenth century. Scholars like Gaetano Amalfi, Antonio Borrelli, and the young Benedetto Croce were concerned about the possible vanishing of the tammurriate so they researched and published lyrics of tammurriate in their collections and many articles in reviews like "Giambattista Basile," published in Naples (1882-1906) and directed by Luigi Molinaro del Chiaro.

The lyrics were and are organized in quatrains of hendecasyllables, named *stroppole*, from the point of view of the logical content of the text. Here is an example:

Bella figliola che te chiamme Rosa	Beautiful girl called Rosa
Che belle nomme mammete t"a mise	What a beautiful name your mother gave you
T'a mis"o nomme re tutte li rose	She gave you the name of all the roses
'o meglie fiore che sta 'nparadise	The best flowers that are in heaven.

In reality they are sung in a different way: in distich, with a musical structure that stops at the end of the second line. I make this example, quoting Roberto De Simone, (1979) with the first distich, which can be sung:

a) Both the lines
   Bella figliola che te chiamme Rosa
   Che belle nomme mammete t' 'a mise
b) Repeating the first line

Bella figliola che te chiamme Rosa

Bella figliola che te chiamme Rosa
Breaking the line, usually the second, and with the increase of short and stereotyped phrases
Bella figiola che te chiamme Rosa
Che belle nomme mammete e vo' veni' and ghiamme ia'
Che belle nomme mammete t"a mise

Often the singer executes these stereotyped phrases after the melismatic cadence of the *votata*. Usually they have ironic content and sexual meaning such as "*Chella vo' fa' vo' fa' vo' fa'*" (She wants to do it), "*O' piglia ' n mano ' o votta ' n terra*" (He brings on his hand and he throws to the ground). At other times, he can use free expressions like "*Ue' Maro', Maro', Maro'*", or sounds that imitate animals such as the braying of the mule, the barking of the dog, etc.

Ethnomusicologists have argued about the expressive freedom and capability of improvisation by the singer. Improvisation seems not to be practiced very much, but surely variation does exist. In the circle of tammurriate, I have never heard a creation *ex novo* of a text. I have heard singers with the capability of arranging more or less stroppole, coming from a common encyclopedia. A good singer will know many stroppole. This is what Diego Carpitella called "modular organization of the song."[16] Biagio, another young informant, told me

I' sacce nu sacch'e stroppole, pure Marco, e Tatonno! Ma nun ce stanne sante, nun puo' sape' tutt'e stroppole. O' meglio cantante ne po' sape' tutte ma mancante una. Sul'o riavule e' sape tutte quante.
I know a lot of strophe, like Marco, and Tony! But it is impossible, you cannot know every strophe. The best singer can know every strophe but one. Only the devil knows all the strophes.

Tammurriata as a Prayer
The tammurriata was and still is performed during a specific series of religious events in the Neapolitan area. This festive cycle starts with the already named *Madonna dell'Arco*—perhaps the most important of the religious popular feasts in Campania. It happens on Easter Monday in Sant' Anastasia. Other pilgrimages connected with the tammurriata include those to the shrines of *Santa Maria al Monte* in Nocera Inferiore (Easter Tuesday), *Madonna di Castello* in Somma Vesuviana (Saturday after Easter), *Madonna di Villa di Briano* (Sunday after Easter) in Villa di Briano, *Madonna delle Galline* in Pagani (the same day), *Materdomini* in Nocera Inferiore, *Madonna dei Bagni* in Scafati, *Madonna Avvocata* in Maiori, *Madonna della Neve* in Torre Annunziata, traditionally ending September 12th with the pilgrimage to the *Madonna di Montevergine*, in Montevergine, called in dialect *'a juta (the voyage)* or*'a sagliuta* (the ascent). Another pilgrimage is the great festivity at the shrine of *Sant'Anna* in Lettere, which indirectly

belongs to the Madonna's cycle, being dedicated to Mary's mother, Saint Anne. Another pilgrimage to the *Madonna di Montevergine*, decidedly more selective, occurs on February 2, the so-called Candelora.[17]

The tammurriata as a form of prayer, indissolubly bound with the ceremonial and ritual times of these specific Catholic feasts, can be seen as a form of what Robert Orsi (1985, 1993, 1995) calls "religion of the streets" suggesting a distance from the official religion.[18] The tammurriata is undoubtedly an expression of the religion of the street, as inflected in the Neapolitan area, and very often the clergy stands against these performances, labeling them as "pagan." This difference between vernacular and official religion in this area, and more in generally, in southern Italy can be expressed by the emblematic position of Carlo Levi (1945,102):

> *Nel mondo dei contadini non c'e' posto per la ragione, per la religione e per la storia. Non c'e' posto per la religione appunto perche' tutto partecipa della divinita', perche' tutto e', realmente e non simbolicamente, divino, il cielo come gli animali, Cristo come la capra. Tutto e' magia naturale. Anche le cerimonie della chiesa rientrano nei riti pagani, celebratori della indifferenziata esistenza delle cose, degli infiniti terrestri dei del villaggio.*
> There is no place for reason, for religion, and for history in the farmer's world. There is no place for religion simply because everything participates in the divine; everything is, realistically and symbolically, divine, the sky like the animals, Christ like the goat. Everything is natural magic. Even church ceremonies are pagan rituals, celebrating the undifferentiated existence of things, and the infinity of village deities.

The perspective suggested by Levi revolves around four main concepts: a) the "irrational" and magic mark of a basically primitive religion; b) ancientness, privileging the idea of "relics" or vestige indebted with the nineteenth-century folkloric survivalism (Hodgen, 1936); c) the syncretic character of subaltern religion, combining Catholicism with previous religions; d) the familistic relationship with the divine, based on pragmatic exchanges: "the southerner instituted a custom of making all manner of up-front bargains with saints or the Madonna" (Primeggia 2000, 83).[19] Furthermore, following Marxist theoretician Antonio Gramsci's (1929-1935) perspective, folklore (therefore popular religion) contrasts with the official, dominant, and hegemonic culture (and religion) because of its position in the social dynamic, but they are both defined by this dialectic. In other words, according to Stewart (1991) stressing the opposition between folk and official religion does not reveal the breadth and coherence of the religiosity of the street. In this dialectic tension, not surprisingly the idea of prayer is very different: the formalized expression of devotion, imposed by Church hierarchies, is far from the individual moment of contact with God. Within this dialectic, dance and music is also considered a sin by priests, while considered a way to pray by believers.[20]

The tammurriata contains a constant symbol. I am talking about the *circle*, a figure continuously proposed and re-proposed. It is a circle that the hands of the dancers construct and it is a circle that the steps of the dancers will draw on the ground. The

performance unfolds inside of a circle as well, one made by the spectators to delineate the ritual space of the song and the dance. The pilgrimage itself, as a ritual, involves circularity. It is a journey involving going and returning, year after year. I would suggest a linguistic example: in Italian language the journey is go and return. Not in English. If I buy a train ticket in Italy, I will buy a ticket to go and return, if I buy a train ticket in United States it will be, more symbolically, a *round trip*. In this case, English gives a better way to explain what I am trying to say.

The tammurriata in its complexity implies a perpetual return. This is one of its functions, the evocation of immortality for the cyclical scansion of the festivity. What the dancers will write on the space (the circle of the dance on the ground) they will do on the time (the circle of the ritual journey). It would be interesting to analyze better the hypothesis of the circular organization of the time in the southern Italian subaltern classes. But here it is enough to say that it will need to wait for the return of the festive recurrence the next year, to complete the circle and start again: an expectation from what is called *daily time* in contrast to what is called *festive time*, donated by the god (in the Christian tradition of the Old Testament) or however connected to it (for instance, in all the Greek-Roman world).

The festive institution happens inside this particular organization of time, ritual, and the exceptional, while at the same time it contains inside it other specific times, like the tammurriata, also ritual and exceptional. With the first beat on the drum there begins an ephemeral temporality, as would be defined by philosopher Jean Francois Lyotard (1980), that will keep on until the last sound of the cymbals. A temporality where enculturation and socialization (you will see always children in the tammurriate), transmission of competences and values, communications towards the god and the approach to him become possible, for an ecstatic component that sociologist Cazeneuve (1974) would call *depaysement*, or the estranging effect. In the tammurriata, the *hic et nunc* does not exist: it is a temporality that happens on a meta-historic horizon. This is what makes the tammurriata a performance unavoidably ecstatic—in its etymological meaning of displacement of the soul.

Additionally, we need to remember that the tammurriata is also a "survival" of the dances of the Greek and the Roman world. the tammurriata conserves the two fundamental movements of the *cheironomia* (the importance of the hands during the dance) and of jumping, present, for example, in the dance of the satyrs (*sìkinnis*). It was danced inside a divine temple as the Bacchic dance (with the rhythmic elevation of the arms), executed from the *baccanti* during the rituals of fertility. These cults were certainly widespread in the area, as demonstrated by several ruins of specific temples or archeological finds in Pompeii and Herculaneum.

The dance has, therefore, characteristics of prayer as a communication to God, allowing contact with God that was possible only outside ordinary time and stasis. But more importantly, insiders themselves suggest the idea of tammurriata as a prayer. For example: once in Pagani, during the *Madonna delle Galline* feast, they all were ready to dance, but they waited for the best dancer to start. This man did not want to dance, as a few days before there had been a death in his family. Finally, after being pressed

by the group, he decided to dance, saying: "*Va buo' ' o faccio pecche' aggi' a pria' a' Maronna,*" or "Ok, I will do it because I need to pray to the Madonna."

The idea of tammurriata as a prayer is further evident when the peculiar structure of the performance and its occurrence in proximity of the sanctuary are considered. While approaching the entrance of the church and even more when pilgrims come closer to the icon of the Madonna inside the church, the tammurriata is often preceded by another kind of song, the so-called *canto a figliola*. It is a song without cadency, dedicated to the young girl (figliola), or the Madonna. A typical canto a figliola is, *"Chi e' devotea Maronn'e ll'Arche"* ("Who is devoted to the Madonna dell'Arco"). Furthermore, many informants report this idea of the tammurriata as a way to pray to the Madonna. Antonio Esposito—also one of the most influential singers of the area—said:

> *Non puoi capire cosa significa la* tammurriata *se non sei un contadino e se non hai la devozione per la Madonna. Le due cose stann'assieme. Se non sei contadino non puoi capire il rapporto con la terra, ma proprio quella che tocchi con le mani e con i piedi, non puoi capire quanto costa lavorare nei campi e quindi apprezzare il frutto di quello che fai. E se non hai la devozione per la Madonna non puoi capire che tutto questo è grazia di Dio. Che se ce l'hai è perché la Madonna lo vuole. E allora l'unica cosa che puoi fare è ringraziarla, col tuo lavoro e con le tue canzoni. Per questo motivo tutti i gesti delle tammurriate ricordano i lavori dei campi, il prendere i frutti dagli alberi e lo zappare la terra. Quanne staie o' santuario e balli, quello che fai e' pregare la Madonna. La* tammurriata *è la danza della terra.*
>
> You cannot understand the tammurriata if you are not a farmer and if you are not devout to the Madonna. The two things are intertwined. If you are not a farmer, you cannot understand the relationship with the earth, the ground that you touch with your hands and feet, you cannot understand how much it costs to work in the field and then appreciate the outcome of what you do. And if you are not devout to the Madonna, you cannot understand that all this is the grace of God. If you have it, it is because the Madonna wants it. Then the only thing you can do is to thank Her, with your work, with your songs. For this reason all the gestures of the tammurriate remind you of the work on the field, when you harvest fruits from the trees or when you dig the dirt. When you are at the sanctuary and you dance, what you do is just to pray to the Madonna. The tammurriata is the dance of the earth.

G.C., an informant from Pagani, near Naplesexpresses a similar interpretation:

> *'A gente pensa che quanne stamm'a balla' ce stamm'a diverti'. Chill'e' 'o vero' ce stamm'a diverti' ma nun e' sule cheste, stamm'o santuario, stamme vicin'a Maronna, stamme cherenne 'e grazie o stamm'a ringrazia' pe' chille ch'amme avute. Pe' me e' na preghiera, ma no 'e chelle che m'agg'a battere 'npiette. A Maronn'o sape chelle che sto a fa'.*
>
> People think that when we are dancing we are just having fun. Yes, we are having fun, but not only this, we are at the sanctuary, we are close to the Madonna, we are asking for a grace or we are giving thanks for the graces we have had. For me it is a prayer, but not like the ones where you need to beat your chest. The Madonna knows what I am doing.

The idea of prayer expressed here by the dancers is completely different from the one suggested by the Catholic Church, who might be said to "own" the cult and therefore the ritual. These different attitudes means only that we have a conflict, a dynamic between an institutional perspective of the cult and a folk approach to the same. In other words, the separation between *church*, where the official ritual is performed, and the *courtyard* of the sanctuary where the dances are performed, does not relate to a distinction between secular and sacred, but between two different ideas of sacred. It also sets the battlefield between hegemonic power and subaltern resistance. For instance, the struggles between the Dominicans of the sanctuary of the Madonna dell'Arco and the religious associations spread all over Naples' outskirts mostly concern music and dance: in the last twenty years (I first attended this pilgrimage was in 1988) they progressively prohibited performing the *canto a figliola* with the following tammurriata, then the *canto a figliola* itself, then *the canto a figliola* inside the church, then the tammurriata in the immediate proximity of the sanctuary. It is a real as well as metaphoric mechanism of expulsion, in which official clerics sent dancers and musicians as far as possible from the church, allowing only the orthodox devout inside.

The Tammurriata Far Off the Churchyard

Displacing folklore, as in this case, the tammurriata was and is not unusual. Performances of the tammurriata in different contexts and with different purposes, and often by performers out of the peculiar social scenario of vernacular religion, are well documented at least starting in the twentieth century. The following examples emphasize such displacement:[21]

a) One of the tammurriata's first displacements was staged in the United States in 1934. The artist Gilda Mignonette (1970) performed a song called *Tammurriata Americana* (American Tammurriata), first in Naples then in New York City (often with the Italian American singer Farfariello).The song was written by Libero Bovio and Ernesto Tagliaferri, well-known authors of classical Neapolitan songs. Gilda Mignonette was called the "Queen of Emigrants." After a debut in the café-chantant in Naples, she moved in 1924 to New York City and she soon became a successful international singer. The *Tammurriata Americana* musically has little to do with a traditional tammurriata but suggests through its lyrics a blend of Neapolitan and American elements, for example,"*Tammorre e sax, trummette e benge, chitarre e gezz,"* ("Tammorre and sax, trumpet and banjos, guitar and jazz"). It was an international hit.
b) A second moment of displacement can be exemplified by *Tammurriata Nera* (Black Tammurriata), written in 1944 by E. A. Mario and Edoardo Nicolardi and performed by many singers immediately after WWII, such as Vera Nandi and Roberto Murolo. Renato Carusone (1982) made it very popular in the 1950s. The lyrics tell the story of a woman that gave birth to

a black baby boy in the aftermath of WWII. Interestingly one of the lines is a Neapolitan translation of an American song, "Pistol Packing Mama" by Al Dexter. It says, "*E levate 'a pistuldà uè e levate 'a pistuldà, e pisti pakin mama e levate 'a pistuldà"* ("Lay that pistol down, babe, Lay that pistol down. Pistol packin' mama, Lay that pistol down"). The song signifies the struggles of a society coming out of the war and the relationship with the liberation army.

c) In the 1970s, following the international movement that started a decade earlier in the UK and the US, a folk music revival, itself suggesting a form of cultural resistance, began in the Neapolitan area. On the one hand, the work of the influential musician Roberto De Simone, performing with the ensemble *Nuova Compagnia di Canto Popolare*, was more aesthetically and philologically-oriented toward research on the field of folk music. On the other hand, groups like *E' Zezi,* formed by workers from area automotive factories and directly involved with political interpretation of folk music, were the double-soul of this reinvented tradition. In both cases, tammurriate became an important part of their repertoire.
d) Finally, in the 1990s, another moment of displacement of tammuriata took place, this time adopted with political perspective that was anti-global. The following section analyzes the specific connection between performance and social commitment, bringing again the tammurriata into a political scenario, and the following transformations.

Tammurriata as Resistance

In the midst of the political turmoil of the 1970s and in the previously described tensions between institutional aspects and popular approaches to religion (i.e., within a hegemonic/counter-hegemonic dialectic), it became easy to displace the tammurriata toward a different meaning: no longer simply a prayer, it could be performed as an instrument of cultural resistance. This made possible a peculiar reading of the influential pages of Gramsci, *Osservazioni sul Folklore* (1975, 188-190):

> Folklore should instead be studied as a "conception of the world and life" implicit to a large extent in determinate (in time and space) strata of society and in opposition (also for the most part implicit, mechanical, and objective) to the "official" of the world (or in a broader sense, the conceptions of the cultured parts of historically determinate societies) that have succeeded one another in the historical process.

It is clear that for Gramsci subaltern groups have a fragmentary, incoherent, and contradictory conception of the world and life. But in that peculiar historical moment and social context it was more instrumentally interesting (or politically relevant) to underline folklore as an opposition against dominant classes, even if "implicit, mechanical, and objective." In other words, folklore, by position and default, is a

form of resistance and it is revolutionary (see for instance, Luigi Lombardi Satriani 1974). Therefore folk music, like the tammurriata, literally became the soundtrack of all the left-wing political groups.[22] As simplistic as it can look, this was the process of folk revival in the area. It is important to keep in mind that the area surrounding Naples was the center of a fast and traumatic industrialization process starting in 1968 with the project of the car factory AlfaSud in Pomigliano d'Arco. The need for unskilled workers was fulfilled with local farmers. Almost inevitably, the process of unionization, as well as political communications, used cultural forms recognizable by the local workers. As suggested by Gammella (2009) the tammurriata was one of these forms, perhaps the most important one. Musical bands like *Gruppo Operaio E' Zezi*, the *Collettivo Nacchere Rosse* and the *Gruppo Folk d'Asilia* were formed, mostly by workers from the AlfaSud. Their music was profoundly in debt with local folk music even when they produced new songs. Notably the first work of *Gruppo Operaio E' Zezi* was called Tammurriata *dell'AlfaSud* (1976).[23]

However, the connection with the pilgrimages was not lost. As Marcello Colasurdo, a founder member of the Zezi and now a professional folk singer, said,

> *Nuie faticaveme rint'a fabbica e magnaveme pane e politica. Ma i' nunn'agge mai perso nu pellegrinagge. La' agge 'mparate a canta' e la' torno, ogni volta. Comunista e' buono, 'a Maronna e' ll'arche e' pure pe' me.*
> We worked in the factory and we ate bread and politics. But I never missed a pilgrimage. I learned how to sing there and I went back there, every time. I can be Communist, but the Madonna is for me too.

An analysis (even if short and superficial) of the period is not complete if I do not take into consideration another aspect of the folk music revival of the 1970s. A pivotal figure of this movement was Roberto De Simone, a classical trained pianist and composer. In 1967, he founded the "Nuova Compagnia di Canto Popolare," undoubtedly the most popular folk music band of the time. Roberto De Simone (1977), also involved in the political process I have described, suggested a different path for folk music revival more oriented toward fieldwork, research, and re-elaboration of oral traditional music informed by elements of different traditions that were, more written, bourgeois and cultured. The aesthetic product was (and is) at the same time refined and popular, easy-listening and complex, politically oriented but available for everybody. This explains why it has lasted in time much more than other productions. Even today the "Nuova Compagnia di Canto Popolare," even without Roberto De Simone, is still considered a fundamental moment of folk music. For the economy of this paper, it is important to note that the aesthetic products of Roberto De Simone survived the political turmoil of the 1970s. In other words, if the tammurriata as a resistance did not survive the social changes and political readjustment of the 1980s, the folk music revival suggested by Roberto De Simone was still very influential for a new generation, with an important consequence: the tammurriata did not fall down again in a sort of oblivion. It was no more relegated

to the churchyard and not even in the occupied factories, but still maintained aspects of interesting musical production and of political declensions.

The Glocal Tammurriata, or the Tammurriata as Political Commitment [24]

At the end of the political turmoil, roughly around the middle of the 1980s, the tammurriata as well as the more general folk revival fell out of broad interest, even if it was still of scholarly focus and niche interests for enthusiasts. After almost a decade of neglect, an event in the area boosted again the interest in this kind of performance. In Naples on July 8, 1994, the 20th G7 summit opened at the Royal Palace in Piazza Plebiscito. The leaders of Canada, the European Commission, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States met to discuss economy, environment, job, trades, and other topics. At the same time, the record label *Novenove* released the CD *Cantanapoli Antifascista* (1994), bringing together ten of the most important Neapolitan groups in a musical assault on neofascism. The band *99 Posse* performed a song named "G7." These are the lyrics of the first strophe:

Ho fatto un sogno non era divertente	I had a dream it wasn't fun
non mi è piaciuto per niente:	I did not like it at all
C'erano 7 persone sedute ad una tavola	They were seven people around a table
in un pranzo da favola imbandito per	Having a fantastic lunch made for them
loro: E mangiavano, mangiavano,	And they were eating, eating, eating
Come dei PORCI.	Like PIGS.

On the same CD the 99 Posse sings "*Sant'Antonio Sant' Antonio | 'o remico r' 'o demonio*" ("Saint Anthony, Saint Anthony, the devil fighter") in a clear tammurriata style. But by adding "*o demonio e' ' a polizia | Sant' Anto' portala via*" ("the devil is the police / Saint Anthony take it away") they dragged the tammurriata out of the churchyard, the usual scenario of this kind of performance, and drove it into the proletarian ghettos of Naples. Around this time, another Neapolitan band *Almamegretta* released the CD *Sanacore*, containing the song bearing the same name, a dub version of a folk song, a very popular tammurriata:

Io quanne me 'nzuraje ero guaglione	When I got married I was a young boy
ue comm'era sapurita la mogliera	My wife was so savory and tasty!
la primma notte che me ce cuccaje	The first night I slept with her
ne a me venette 'o friddo e a essa 'a freva	I got cold and she got feverish

This CD was probably the most significant and lasting outcome of the Neapolitan anti-global movement, whose spontaneous and unstructured character generally expressed itself during happenings and events organized around the so-called *Centri Sociali*, social clubs self-promoted by youth groups.[25] In Naples, Officina 99, a center situated in the subaltern ghetto of Gianturco, was the center of youth proletarian movements.

Several bands such as the already mentioned 99 Posse and *Almamegretta*, and artists like *Bisca*, Daniele Sepe, and Speaker Cenzu performed their dissent against institutions considered oppressive and hegemonic. Dubstep, rap, and also jazz, electronic, and new music in general were played alongside folk music proposed by historic bands like *Nacchere Rosse*, *E' Zezi* (one of the most influential bands during the folk revival of the 1970s, with a strong political component) or traditional singers and musicians such as Marcello Colasurdo, and many others. The tammurriata soon became the perfect instrument to express social dissent against globalization and the G7 in Naples was the ideal moment and scenario to do so. The tammurriata, obviously a cultural production peculiar to the area, almost inevitably could be used as a symbol against globalization, evoking the dichotomy between local and global. Performed in a new way, contaminated by other musical genres like hip hop or dubstep, clearly borrowed from an international context, the tammurriata became the expression of the city as world territory, in a perspective where the local is interacting actively with a wider milieu.

The popularity of the tammurriata raised the interests to see it not just *in vitro* (in a concert setting or as a part of political events) but also in the natural context of religious events. A new generation of curious observers, amateur field researchers as well as trained anthropologists and ethnomusicologists, young proletarians of *Centri Sociali*—looking for alternative way to make music, but also for a different spirituality—began to attend the pilgrimages and the rituals.

Luca D., a new graduate in sociology told me:

> *Mi piace andare ai santuari per le feste. Non sono credente ma la spiritualità che si respira durante i pellegrinaggi è particolare. E poi quando partono i cerchi delle tammurriate … allora si che si avverte ancora di più. Per me è una botta di energia.*
> I like to go to the shrines for the feasts. I am not a believer but you can breathe a peculiar spirituality. And when the tammurriata's circles start … then you can really feel it even more. To me it is a blast of energy.

Carmine P., a young Neapolitan musician classically trained said:

> *Per me andare alle tammurriate e' una boccata di aria fresca. E' una musica diversa, che sento mia. E mi piace il contesto, che si suoni per i pellegrinaggi, a meta' tra profano e scaro. Bello.*
> To me, going to the tammurriate is a breath of fresh air. It is a different music, I feel it is more mine. And I like the context, the fact that it is played at the pilgrimages, somewhere in the middle of profane and sacred. Beautiful.

Marco G., a student belonging to the Centro Sociale Officina 99, made this comment about differences between old musicians (such as the quoted Uncle Fedele), very much involved into the religious aspect of the tammurriata, and the new ones, like himself, not at all interested on religion:

> *Io con la Chiesa non ho niente a che fare, chille so na mass"e strunze. Pure quann'abballamm"a fora ro santuario vengono e rompono i coglioni. L'anno passato (2008, my note) a Materdomini nun c'hanne fatt'abballa' annanz'a chiesa. Ma nuie steveme la' e abbiamo ballato lo stesso. Io alle 2 di notte sono entrato con gli anziani in chiesa a salutare la Madonna, Zi' Fedele ha cantato per la Madonna, e poi abbiamo suonato fino all'alba.*
> I have nothing to do with the Church, they are such a bunch of stupid people. Even when we dance outside the sanctuary, they come and burst our nuts. The last year (2008) in Materdomini they do not let us dance outside the church. But we were there and we dance the same. At 2 a.m. I went inside the church with the old people to honor the Madonna, Uncle Fedele sung for the Madonna, and then we played music until dawn.

It is important to note that the cultural and political frame of the late 1980s and 1990s saw, on the one hand the crisis of old political formations such as political parties and groups, and, on the other hand, the burst of social tensions around global/local dynamics. If global perspectives were under critique by youth movements, claims for localism, such as the ones proposed by the *Lega Nord for the Independence of Padania* in Northern Italy, were considered racist and deeply offensive.[26]

The G7 Summit held in Naples in 1994 was therefore the occasion to stage political dissent at the same time against institutional global politics and rising localist approach based on ethnic and racial differences. The tammurriata was appropriate for this purpose because it presented the following three fundamental aspects:

a) it is a local folk practice immediately recognizable as Neapolitan. Every symbol of the tammurriata is peculiar to this area: the music, the dance, the drum, the dialect, even the color of the drum, and the ribbon of the castanets;
b) it has a history, even if a short one, as a protest song, already used for political purposes speaking to non-local interests;
c) it is a spiritual performance enacted within groups and thus suggesting its role in defining group identity, as continuously shown during pilgrimages and religious feasts. According to Turino (2008: 111-120) it is possible to call groups like this "cultural cohorts": political, as well as religious, beliefs and activities shaping social groups. In this case, the fundamental shared habit is also performing the tammurriata.

These three aspects, connected with the international dimension associated with the G7 Summit, made the tammurriata a very useful instrument for the glocal agenda expressed against the institution.

When I have asked Marco G. why they dance the tammurriata also in different places, he answered me, underlying the political aspects of the tammurriata, especially the feeling of cohesion between members of left–wing movements:

> *Ballare ti fa stare bene insieme. Ma nuie nun simme tipe 'e discoteca. Ma te lo immagini io a ballare in discoteca? E chella e' music''e merda, tutta mercificata. Ballo la* tammurriata, *e' il mio ballo, fa parte di me e delle mie radici, e fa parte di me perche' e' una danza del popolo e io sono del popolo. Chesta e' na musica e nu ballo che ci contraddistingue, ma c'amma a' fa cu sta tecno tutta merda uguale e omogeneizzata? E sta sicuro che miezz'e tammurriate ce stanne nu sacch'e cumpagne.*
> Dancing makes you feel better between other people. But we are not the kind of people that go to the disco. Can you image me dancing at the disco? That's crap music, made just for business. I dance the tammurriata, it is my dance, it belongs to me and it is my roots, and it belongs to me because it is a people's dance, and I belong to the people. This is a music and a dance that make us different. What we can do with all this techno music, all the same homogenized shit? And you can bet that in the middle of the tammurriate there are also a lot of comrades.

So far it is possible to see the following dynamics in the social expression of the tammurriata:

1. Between different religious perspectives: on the one hand, the official position, with a long history of hegemonic prohibition, of expulsion and condemnation; and, on the other hand, an expression of what I have called (with Orsi) "religion of the streets," with different (and counter-hegemonic) symbols, manipulated by different officiants and representing different relationship of power. For instance, the real issue about dance is not if it is sinful or a different form of prayer, but about religious authority. It is a subaltern orthodoxy (correct belief) dialectally contrasting the official one.
2. Between the tammurriata as a prayer and as an instrument of resistance: as I have already said, the tammurriate can become an instrument of political resistance because of their ever-present counter-hegemonic aspects. But this does not represent a moment of fracture or distance: as contradictory as they can be, tammurriate are performed during the pilgrimage as well as during worker's strikes or the G7 Summit.

Contemporary Tammurriate: From Orthodoxy to Orthopraxy

The aftermath of the G7—in terms of glocal cultural resistance—saw a progressive interest toward this folk performance. Nowadays tammurriate is performed not only during the ritual time of pilgrimages or political events, but also everywhere in the region.

G.M., one of organizer of *Bagaria*, a tammurriata happening in Caserta, underlines:

> *Oggi come oggi le tammurriate si fanno dovunque. E non impari più a ballare o a suonare durante i pellegrinaggi, ma vai ai workshops che si fanno nei dintorni. Lì trovi qualcuno che ti dirà che quello è il passo appropriato per la scafatese o la giuglianese, come se la cosa ha importanza. E trovi pure quelli che noi di Bagaria chiamiamo i "portatori sani della tradizione",*

> *giocando sul fatto che non esiste questo concetto. La tradizione è bella perchè è viva e in continua trasformazione. Se tenti di fissarla in codici, sei fottuto, o meglio la tradizione ti fotterà. Se vuoi si è perso un sapore di autenticità, ma ancora una volta…chi se frega. Quello che si è guadagnato è una circolazione delle tammuriate contemporanee infinitamente piè grande di prima.*
> Nowadays you can find tammurriate everywhere. And you do not learn how to dance or how to play also during the pilgrimages, you go also to the many workshops around. There you find somebody who will tell you this is the right step for the *scafatese* or the *giuglianese*, as it is important. And you can find also who we from Bagaria ironically call "healthy bearers of tradition," mocking them because this concept does not exist. The tradition is beautiful because it is alive and continuously changing. If you try to fix it in codes, you will be screwed, or better tradition will screw you. If you like we can have lost a flavor of authenticity, but again…who cares? What we gain is a circulation of contemporary tammurriate much bigger than before.

From this perspective, the process of change visible in the tammurriata seems to have two aspects (not mutually exclusive: as a matter of fact they can be seen at the same time, but in different cultural cohorts):

a) tammurriata as a performance for non-traditional purposes, but still referring to orthodoxy as a prayer and/or as instrument of resistance;
b) tammurriata as a performance for non-traditional purposes, where orthopraxy is prevalent.

If I stress the idea that the tammurriata is a form of prayer or instrument of resistance, then it is correct to state that the contemporary tammurriata can be interpreted as a displacement from an original *orthodoxy*, the "correct" belief, or the "conformity to an official formulation or truth, especially in religious belief or practice," toward a new *orthopraxy*, the "correct" practices, the creation and perpetuation of ritual forms "considered" as correct, a level that can be called *orthopraxy*.[27] Orthopraxy is intimately related to a process I have called stylization (Ferraiuolo, 2009): the creation of a "style" (in this case a pattern of practices) and conformity to a "style" (in this case respect for officially correct practices).

The process of stylization stresses more on formal local differences, but at the same time, suggests a diffused knowledge: nowadays a dancer or a drummer certainly is trained to perform the various styles of tammurriata. The result is a detachment from the original liturgical ritual: the devotion to a particular saint or Madonna is no longer requested. It may be even an obstacle for mastering the tammurriata's several different styles. The performance-centered events (workshops, happening, but also the pilgrimages) tend to propose the tammurriata as a whole. In terms of identity, the cultural cohorts become even more the participative model, with bonds that are not only political, but also aesthetic and performative.

Anthropologist Susan Reed (2009) analyzes a similar process concerning the Kandyan dances. She uses E. Valentine Daniel's opposition (1996) *ontic* versus *epistemic*,

suggested for Sri Lanka's religious feasts: "the categories of ontic and epistemic delineate two modes of orientation to the world. The ontic represents a mode of *being in the world*, while the epistemic is a mode of *seeing* the world. The ontic is more closely aligned with ritual and mythic interpretation of the past, while the epistemic can be said to characterize theater and a (European) historic orientation. In Daniel's analysis of Sri Lankan pilgrimage sites he notes that several have undergone a transformation from an ontic "being" to and epistemic "seeing" and shift from participation to observation, congregation to audience, and ritual to theater" (Reed, 2009: 176).

I see similarities with my proposed coupling of orthodoxy/orthopraxy: orthodoxy, as well as the ontic, relates to being in the world, connected with beliefs, while orthopraxy, as well as epistemic, is somehow connected with seeing the world, privileging a practice. But I also see fundamental differences in the tammurriata, when the shift from participation to observation and from congregation to audience is never so sharp. People attending the pilgrimages, with various degrees of participation, suggests a more nuanced situation. And if they also attend workshops to learn the correct way to dance, this engagement does not seem to be an opposition, but a completion. The discussion, therefore, is about different degrees of being and seeing in the world. If there is any shift, it is a shift not from participation to observation, but within a participation involving no longer a deep belief, but a correct practice, through which a cultural cohort still identifies itself. Thus nowadays, and more than ever, its significance is expressed by these exemplar lyrics, suggesting the correct practice:

Abballate abballate,	Let's dance let's dance,
femmene vecchie e maretate,	old married women,
e si nun ballate buone	and if you do not dance correctly
non vi cante e nun vi sono.	I will not sing and play for you.

Notes

1 *The Tammorra Displaced* is also the title of a documentary, directed by Paolo Favero and Augusto Ferraiuolo, filmed in 2005.

2 I did fieldwork on the tammurriata in the mentioned area on several occasions starting from my thesis' work in the middle of the 1970s. For a long time I was a regular attendant as observer as well as musician. My last presence in the field was in 2015 at the Sanctuary of Villa di Briano.

3 It would be more appropriate, according to Mazzacane (1987) to talk about *festive institute*, a term that immediately suggests the consolidation of the religious feast in a social institute, with symbolic meaning, social functions, and motivations in the social group

4 The fundamental element of the pilgrimage is the *journey*: a journey between a profane place and a sacred place and towards God in the ritual time of the festivity followed by a return towards the daily time of the daily life.

A song that is executed for the festivity of Montevergine expresses very well the idea of this ritual journey. The pilgrims sing: *Simme ghiute and simme venute quant e' razie ch' imm' avuto* (We came and we came back, how many graces we have obtained). In

this lyric is expressed both the topic of the journey, in its round-trip movement, and the deep motivation, that is, the demand and the attainment of grace from God, through the intercession of a saint.

5 The shrine of Montevergine is located in the village of Mercogliano, near Avellino. The devotion for this particular Madonna is spread all over the region. Many pilgrims will still walk the almost 35 miles from Naples to pay respect to the Madonna.

6 This and all translations in this essay are mine.

7. *Paranza* is a term borrowed from the Southern Italian sailors' slang. It comes from the dialect *paro* which means "couple" and indicates two fishing boats proceeding together and using the trawl-net. It also indicates a specific boat, typical of central Adriatic. By extension, the term designates a group of people working together for the same goal. *Capoparanza* is the leader of the group.

8 The Irish *bodhran* is a frame drum traditionally made with a wooden body and a goat-skin head. It is played not with hands but with a double-headed stick called a *cipín*, *tipper*, or *beater*. The Brazilian *pandeiro* is a frame drum smaller than the tammorra. Nowadays the head is often made with synthetic skin, and the frame is loaded with metal jingles, called *platinetas*. Sound is generally produced by alternating thumb, fingers, palm of the hand and by shaking the drum, holding it with the head up.

9 The *bendir* is a frame drum similar to the *Def*, another drum very common in Eastern areas. It is played by hand, holding the drum inserting the thumb in a hole placed on the frame. Inside the drum, there are attached strings in order to produce a snare effect.

10 It can be argued that in the past the use of the tammorra was entrusted exclusively to women. In many cults of the ancient Rome, the officiants were mostly women. There are iconographic evidences about it. We have also other iconographic testimony (such as a Pompeian mosaic at Archaeological Museum of Naples and one Pompeian style fresco at Royal Palace in Caserta) that illustrates the use of the tammorra between men.

11 In the Neapolitan area and, more in general, in Southern Italy the tarantella is considered the folk dance *par excellence*. The etymology of the term suggests the connection with the spider (*taranta*) and its function as musical exorcism against the disease produced, at least in folk medicine, by spider's bites.

12 One example of Montemarano's tarantella is included in the Alan Lomax and Diego Carpitella field recording (1958).

13 The *castagnette* are composed of two concave parts of wood (approximately 3-4 inches long) and inlaid in different ways on the external surface. They are tied together with a string, where they put one or two fingers, usually index and/or middle finger, that causes the beat. Often the castagnette are adorned with colorful ribbons.

14 Folklore (and, of course, dance) have often been used as exploitable symbols of ethnic and national identity. It would be enough to remind the romantic use of folklore in Germany and Scotland in the 18th century, in Ireland (19th century), and also contemporary ethnic claims based on, or supported by, folklore (Greece, 20th century). On this topic see for instance Cirese (1976), and Kirschenblatt-Gimblett (1998).

15 Susan Reed (2009: 81) analyzes this pattern in Kandyan dances: distinctions between the

three regional dances (Kandy, Kurunegala, and Kegalle) have become less significant.

16 On this topic see for instance Maurizio Agamennone and L. Di Mitra (2003)

17 This last feast deserves a specific study (or better attention) because it has a procedure and participation absolutely atypical since it happens at dawn and it belongs to the *femminielli*, the Neapolitan transvestites.

18 Robert Orsi (1985: XIV) uses the concept of religion of the streets to broaden and deepen the understanding of the phenomenon of popular religion that he saw as narrow and limited. I agree with Orsi about the necessity to fully analyze the concept. I am using the term "popular" here only because I need to contextualize the phenomenon historically and geographically (Italy after the World War II, and the scholarly approach of Carlo Levi, 1945).

19 Levi's perspective, while suggesting an opposition between official and vernacular religions, misses the dynamic between a hegemonic group and a subaltern one engaged in continuous dialogue and influencing each other, even if in different measures. Subaltern religion does not stand by itself.

20 Dance in Southern Italy can be considered as a memory of ancient Greek and Roman cults, as I will address later in the paper. It is well known that dance as form of religious ritual is present in several societies, as Susan Reed (2009) suggests in her very interesting recent works.

21 These examples constitute by no means any sort of thorough list. My intention here is simply to suggest that displacement of the tammurriata is not a new phenomenon.

22 The tammurriata as instrument of resistance offers an important sense of oneness for subaltern groups, reinforced by a common political understanding, above in this period of time. The feeling of oneness with others shaped by dance is studied by William H. McNeill (1995). He suggests the term "muscular bonding" for this peculiar feeling. Thomas Turino (2008) (uses the term "sonic bonding" where music is also involved. Both authors recognize a direct reference to Gregory Bateson (1972).

23 The album contained also what is probably the most notable song of that period: 'A Flobert, narrating the explosion in a toy factory in 1975. Twelve young workers died in the explosion.

24 Glocal is a term indicating how local aspects interfere with global dynamics. The term was popularized by Roland Robertson (1995). Also see for instance, Zygmunt Bauman, "On Glocalization: or Globalization for Some, and Localization for Others," *Thesis Eleven*, Vol. 54, No. 1. (1 August 1998), pp. 37-49.

25 A first expression of the anti-global movement can be considered the riots during the IMF and World Bank annual meeting hold in Berlin, in 1988. The growth of this movement was clearly evident during the J18 – Carnival against Capitalism in 1999 (London, Eugene, OR - USA, and several other cities all over the world), the N30, in Seattle, WA – USA, for the WTO meetings. In 2001 during the riots against the G8 in Genoa, Italy, policemen killed a young man.

26 The existing bibliography on this topic is continuously growing. Just as examples I would suggest: Allen B. and M. Russo (1997); Biorcio R., (1997). On the other hand, for a view of peculiarity of Southern Italy, I would suggest Jane Schneider (1998).

27 The definitions of orthodoxy and orthopraxy I am using here as a starting point comes from

the *Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English Language*.

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Response

The Tammorra Displaced:
Music and Body Politics from Churchyards to Glocal Arenas in Neapolitan's Area, by Augusto Ferraiuolo

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This beautifully laid-out essay considers the multifaceted and venerable *tammurriata* (music, song, dance, and Marian devotional ritual—all rolled into one) found in the Campania region of Southern Italy, through its various transformations and displacements in a historic arc which begins in the Ancient world. While maintaining many parts of its core as a devotional practice and marker of local identity, in modern contexts it has taken on a new political role, from the 1970's folk music revival to the chance happenings of the G7 meeting in Naples on July 8, 1994. This event ignited a proletarian *tammurriata* movement resonating out from the social centers of Naples to performances on concert stages by groups such as 99 Posse, Almamagretta, a displacement which moved it from folk culture to global/glocal politics, but not necessarily displacing it from the former.

The theoretical framework is rich and Ferriauolo's focus on orthodoxy vs. orthopraxy (roughly correlating with old vs. new *tammurriata* practices) is particularly interesting. Further, his ethnographic fieldwork is sound and well-grounded. He is as at ease with academics, as he is sensitive to musicians, dancers, and little old ladies. Dialect texts are aptly chosen and accurately transcribed (although a more careful distinction between apostrophes and accents should have been made). The essay also treats the vexed question of academic vs. less mediated approaches to these musical forms and practices (i.e., rigid "codifiers" vs. more fluid grassroots practitioners; dogmatic Clerical exclusions vs. people's devotional preferences). But its greatest strength is getting inside the complex, personal meanings of the *tammurriata*—wherein Marx and the Madonna may unapologetically coexist in this "religion of the streets." It also shifts away from high/low, official/folk dichotomies, to focus instead on turf wars over means and spaces of participation.

We have witnessed a similar (sometimes politicized) musical scenario with the better known *pizzica-pizzica* (the music of *neo-tarantismo* or therapeutic spider dance ritual) in another Southern Italian region: Puglia. This music exploded on the global scene at the end of the 1990's, and has been helped along in our age of social media. One might expect the same for the *tammurriata* in time. Therefore, this essay will be vital to mapping these musical trajectories throughout the South and on the world stage. Read in conjunction with forthcoming volumes—Incoronata (Nadia) Inserra, *Reimagining the Italian South in Italy and the U.S.: The Transnational Circulation of Tarantella Folk Music and Dances*, University of Illinois Press (with a special focus on women; in English); and Goffredo Plastino and Franco Fabbri (eds.), *Il Folk Music Revival in Italia,* Il Saggiatore (in Italian)—it will be possible to gain an even more complete picture of this music's peregrinations and impact.

Self-Representation and the Construction of the Igbo World among Igbo Students in a Public University in Nigeria

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Abstract
Construction of a distinctive cultural identity in a heterogeneous community entails employing cultural symbols to portray a group's peculiarity. Within the university space in Nigeria, Igbo students re-enact the Igbo world through the employment of cultural symbols and ceremonials for the construction of an Igbo cultural identity. This study employs empirical evidence to explore how the Igbo world is re-enacted through ethnic identity construction within the territoriality of the university.[1] *By looking at how the local culture is translocalised in the university space, I explore the Igbo world in the context of this multi-ethnic, yet peculiar environment. The questions are: how do Igbo students in public universities in Nigeria (re)construct Igbo identity in the university space, using cultural forms, symbols, and ceremonials? In what forms do the conferred connect with the larger university community as a symbol of the "self" and the "collective," reflecting group distinctiveness and contributing to the sustenance of the Igbo world in the university environment? This study has implications on the sustenance of Igbo cultural identity in a globalising world.*

Key words: Igbo ethnic identity, cultural symbols and ceremonials, Igbo students, university space

Introduction

As an undergraduate student at Roseville University (pseudonym), Nigeria, between 1988 and 1992, I had the opportunity to serve as the treasurer of Anambra State Students' Association (1988–1989), and later as the Vice-President of the association (1989–1990). My position as an executive member of the association offered me an opportunity to understand, from the insider's perspective, the vision and workings of Igbo ethnic-based students' associations in higher education institutions (HEIs), and how they participate in ethnic identity construction. Although it has been almost two decades since I left the institution as a student, I rely on memories and ethnographic methods to explore how ethnic-based students' associations in the university recreate and re-enact group identity.

For the Igbo students at Roseville University, located in southwest Nigeria, the construction of *uwa Ndi*-Igbo (the Igbo world) is pertinent, bearing in mind that Roseville is situated in the southwest, far removed from the south-eastern region, the homeland of the Igbo. Roseville, like other universities in Africa, has been affected by dwindling government subventions to HEIs, which dates back to the 1980s following

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the economic depression that marked the period. During that same period of time, the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), as recommended by the World Bank, aimed at addressing the nation's economic challenges, never abated the problem of "brain drain" that affected academic staff enrollment in universities in Africa from the 1990s. Besides "intellectual flight," the presence of foreign students in the institution declined so rapidly that by the 2010-2011 session the number of foreign students at Roseville was 35 out of an approximate student population of 20,000, a consequence of the declining standard of our universities in recent decades. Indeed, Niyi Osundare, a scholar-poet, in his Valedictory Lecture, bemoans the situation in the Nigerian premier university and argues that it is losing its "universe" (Osundare 2005, 2). Notably, whatever the condition of the university in Nigeria as an institution of "ideological production" (Pereira 2007, 27) may be, Igbo students are part of the student population from numerous ethnic groups in the country studying at Roseville University. Much like students from many of these ethnic groups, Igbo students (re) create the Igbo world within the university space for various reasons ranging from cultural nostalgia to cultural identity construction.

Construction of a distinctive cultural identity in a heterogeneous community like the university entails employing cultural symbols to portray a group's peculiarity. Igbo students at Roseville University re-enact the Igbo world, using diverse cultural forms, ceremonials and symbols. This study employs empirical evidence to explore how the Igbo world is (re)produced within the territoriality of the university through this process. The translocalisation of the Igbo world is part of the processes through which "local contents" are incorporated into the "universality" in the University. The questions are: how do the Igbo students in public universities in Nigeria (re)construct *uwa Ndi-Igbo* (the Igbo world) in the university space, using cultural symbols and ceremonials? In what ways does this representation interact with the university's macro culture and contribute to the generation of "local contents" and translocalisation of the Igbo world in the university? In what forms do the conferred, in the case of the *igwe* (the traditional leader) of the Igbo students' association for instance, connect with the larger university community as a symbol of the "self" and the "collective," reflecting group distinctiveness and contributing to the sustenance of *uwa Ndi*-Igbo in the university community? In answering these questions, the study first identifies some of the cultural forms, ceremonials, and symbols associated with the Igbo people, and how the students employ them to construct the Igbo identity on campus; second, it explores how other student communities perceive Igbo students and their socio-cultural "architectures" on campus. Finally, the article explores the *igwe* as a symbol of the "self" and the "collective" in the university space. This article is a contribution to the current debate on the future of Igbo culture in the face of Westernisation and globalisation.

Various scholars of Igbo studies have expressed fears of threats to Igbo language and culture in contemporary times. Obviously, a look at reports emanating from both theoretically and empirically based research, and international organisations such as UNESCO, suggests that Igbo language and culture is at the risk of going into

extinction in the near future, if nothing is done to check the current trend (Ejiofo 2011). Nevertheless, we cannot overlook the dialectical processes that constitute part of the ingredients of globalisation in view of what Igbo people bring to the market place of ideas and cultures in the process of the construction of their identity as exemplified in different places and spaces where the Igbo world is being (re)created. No matter how negligible these contributions may seem, we cannot but appreciate such "marginal" contributions made at micro levels to promote Igbo culture. I contend that while Igbo culture is obviously threatened, there are spaces beyond Igbo land where Igbo cultural values and identities are being (re)enacted. In the university space, and outside of it, both within Nigeria and in the diaspora, translocalisation of the Igbo lifeways contributes to the sustenance of the Igbo traditions and values. An Igbo cultural renaissance can and does emanate from spaces beyond Igbo land. Further, I argue that the translocalisation of Igbo culture at the university space deconstructs the universality that characterises the University, a key instrument of Westernisation; that peculiarity marks out the "University" as a distinct entity. The presence of the "local" in the University, however, is a manifestation of the utilisation of freedom, which is one of the main ideologies of the University. Yet the reality of mixture of varieties as exemplified in the Igbo language spoken by students-participants in this study is a challenge to the achievement of an authentic Igbo cultural identity reconstruction in a globalising world.

Review of Literature

Research on ethnic-based organisations is not a novel thing in the fields of anthropology and sociology. Associational life remains an adaptive mechanism in indigenous African societies. In a study of ethnic-based organisations in the northern city of Kano, Nigeria, Eghosa Osaghae, a political scientist, in his work, *Trends in Migrant Political Organizations in Nigeria: The Igbo in Kano* (1994), argues that both the Igbo and the Yoruba in northern city of Kano, Nigeria, developed "supra-ethnic associations," with institutionalisation of kingship known as *eze Ndi*-Igbo ("king" of the Igbo people) and *Oba* among the Igbo and Yoruba peoples respectively, which, according to him, is meant to create "home away from home" and provide an avenue for the children born outside their parents' ethnic homeland to be acculturated into the culture of their parents. In the article "Power of Space, Space of Power: The Socio-Cultural Dynamics in the Institutionalization of *Eze*ship in Non-Igbo States in Nigeria," Ukpokolo (2012a) argues that the institutionalisation of *eze*ship in non-Igbo states in Nigeria has engendered socio-cultural complexities both at the home town and the non-Igbo states where "supra-ethnic associations" and kingship institutions have developed, as space in both places have become contested arenas, a consequence of transgression of boundaries. In any case, in "Hometown Associations as a Means of Governance in Nigeria," Honey and Okafor (1998) contend that hometown associations in urban Nigeria are of importance in the development of corresponding home communities.

The university is increasingly attracting attention in discussions on socio-political and economic development of nations, as well as issues about a people and their world,

which significantly borders on ethnic identity. In higher education institutions (HEIs), students belong to multiple groups, some of which are compulsory while others are optional (see *Fig. 1*). For instance, membership of departmental/faculty associations is compulsory whereas it is optional for religious groups, social clubs, ethnic-based organisations and similar cases. Group membership contributes to the development of collegiate students. In a study titled "Bridging Gaps, Creating Spaces: University of Ibadan Female Undergraduate Students in Intercultural Encounter," Ukpokolo (2012b) notes that the undergraduates in HEIs need psycho-social support and they obtain this from peers in the informal circles where they interact through the process of informal mentoring. Similarly, John A. Axelson, a professor of counselling, in his book, *Counselling and Development in a Multicultural Society* (1995), contends that different group activities that the students are involved in give them a sense of security and belonging and help in the fulfilment of human gregariousness.

Students in HEIs often encounter diverse challenges in their attempt to be integrated into the culture of their institution. The gap created by the cultural differences between their home culture and the culture of their university is bridged by various means, including associational life. In the article, "Ethnic Communities within the University: An Examination of Factors Influencing the Personal Adjustment of International Students" (1998), Al-Sharideh and Goe contend that in the United States participation in ethnic organisations helps international students to develop strong ties with the co-culturals, providing a soft-landing for them and a space to learn how to cope with the challenges of their new environment. Commenting on international students and transitional challenges in the United States, the sociologist John A. Arthur, in *Invisible Sojourner: African Immigrant Diaspora in the United States* (2000), argues that for the international students in the United States, ethnic associations help to adapt to the new environment by enabling them to bond with members of their ethnic group and overcome the initial challenges encountered in the institution of higher learning. Ethnic-based associations in HEIs, however, have diverse goals besides assisting in cultural adaptation of members. For instance, in the article, "A Search for Post-Apartheid Collective Identities: Ethnic Students' Organisations at a South African University" (2008), Dinga Sikwebu observes that ethnic-based associations in Wit University, South Africa, function as instrument of identity construction in post-apartheid South Africa.



Figure 1: *Students' Multiple Group Membership* (Source: Ukpokolo 2012b, 75).

The focus of this paper is to examine how Igbo students at Roseville University engage in the (re)production of *uwa Ndi*-Igbo (the Igbo world), using cultural symbols and ceremonials. Studying Igbo students does not imply that the Igbo people are a homogenous group. I am aware of the heterogeneity that characterises Igbo culture as exemplified in diverse Igbo culture areas in Nigeria, despite the obvious "cultural universals" that mark the people's lifeways. Further clarifications on these are made later in this article.

Context and Methods

This research employed semi-structured interviews, key informant interview, focus group discussions, participant observation, and life history as data gathering techniques. An ethnographic approach is the most appropriate for research of this nature as it offers the researcher in-roads into the students' understanding of what they do. Besides, I have also integrated my personal experiences as a former executive member of National Union of Anambra State Students (NUASS) to validate the data generated through other methods. A total of 25 participants were involved in this study, comprising of four executive members of the association, namely the President, the Social Officer, the former *igwe* (traditional ruler) of the National Union of Anambra Students' Association (NUASS), and the current one (at the time of research), and other informants randomly selected. In selecting the participants, male and female students were included in the sample to create a gender balance. A total of two focus group discussions were also carried out comprising five students in each session. Six non-Igbo students were also interviewed in order to ascertain their perception of Igbo students' construction of their identity in the university.

As a researcher-participant, I have consciously built on and integrated my knowledge of the subject providing insights as an "insider" as suggested by a feminist scholar, Lesley Shackleton in Shackleton (2007) in "Lost in Liberalism: A Case Study of the Disappearance of Gender Agenda at a South African University." I am aware of the "insider-outsider" debate in qualitative research, which focuses on whether the inside-researcher can give objective assessment of research subjects as she/he is an integral part of the researched issue, a major position in positivist school of thought. This study leans on the conclusion drawn by Christina Chavez, a qualitative researcher, who finds that "insiders can understand the cognitive, emotional, and/or psychological disposition of participants as well as possess more profound knowledge of the historical and practical happenings of the field" (Chavez 2008, 27). As an Igbo by birth and a former executive member of NUASS, not only am I acquainted with my research field, I also possess insider's knowledge of my research subject and field. My positionality, therefore, offers me a good ground to grapple with the subject matter of my research, integrating my experience into it. This study is not just about uncovering reality, using an emic approach, but also about discovering, creating and documenting textuality that emerges in inter-subjective encounters. In studying the Igbo students, I have gone beyond what they do by engaging in discursiveness that emerged as the product of our engagements. Interpretive analysis, which is associated with

anthropologists like Clifford Geertz (see Geertz 1973), offers insights in the analysis of the data collected. This study was conducted both in English and Igbo languages. The informant had the choice of responding to questions in whichever language she/he chose. Where the informant chose Igbo language, translation has been included in the data presentation and analysis. One conspicuous point emerging from this study is that most of the informants mix Igbo and English languages, a case of code switching and code mixing—a common problem among Igbo language speakers. This phenomenon, too, is explored in this article. Of course, the problems associated with translations such as lack of equivalent words or even at times meaning, were also encountered in an attempt to translate from Source Language (SL) to Target Language (TL). Rather than word-to-word translation, I opted for equivalent meaning, inserting words where necessary to generate the near-accurate translations and meanings. The fieldwork for this article was carried out between 2010 and 2011.

Igbo Students' Associations at Roseville University

The university, referred to as *mahadum* in Igbo language, meaning "know it all" and, by implication, "a place where one learns all things," remains a subject of discussions in higher education scholarship. In Africa, scholars focus on the university as a place of "ideological production" (Pereira 2007, 27), "a critical component of development and development discourse" (Lawuyi and Ukpokolo 2012, 2), and a place and space for "identity construction" (Sikwebu 2008, 107), among other issues. Basically, the university is established to produce knowledge for societal advancement. Also important is the cultural production that takes place in the university space. Indeed, students are key stakeholders in the enterprise of knowledge production and key participants in cultural (re)production in the university, particularly through the multifaceted students' associations to which they belong.

At Roseville, there are 146 students' associations cutting across academic and religious bodies, social movements, social clubs, and ethnic-based organisations. Igbo students' associations are part of the different ethnic-based associations in the institution. There are five major Igbo students' groups representing five Igbo states in southeast Nigeria. These are Anambra State Students Association (NUASS), National Association of Abia State Students (NASS), Federation of Ebonyi State Students (FESS), National Council of Enugu State Students (NACESS), and National Association of Imo State Students (NAISS). These associations have common visions and missions that are reflected in their membership, administration, and annual activities. Four categories of Igbo students at Roseville were identified:

(i) Students that come from Igbo land and are conversant with Igbo traditions and values. Most students in this category show interest in Igbo students' associations and easily rise to leadership positions in the association as a result of their knowledge of Igbo culture.
(ii) Those born outside Igbo land with some knowledge of Igbo culture by virtue of their frequent visits to Igbo land. Some students in this category

may join Igbo students' associations while others may not. Those that join are easily co-opted to function in diverse capacities, such as membership of organising committees of programmes of the association.

(iii) Those born outside Igbo land who lack the knowledge of Igbo language, traditions, and customs due to the socialisation they have received. Most of the Igbo students in this category hardly show interest in the activities of Igbo students' associations, and subsequently remain disconnected from the home culture. For those that are eager to learn, the ethnic-based association provides the platform for a (re)connection with the in-group and gives them the feeling of "being there though not there."

(iv) Those who do not associate with the Igbo students' associations based on personal reasons comprising lack of time, involvement in the larger students' union leadership and/or students' fellowships on campus, and lack of interest.

Participating in the life of the association helps the students in satisfying the cultural yearnings emanating from their diasporic identity. They are able to interact closely with those who speak the same language, share the same cultural values and help in their adaptation processes by providing a safety net in the difficulties they encounter in their new environment. This agrees with the position of Al-Sharideh and Goe on international students in American HEIs when they hint that:

> The network ties established within an ethnic community can be utilized by international students as a means of coping with and resolving problems that emerge during the course of their studies, thereby facilitating the adjustment process (Al-Sharideh and Goe 1998, 700).

Al-Sharideh and Goe, however, argue that for the international students in American universities, the more attachment they have with their ethnic communities, the more the distance between them and assimilation into American mainstream culture. The current study, however, has not verified this hypothesis within the context of the Nigerian society. Undoubtedly, as Sikwebu rightly notes, "[I]n unfamiliar and uncertain places, individuals use spaces such as communities, ethnic groups or bodies as insurance against displacement and to make meaning of their new conditions." While the university environment in Nigeria may not be classified as an "unfair environment," for the new entrants, it is, indeed, characterised by "uncertainty" (2008, 114).

The word "Igbo," according to Uchendu (1965), is used in three senses: the Igbo homeland/territory; the native speakers of the language, and as a language group. Forde and Jones (1950) identify five sub-cultures of the Igbo ethnic group, *vis-a-vis*: Northern or Onitsha Igbo; Southern or Owerri Igbo; Eastern or Cross River Igbo; North-eastern Igbo; and Western Igbo (part of the Igbo land in Delta State, Nigeria), with each sub-culture exhibiting certain cultural peculiarities. The Cross River Igbo, for instance, Forde and Jones note, are assumed to have adopted their double

descent system from their Ibibio neighbours, while the western Igbo are believed to have adopted the strong kingship/chiefdom system from their Benin (in Edo State) neighbours. The scholars, however, observe that all Igbo sub-cultures share certain cultural similarities, which include the Igbo language, white chalk culture,[2] strong socio-political institutions and cultural practices such as age grade system, *umunna* (patrilineage) grouping, masquerade institution, kolanut rituals, the vigour of Igbo music and dance movements, Igbo cuisines, dressing, sophisticated arts designs such as *uli* (delicate body painting), pottery designs, among other cultural practices. The River Niger divided the Igbo land into two unequal parts—the eastern Igbo (east of the River Niger), and the western Igbo (west of the River Niger), with the larger portion to the east. The Igbo land and culture referred to in this article is the Igbo east of the Niger and their culture.

Through the activities of the Igbo students' associations at Roseville University, the Igbo culture is translocalised, bringing the "local" into the "universal," the University. Dissecting "university" as a concept, Niyi Osundare posits that "uni" indicates "its oneness, its wholeness, its indivisibility, its essential integrity...a oneness derived from a whole, a macrocosm condensed into a microcosm." "Uni" represents "its intellectual concentratedness, its singleness of purpose in the pursuit of knowledge, learning, and wisdom, and the science of being and becoming, its insistence on the indivisibility of the integrity of intellect and knowledge" (Osundrae 2005, 8). The second dimension of the concept "university," he maintains, is its "universus," which "highlights the dynamic process by which that wholeness is achieved...the universality of its import.... For a university in name and in truth, is a curious and complex mix of the one and the all, the unique and the universal." "[I]ts 'universality' transform the university and makes it 'a compost of thought and garden of ideas'" (Osundare 2005, 9). Such a "garden of ideas" welcomes all and excludes none, except that which destroys when convincingly proved to be so. Invariably, students' multiple groups constitute part of those multiplicities of categories that contribute to the "universal" in the university. While the "uni" is the hallmark of the "University," the diversity of "cultural voices" in the university space is a deconstructionist instrument achieved through translocalisation processes, of which ethnic-based associations represent a category. This is achieved through cultural (re)productions in the university environment.

Ethnic associations such as the Igbo students' associations perform various functions such as instrument of acculturation. According Ositadinma, an informant and a member of NUASS:

> When we come together, we teach our fellow students the things we do; the way we dress …, the way we greet. Igbo people have the way we greet (Ositadinma 2011).

Igbo cultural norms, as the informant highlighted above, are represented in such cultural forms as mode of dressing, greetings, language, symbols, and ceremonials. These will be further explored in the subsequent sections in this article.

Constructing Collective Identity through Cultural Symbols and Ceremonials

A human group constructs ethnic identity in the ways and means the people represent themselves, and are perceived by non-group members. This construct is evident when both the material and non-material aspects of a people's culture are employed to the group's advantage and subsequently establish ethnic boundaries. According to Nagel (1994, 153), ethnic boundaries are not static, for "the location and meaning of particular ethnic boundaries are continuously negotiated, revised, and revitalized, both by ethnic group members themselves as well as by outside observers." Ethnic-based identity not only reflects shared values and locality but also demonstrates an acknowledgement of that difference by non-group members, using cultural identification. Lamont and Molnar (2002, 168) identify two types of boundaries existing in intra- and inter-group interactions, which, according to them, are symbolic boundaries and social boundaries. They contend:

> Symbolic boundaries are conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space. They are tools by which individuals and groups struggle over and come to agree upon definitions of reality (Lamont and Molnar 2002, 168).

The significance of "symbolic boundaries" is that it allows people to capture the "dynamic dimensions of social relations, as groups compete in the production, diffusion, and institutionalization of alternative systems, and principles of classifications" (Lamont and Molnar 2002, 168). Besides, Lamont and Molnar further argue, symbolic boundaries tend to "separate people into groups and generate feelings of similarity and group membership system" (Lamont and Molnar 2002, 168). Often times, symbolic boundaries also function as instruments through which individuals or groups can acquire status and monopolise resources (Epstein 1992, 232) within and outside the group. This exclusivist tendency marginalises non-group members, not because they do not desire to occupy the centre space as active participants but, because of their lack of cultural capital in the form of "shared understanding;" their marginality is reinforced. Such cultural capital is symbolic and constitutes the resources necessary to navigate space within and between the constructed boundaries. The result is the establishment of social boundaries. Essentially, elements of social boundaries, Lamont and Molnar (2002, 168) hint, are "objectified forms of social difference manifested in equal access to and unequal distribution of resources (material and non-material) and social opportunities," which are also revealed in constant behavioural patterns of association.

Ethnic-based associations employ symbols to construct social boundaries, and concretise the groups' position in the social space. Those associations use those same symbols to place the "Other" on the periphery, that is, those who do not share a people's ethnic identity. For the "Other," the only option is an acknowledgement and recognition of that difference. At the heart of this social dynamic and negotiation are identity politics, which are inevitable when individuals or groups engage in identity construction. Obviously, ethnic boundaries establish "patterns of social interaction

that give rise to, and subsequently reinforce, in-group members' self-identification and outsiders' confirmation of group distinctions" (Sanders 2002, 327). The university environment provides a platform for the youth as social actors to engage in cultural (re)production through various cultural activities, which the students initiate. Igbo students recreate the Igbo world on the campus, give "life" to it, dissolving place and distance in the process. But the concept of "place" is embedded in meanings too, depending on how the "constructor" interprets it. For the students, as they engage in the expression of their identity at the university, this arena becomes "the homeland." Locale loses its strangeness and its polysemic nature is re-affirmed through its continual shift in identity—from a classroom, a hall, for instance, to "Igbo land," to "village square." Thus, Massey affirms:

> Place is a product of social relations and expressions of identity, as well as a node in a larger network of other places. The 'local' is linked to other locales through social relations, an important aspect in the formation of translocalities (Massey 1994 quoted in Tan and Yeoh 2011, 41).

The university is a locale of encounter with those who are different from us, providing equally a spatial context where we encounter co-culturals, necessitating self-definition. Igbo students' "Week at Roseville" provides an opportunity for the Igbo students to (re)create Igbo cultural identity through the (re)production of the Igbo world in diverse ways such as dressing, language, symbolic invocations, and cultural ceremonials.

Igbo Students' Cultural Week

Annually, Igbo students hold Igbo Cultural Week which is presently marked at the state association level, implying that each of the Igbo groups is a symbol of the whole. Several activities are slated for the one-week celebration, climaxed with "Cultural Day." To enhance Igbo visibility on campus, elements of Igbo culture are re-enacted. For NUASS members in particular, the eve of their week begins with a masquerade performance. According to Ikechukwu, a former president of NUASS:

> *Mmanwu je aga na* different halls of residence. *Ewere ogene gagharia na* campus *ka ndi mmadu mata na* Igbo Week ga *ebido* (A masquerade will go around different halls of residence. A gong is used to make announcements around the campus so that the people will know that Igbo Week will commence) (Ikechukwu 2011).

A masquerade performance in Igbo culture is an invocation of the ancestors, and reflects the people's belief in the duality of human existence, and the interactions between the physical and the spiritual realms. Through this cultural re-enactment, Igbo students, though Christians, connect to their ancestral root, a practice that captures their "hybridity" (Bhabha 1994). In Igbo land, the masquerade performs multiple functions, including instrumentation of security, peace-making, and entertainment. For the students, however, it is solely for entertainment. Igbo Cultural Day is marked with *akuko uwa* (news), *ilu* (proverbs) competition, *gwam-gwam-gwam* (riddles), (*egwu*

omenana Ndi-Igbo) Igbo cultural dance, and functions as a platform for the promotion of Igbo dressing, and cuisines such as *ofe onugbu* (bitter leaf soup), which the female students prepare. Costumes and dresses are maximally employed to create Igbo presence on campus. Notably, scholars like Abner Cohen contend that dressing is a technique employed by the elite to elicit the dialectical relationship between the individual and the collective. According to him, "Dress, music, poetry, dance, commensality, and rhetoric are all techniques that play crucial part in the process of sociocultural causation" (Cohen 1981, 207).

Dressing is an instrument of identity creation and distinguishing between and amongst individuals. All cultures of the world have conventional mode of dressing for men and women, and these are reflected in clothing, skin markings, beads, body decorations such as *uli* motif (among the Igbo) or hairstyles. In the ancient Benin Kingdom, complete or partial nudity represented formal dressing, hierarchy in the kingship system, palace community, and texture of socio-cultural occasions. In contemporary times, though, complete nudity no longer exists; the latter remains part of the aesthetics of beauty of apparel in Benin kingdom (Nevadmsky and Airihenbuwa 2007; Edo 2007). Igbo people have an elaborate dress tradition. A man wears a long gown under a pair of trousers or a wrapper, a red cap with a feather, and beads for the wrist and neck, while a woman dresses in a pair of wrappers with matching blouse and head gear. Beads and earrings are worn on the neck and ears respectively to accentuate beauty. Although some of these clothes are made to individual specifications, they often fall within the culturally-acceptable styles for men and women. Thus, suede materials with *isiagu* (lion's head) design are men's clothing material while both men and women use George and hollandaise materials for wrappers. For the Igbo students at Roseville, the wearing of cultural attire to Igbo students' association meetings and for the Igbo Cultural Day event accentuates the authentic Igbo identity.

The Cultural Day activities, which mark the end of Igbo Week, are the peak of the celebration, an occasion for the re-enactment of the collective but distinctive identity of the Igbo people, and connecting the Igbo students to the larger university community as well. Such activities engender commonality among disparate Igbo groups and establish a form of cultural markers for their identification and self-definition. *Oji* (Kola nut), which is a symbol of life, peace, and hospitality in Igbo culture, is employed in ritual performance of *igo oji* (kola nut rituals/prayers). Ikenna, the *Igwe* of Anambra State Students' Association in the 2010/2011 academic session, demonstrates a typical example of how *igo ofo* using *oji* is performed:

N*na, umu ndi-Igbo agbako go,*	Father [Supreme Being], Igbo children have gathered
Were si ka M kene gi ekene.	and said I should thank you.
Ihe anyi na ekpe na ekpele,	What we ask in prayer is,
anyi na ago na ofo bu	what we supplicate with *ofo* is
ihe ga agara anyi were were.	that things will be easy for us
(*Ndi mmadu azaa, "iseeee"*)	(The people respond: *iseee*, meaning "So be it")
Asi na umu anyi ndi na-agu akwukwo,	We say, our children that are schooling

ha ga enwe uburu akwukwo.	shall be intelligent.
O buru na ha gusia akwukwo	When they complete their education,
ha ga enweta ezigbo olu.	they will get good jobs.
(*Ndi mmadu azaa "iseeeeeee"*)	(The people respond: "So be it")
Ndi umu agborobia ndi ga anu di	The ladies that wish to marry will get good
enweta ezigbo di.	husbands.
Ka oje abu ebe obuna ha no, ana asi	So that wherever they are, people will say
"Ndi a bu umu Igbo. Ha na-eme ofuma."	"These are Igbo people. They are doing well."
*I*seeeee	So be it ooooo!

(Ikenna 2011, translation mine).

To perform the *oji* ritual, the "elder" who leads the prayer, shows the presented bowl of kolanut to all present, and then picks one with his right hand and extends the hand towards the audience while saying the above prayers. *Oji* ritual performance is a solemn occasion that demands the attention and concentration of all present. Besides the "elder" who leads the prayers, all present at the event are active participants, and respond: "*Iseee! Iseee*!" In such ritual performances, the fusion of the temporal and the spiritual is affirmed through the invocation of the Supreme Being and the Earth goddess to come and participate in the activities of the living and bless the students. The significance of such performance is insinuated in Ukpokolo (2011):

> The kolanut, as a symbol of life and peace, is a revitalising agent, using the agency of the public meeting to reinvigorate interest in, and concern for social order. For the order to prevail, roles are properly distributed, and performances are well monitored. It is equally important that collective goals are kept in focus, both for the purpose of ensuring that divided loyalty does not arise, and a meaningful, directional development is pursued (173).

Thus, while the "elder" performs the kolanut ritual, the audience actively monitors and responds appropriately, for the ritual is incomplete without such harmony.

Although each Igbo student group operates independently, self-definition engenders a group's pride in what they are and represent, as contained in such songs as:

Anyi ma kwa ndi bu ndi ma oluooo.	We know who is who, when the time comes.
Anyi ma kwa ndi bu ndi ma oluooo.	We know who is who, when the time comes.
Anyi ma kwa ndi bu ndi ma oluooo.	We know who is who, when the time comes.
Anambra State *so kwa na ndi bu ndi*	Anambra State is part of who is who
ma oluuuoooo n'obodooooo.	when the time comes in the community ooooooo!

(Ikenna 2011)

A group's emphasis on their superiority does not in any way infer competition with other Igbo groups. The emphasis is on their belief that, among the community of students on campus, Igbo students present a strong presence. Of particular importance is the atmosphere conjured when such songs rend the air; a cultural practice termed *ima mbem* (a form of acrobatic display) among the Igbo people is initiated. Ogenna, the Social Officer, describes it thusly:

> When we sing this type of song, another person will run here and there and begin to attempt to do what ordinarily is impossible. He may attempt to climb a tree, to push down a tree, a house, while someone tries to hold him back. As we do this, others watch us and wonder what is happening. People will hold him so that he does not injure himself (Ogenna 2011).

At that moment, laughing, shouting, cheering and clapping from the audience fills the atmosphere, while some Igbo students scream "*Jide ya! Jide ya! O je ebebi ife! O je emebi ife! O je emeru aru!*" This means, "Hold him! Hold him! He will destroy things! He will destroy things! He will injure himself!" Attempts are made by some other participants to grab the performer. Igbo people believe that at the moment of *mbem* performance, the spirit of the ancestors takes hold of the performer and imbues him with supernatural powers which his mortal body cannot contain, forcing him to engage in extra-ordinary activities. At that moment, humans must assist the performer to act within acceptable parameters in the physical world. The Igbo people's belief in the duality of human existence as well as the close interactions between the physical and the spiritual worlds as contained in their worldview is brought to bear in such situations, and influences their actions and inactions—thoughts, feelings, perceptions, convictions and reactions. Indeed, such moments reflect their identity and uniqueness as people as captured in their worldview, a concept that Rapport and Overing (2000) rightly note,

> [R]epresents fundamental conceptions of the world, conceptions which ramify into all other thoughts and feelings about the world, and conceptions which directly influence how people behave in the world. Furthermore, worldview is used to point up critical differences between groups of people …based on how they see the world (395).

In Igbo land, while the performer may climb a palm tree and destroy palm fronds, he is held back when he tries to pull down the branches of mango and pear trees or push down a building! Within the university community, although "cultural outsiders" wonder what these "extra-ordinary" displays mean, they identify and define such performances as the Igbo people's "way of doing things." To further demonstrate how *uwa ndi*-Igbo is re-enacted, Chinenye, a NUASS member, affirms,

> *Ana agba egwu omenana nke ana ama akwa were agba. Na atu ilu, na esikwa nri ndi* Igbo *nke iribeghi* since *ijiri lota na ulo akwukwo* (We dance traditional dances which are normally danced tying wrappers. Proverbs are used in speech. We also cook Igbo food such as

> the type you've never eaten since you returned to school) (Chinenye 2011).

Cultural reproduction processes that take place within the period of Igbo Week, and other avenues of showcasing Igbo customs and traditions at the university environment further demonstrate the students' efforts at making their presence felt, as their colleagues connect to the Igbo world inherent in the south-eastern region of the country. Connectivity is established, as the distance between the two places—Igbo land and the university's peculiar environment—is bridged and melted, both for the Igbo students and the observers, dissolving place and space within an intangible moment. In such a situation, as Tan and Yeoh contend,

> Locality is...(re)produced in a stream of social activities which occur in place. Conversely, material expressions of place provide the medium for the reproduction of the local. Hence the local is (re)produced through social actions and practices and also expressed in the form of material objects and artefacts in place (Tan & Yeoh 2011, 50).

Processes of translocalisation manifest in various social and cultural activities and contribute to satisfying the yearnings of nostalgia experienced by those separated from the sounds and rhythms of their local communities. Here, the students identify themselves as belonging to and coming from one "community," Igbo community, spurring in them self-consciousness, engendered in and by what they do. Yet, such a communion can only be "imagined." As Anderson (1983) notes of this form of self-identification, "all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined," and concludes, "Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined" (Anderson 1983, 49). Such "imagining" emanates from and gains meanings in the very "styles," the cultural "architectures," constructed by the students through the instrumentality of the cultural artefacts in the Igbo world utilised in the definition of the "self" and the "collective." Thus, sounds from *ekwe* (wooden gong), *udu* (clay pot drum), the *ogene* (gongs), and *oja* (flute) and clapping of hands and stamping of feet are harmonised in rhythms beyond linguistic expression, invoking meanings and realities, which only the "initiated" understand. Reproduction of locality ensures that the Igbo people's lived life, separated by physical distance and symbolically by the quest for Western education at Roseville and the values and ideologies that Western education represents, can be (re)created and (re)enacted by means of cultural (re) production processes.

Constructing the "self": The "Igwe" as a Cultural Symbol

Symbolic objects are instruments of group identity construction. Every symbolic object in a culture conveys meanings, which the creators of the symbol, make of it (Ukpokolo 2011). For the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, cultural symbols give meaning to existence by providing a "model of" the world as it is and a "model for" the world as it ought to be (Geertz 1973, 93). Similarly, Edmund Leach in *Culture and Communication: The Logic by which Symbols are Connected* contends that symbols, either verbal or non-

verbal, distinguishes one class of things or actions from another, helping us to create artificial boundaries in a field that is naturally continuous (Leach 1976, 331). Symbolism is manipulated by different peoples in different human societies and cultures to make statements on who they are, what they do and the meanings they hold concerning those things that matter to them, thereby helping people to distinguish between "us" and "them", and indicates the difference within a group. At Roseville, Igbo students explore cultural symbols to construct Igbo identity. In recent years, the conferment of "traditional leader" has become one of the ways of translocalising the cultural patterns of the Igbo people and as a way of expressing their uniqueness. The *igwe* is the Igbo students' "traditional leader" and is addressed as "His Royal Highness." According to Ikenna,

> The *igwe* must be versed in Igbo culture; be able to answer questions on Igbo culture. Igbo elders from town are invited to crown the students' traditional leader….After the conferment, the new *igwe* chooses his cabinet members who will also be screened to ascertain the extent to which they are grounded in Igbo culture (Ikenna 2011).

For the Igbo students, the "institutionalisation" of *igwe*ship is one of the ways of defining their cultural peculiarity. The *igwe* is a symbol of the collective identity, and clothes are manipulated to maximise an effect, "to define or camouflage identity" (Cohen 1981, 210–211). Ikenna hints,

> Each time we hold a meeting, the *igwe* puts on his traditional attire—*isiagu* robe. He puts on beads; he puts on a red cap and he equally has *lolo* [the 'wife' of *igwe*]. The *lolo* will dress the way it is done in the traditional setting...a woman puts on *omuma na ntukwasi*—a blouse and two wrappers (Ikenna 2011).

Igwe literally means "the sky" or "the heavens," but in the context of traditional leadership in Igbo land, *igwe* stands for "power," "awe," or "reverence" and is one of the appellations ascribed to traditional leaders in Igbo land. The *igwe*, by virtue of the position he occupies and his regalia, is a symbol, a representation of sorts. He conjures meanings that reflect his people's perception of reality. Clifford Geertz captures this reality in his analysis of sacred symbols:

> Sacred symbols function to synthesize a people's ethos – the tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood—and their world view—the picture they have of the way things in sheer actuality are, their most comprehensive ideas of order (Geertz 1973, 89).

The reality, encapsulated in what the *igwe* represents. is embedded in symbolic action. According to Cohen, this action involves "the totality of the self and not a segment of it," the selfhood realised through frequent participation by those who share this worldview in "patterns of symbolic activity" (Cohen 1981, 210–211). The *igwe* is greeted with the appellation, "*igweeeeee*," whenever he speaks in meetings or when

encountered on campus by the members of the Igbo students' association, and he responds by waving his right hand as a sign of acknowledgement.

The *igwe* represents the peculiarity and difference that creates boundaries both within the group and outside of it. As a symbol of his people's cultural values, the students' *igwe* fills a distinctive cultural gap created by the difference between the home culture and the culture of the students' new environment. He represents what his people believe to be ideal—beauty, glamour, aesthetic, and the symbolism necessary to create group identity. For the Igbo students, the *igwe* is a cultural custodian by virtue of the knowledge he possesses of how things "ought to be" among his people. The role of the *igwe* runs parallel to the role of the president of the Igbo students' ethnic association. While the president's duty is to relate with the university authorities as a political leader, the *igwe*, the people believe, is a traditional ruler, a father, a custodian of the customs and traditions of the Igbo people among his fellow students. Although the *igwe* does not enjoy official recognition from the university authorities (as he is not presented as one of the executive members of the association), to his group, he functions as the nexus that connects people and their home values and, thus, enjoys both political and socio-cultural recognition within that group; in the social arena he enjoys the recognition of students from disparate Igbo ethnic groups on campus. His position and status have implications on the Igbo identity more than that of the president of the association. For instance, it is mandatory for the *igwe* to reflect this cultural identity whenever he attends Igbo students' meetings by appearing in his full regalia, and on daily basis, puts on a bangle made of beads on his wrist, a symbol of his royalty. The existence of the two parallel structures is a replication of what obtains at the hometown community where town union leadership exists parallel to the traditional leadership.

The *igwe*'s symbolism is further reflected in diverse ways he constructs and reconstructs his identity. For instance, the attire takes on meanings beyond mere clothing to become a cultural marker, an identity marker, conjuring and transforming meanings that are beyond mere fashion. But, of what significance is an *igwe* in the university community? According to Chukwudi, the first Igwe of NUASS:

> *Eeeee… Mgbe M no na* school, *a bu M igwe ndi* Anambra State students by extension *igwe ndi Igbo [na* Roseville] because only Anambra State students had *igwe* then. So, *a na eme ihe na* town, *ana M eje* represent*ie* the whole of Igbo students *no* [*na* Roseville], that is between 2007/2008 and 2009/2010 (*Eeeeee…* When I was in school, I was the *igwe* of Anambra State students and by extension, the *igwe* of the Igbo students [in Roseville] because only the Anambra State students had *igwe* then. So wherever there was any occasion in town, I represented the whole of Igbo students [in Roseville], that is between 2007/2008 and 2009/2010) (Chukwudi 2011).

For the people, the wearing of "long red cap and a feather" is one of the major things that sets the *igwe* or any "chief" apart. According to Ikenna,

> There is no place in Igbo land that a chief will not put on a red cap and feather, and those

> things signify some things. So when we are talking about bringing the Igbo world into the university, we try to inculcate those cultural values into our fellow students who do not have the opportunity of seeing these in Igbo land (Ikenna, September, 2011).

He acknowledges that Igbo culture is under threat. According to him, "Igbo people don't seem to regard their culture or see it as anything, and are taking to contemporary ways of doing things, which is a problem" (Ikenna 2011). To the students, this situation is a challenge they must confront through the recreation of Igbo ethnic identity, not just for the sake of cultural nostalgia but also for self-preservation and the prevention of cultural homogenisation.

...connecting with others

Connecting with the larger students' community raises the question of how the Igbo group's constructed identity is interpreted in inter-cultural encounters, that is, how "cultural outsiders" respond to what the Igbo students claim they are. According to the former *igwe*, Chukwudi, the Igbo students' group has affected the university community, particularly in the way students from other ethnic groups respond to what the Igbo students do and represent. He recounted his experience thus:

> When I was the *igwe* of Anambra State students, whenever I came out with Igbo attire, other students will be hailing me "*igweeeee*." Others will say, "I want to snap picture with you. I want to snap picture with you." When I attended dinner party organised by any faculty or association of between 500 and 1,000 students, I was always given an award: "The best dressed person here is *igwe*," because I wore the Igbo attire. At the end of the day, the best dressed person is *igwe* (Chukwudi 2011).

Other areas that informants claim that Igbo cultural visibility has connected with non-Igbo students include the cultural practice known as *ina ito* (a form of Igbo greeting amongst men, which involves the hitting of the back of one's hand against another person's three times). Ikechukwu (former president of NUASS) notes that whenever *ina ito* is going on,

> *Osokwa ya buru onye na eme ngafe, O je akwuru, kwuo* something. *Oge ufodu ha fu ebe gi na ndi chiri echichi na ana ito, ha eweta aka ha. I si, "Mba, I chighi echichi." O na ewute ha. Ha asi, "Kee kwanu ihe ha ga eme." Asi M ha, "Uwa ozo ha ga aputa ha buru onye Igbo." Ha achia ochi jewara* (Even if the person is a passer-by, he/she will stand and utter something. At times, when they see when you and a titled person are performing *ina ito* [greeting in a traditional Igbo way], they will bring their hands to participate. You will say "No, you are not a titled man." This hurts them. They will ask "What will I do to qualify." I will say to them, "In your next world, try and be an Igbo person." They will laugh and go away) (Ikechukwu 2011).

He concludes that non-Igbo students admire the way the Igbo people "do things. They like the way we dress. They want to have our native attire."

The acceptability of Igbo clothing, admiration of other aspects of the culture such

as *ina ito*, and the utter display of shock and admiration at the *ima mbem* performance, as the informants note, indicate the acknowledgement of the aesthetics, creativity, and richness of Igbo traditions and culture. Igbo students at Roseville demonstrate their eagerness to preserve their culture in the face of globalisation and the diverse cultural contestations that confront the contemporary young people in Africa. Igbo ethnic construct at Roseville establishes the group's cultural legitimacy among the students' community. By excluding the cultural outsiders through Igbo culture-bound social actions, the students set cultural boundaries. Similarly, social status such as *igwe*ship enhances the capacity of the privileged to establish his hegemony among his people. The *igwe* as a socio-political and cultural ascription in the Igbo world raises the status of the conferred. In intra- and inter-group social dynamics, there is a dialectical relationship where members of a group identify with what they do as part of their "being," the cultural outsiders acknowledge this difference, accept it, and participate in re-establishing ethnic boundaries. In this interface of "being" and "not being," the university remains a citadel of learning, of ideas, of exploration, and of discovery. And, in the words of Niyi Osundare, the university is marked by "its inclusiveness, its diversity, its wholeness and comprehensiveness, the interconnectedness...Its mission is the pursuit—and practice—of freedom, genuine freedom, the liberty to think and feel, dream and care, roam and range, lose and find" (Osundare 2005, 9). Igbo students at Roseville explore and exploit this "freedom" and "diversity" to lend legitimacy to their constructed identity as a distinct group.

However, one thing that remains challenging is the inability of the students to consistently communicate in Igbo language. This raises the question of the place of language in the construction of authentic Igbo identity. Extracts from the responses of the research participants indicate a prevalence of mixture of varieties in form of code switching and code mixing as the interviewees mix Igbo and English languages within and between sentences respectively, a practice referred to as *Engli-Igbo* among Igbo language scholars. The next section of this article examines the relationship between language and cultural identity, with particular reference to the challenges the Igbo students encounter in their attempt to communicate in Igbo language.

Language, Mixture of Varieties, and Igbo Identity

Language conveys thoughts, values, and cultural norms of people. The categorisation of Igbo language as one of the endangered languages of the world emanates from the increasing depletion of the population of Igbo language speakers. Ejiofo (2011) identified some of the reasons that account for this. First, as Igbo people gain Western education and competence in English language, they increasingly tend underrate the significance of their indigenous language. This tradition emanated from the nature of Western educational training the earlier generations of Igbo people received when it was a "sacrilege" to speak indigenous (Igbo) language in secondary schools! Punishment could be strokes of the cane and/or "hard labour." Second, a majority of the present day Igbo elite communicate with their children in English while discouraging them from speaking the Igbo language. Third, English, apart from being the language of

modern technology and administration, is assumed to establish social distinctions and enhances the social status of the speaker. The supposed supremacy of the language is reinforced in the continued emphasis on the use of the language in instructional materials at the basic levels of education. This bias in itself poses a major challenge to the realisation of the vision of linguistic inclusiveness for the Igbo people. Ekwuru rightly notes that "the use of a foreign language affected a paradigm shift in the mental perception and conceptualisation of the Igbo cultural reality" (Ekwuru 1999, 53).

Other developments in the global arena have added a new dimension to the complicated linguistic inequality with which sub-Saharan African countries grapple. For instance, media imperialism occasioned by the clamour for the "free flow" of information has not only led to the influx of Western views and culture into African local communities but also promoted the Western models as the only alternative. Consequently, Adegbola (2006) reasoned that although the "free access" of information as promoted by UNESCO is to "give people the opportunity to gain access to information in the market place of ideas" (2006, 6), the infrastructural advantage which the West has over developing countries suggests that the battle for self-representation, linguistic inclusiveness, and the trading of ideas in this market cannot be on equal terms. Lack of equitable platform, therefore, further suggests that the battle of ideas had already been fought and won long before its commencement. The digital gap has, indeed, assumed insurmountable complexities. Adegbola (2006) identifies the areas where these complexities are obvious: Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have been designed primarily for use in the English language; eighty per cent of the content of the global information infrastructure is in English; less than three per cent is from Africa, most of which is in English; and finally, many of the African languages in written form are not available to modern information technologies (Adegbola 2006, 7). He concludes that "the asymmetry in the information flows between African and the rest of the world will remain, even if the infrastructural defects are effectively addressed" (Adegbola 2006, 7). The above scenario characterises the complex realities in which an Igbo student struggles to communicate in "undiluted" Igbo language. Presented below are specific instances that demonstrate the students' "hybrid" identity (Bhabha 1994) as they responded to interview questions. It is noteworthy that in these cases, the interviewees were supposedly speaking Igbo language.

Table 1: Linguistic Items Representing Instances of Mixture of varieties, and their Meanings

	Linguistic item	**Meaning**
i.	"*O je akwuru, kwuo* something." (Ikechukwu, the former NUASS President)	"He will wait and say something."
ii.	"*Ngaa* dinner *umu akwukwo na* faculty or other associations" (Former *igwe* of the students)	"When I attended students' dinner at the faculty or other associations"
iii.	"*A na-enye M* award." (Former *igwe* of the Igbo students)	"They always give me an award."
iv.	"…just because *M yi akwa ndi*-Igbo" (Former *igwe* of Igbo students)	"… just because I was putting on Igbo attire"

v.	"*Mmanwu je aga na* different halls of residence." (Ikechukwu, the former NUASS President)	"Masquerades will go to different halls of residence."
vi.	"*E were ogene gaharia na* campus *ka ndi mmadu mata na* Igbo Week *je ebido*." (Ikechukwu, the former NUASS president)	"An iron gong will be beaten round different halls of residence so that people will know that Igbo Week will soon commence."
vii.	"So, *a na eme ihe na* town, *a na M eje* represent*ie* the whole of Igbo students ..., that is between 2007/2008 and 2009/2010." (A former *Igwe* of Igbo students)	"So, whenever there was an event in town, I went to represent the whole of Igbo students…, that is between 2007/2008 and 2009/2010."
viii.	"A woman puts on *omuma na ntukwasi* – a blouse and two wrappers" (Ikenna, a former *igwe*, 2010/2011 academic session)	"A woman puts on a blouse and two wrappers"

The above extracts illustrate the prevalence of the mixture of varieties in the verbal expressions of the research participants. A mixture of varieties can occur in diverse forms that include code switching, code mixing, borrowing, pidgin, and creole (Hudson 1980, 51–69). Hudson argues that code switching is an inevitable consequence of bilingualism and/or multilingualism (Hudson 1980, 51). African speakers of any of the European languages engage in code switching and code mixing depending on situations. Linguistic expressions of the research participants, in *Table 1* above, clearly demonstrate the students' involvement in code mixing and conversational code switching while communicating in Igbo language. Interestingly, this also occurs during the students' association meetings where rules against the use of English language during association meetings exist. Often, students inadvertently break such rules several times in a meeting. From the examples presented above, code mixing occurs in certain forms:

a. Lexical transfer: certain English words such as "award," "dinner," and "campus" are represented in English. This is done due to (i) easy flow of communication, and (ii) to avoid loss of meaning of the original word.
b. Dual presentation of a lexical item: Some Igbo words may be presented side by side its English equivalent as in *omuma na ntukwasi*—a blouse and two wrappers.
c. Structural reconstruction: An English word (verb) is restructured by the addition of an Igbo suffix, e.g. "represent*ie*," where "*ie*" is an Igbo suffix. "Represent" (an English word) becomes the root word and "*ie*," the suffix that transforms "represent" to stand for "to represent."
d. "Years" and "academic sessions" are presented in English language though the Igbo language equivalents exist.

Although the above examples do not exhaust all the linguistic pitfalls characterising

the students' use of Igbo language, it demonstrates the "dark side" of the students' attempts at the construction of their ethnic identity. While this challenge remains apparent, we cannot but acknowledge the ingenuity, creativity, and the sense of ethnic nationalism the students—through their ethnic associations, cultural symbols, and ceremonials—demonstrate and promote in their construction of Igbo identity in a university space.

Conclusion

This article explored how Igbo students in a public university in Nigeria reproduce the Igbo world in the university space through translocalisation of aspects of Igbo culture and for the purpose of the promotion of Igbo ethnic identity. Dress, dance, language, symbolic and other cultural forms and ceremonials such as *ina ato*, *mbem*, chieftaincy and *igwe*ship are manipulated by the Igbo students' associations to establish cultural difference. Thus, the territoriality of the university becomes a space where the "local" and the "universal" are blended as part of the constituents of the University, exhibiting its aura of diversity and freedom. The micro and macro forces of Westernisation have undermined the Igbo language, as code mixing and code switching are prevalent in the Igbo students' linguistic repertoire and expression. These practices are a product of the hegemonic grip the English language has on the people and a reflection of their hybrid identity. Students' resilience is demonstrated in their undaunted participation in the cultural and ideological contestations, which privilege a particular way of "being." Resistance to the Western cultural hegemony is an indication of the students' resilience as they, in their micro ways, counterattack cultural homogenisation, which threatens their ethnic identity. To engage in this contestation, the "local" is translocalised, dissolving the distance that bestrides the "home" and the "diaspora," to create a form of "imagined homeland." The role of non-group members in the creation of a group identity is further demonstrated through their participation as observers and their acknowledgement of the difference and the peculiarity, which the Igbo students propagate; they accept the uniqueness of *uwa ndi*-Igbo. Undoubtedly, ethnic nationalism promoted by Igbo students in higher education institutions and other Igbo people in the diaspora stand to contribute to the placing of the Igbo cultural identity on the social and cultural "architectures" of a globalising world, a contribution which demands acknowledgement.

Notes

1 A case study typology was adopted for this study, and the research site is Roseville University (pseudonym). Techniques of data collection include key informant interviews, participant observation, focus group discussions, and life history.
2 The usage and assigning of meanings in symbolic and artistic forms to white chalk.

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Response

Comments on "Self-Representation"

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Based on personal observations, a leadership role in an ethnically based association, and field research, the paper uses Igbo students on a Nigerian campus to show how culture—defined within the parameters of an Igbo identity—is part of university life. The campus is located in the Western part of the country dominated by the Yoruba. Being outside of the Igbo homeland in eastern Nigeria helps in contextualizing the Igbo identity in that space, and in framing the rationale for the retention of cultural identity outside of its primary base as study subjects cope with new challenges, thrive in new terrain, and provoke cultural nostalgia.

The data is strong and the analyses are clear as to the construction of Igbo identity outside of their primary homeland. The activities described by the author include the formation of clubs, promotion of Igbo language, wearing of ethnic clothes, emphasis on cultural symbolism, use of kola nut to pray, performance of various rituals, and the celebration of an annual Igbo Cultural Week that includes lectures, and masquerade performance. Dr. Chinyere Ukpokolo also emphasizes the use of dress, Igbo language, food, and ceremonies "to establish cultural difference."

The data and methodology are sound. The evidence supports the conclusion of the connection between expressions of culture and identity retention. Much of the evidence is used to support assertions that practices are grounded in a belief that Igbo culture should not die, and that Igbo language, if not used, can become extinct. The essay is well written; the best part being where the practices are analyzed, which is so well done that outsiders of the culture can understand them.

There are three issues arising from this essay. First, it contributes to studies on African immigrants in cities, specifically how they use ethnic-based associations to create networks to assist one another to build semi-autonomous communities. Building a home away from home, those associations contribute to the socialization process. What is different in this study is its localization within a university community that avoids generalizations. The difference between what students do on campus and what their parents do at home and what migrants do at other locations requires better clarification. If there is no difference between practices on campus and the city at large, then the uniqueness of that campus space disappears; if indeed there are differences, then the author has the opportunity to compare and contrast associated lives in different spaces within the same city.

Yet a fundamental problem which is not addressed is the distance of travel, that is, how far the Igbo students are removed from their homes. These students are not permanent immigrants, strictly speaking, given that the locale is still within Nigeria and the subjects have not crossed international borders. There is, thus, a significant difference in the experience of the Igbo in Western Nigeria, who have continuous and easy access to Igbo geographical space, and the immigrant in far-flung places who are cut off geographically and

physically.

Second, the author assumes that the localization of Igbo culture can be blended with universalism on a Nigerian campus. The paper offers no data to support this assertion. Rather, the contrary may be true as is clearly articulated in the closing sentences: "Resistance to the Western cultural hegemony is an indication of the students' resilience, as they, in their micro ways, counterattack cultural homogenization, which threatens their ethnic identity." It is unclear how the combined examples are incorporated into the "universality" of the university. Indeed, the data analysis suggests the rejection of cosmopolitanism embedded in a university project. It could be that the author's intuition about the legitimacy of universalism (with a small "u") is under-theorized, but it could also be a matter of data. This tension in the essay opens up another research area to be pursued. While globalization is recognized, and discussed in tandem with "universalism," the localism expressed here does not clarify its linkage to broader, less-territorial based culture and influences.

Third, the essay assumes that there is such a thing as "an authentic Igbo cultural identity." This authenticity is an invention, an imaginary cluster of ideas and practices that define a group. Like most other African groups, many practices are of recent origins and constructions, which lack the historical depth that is often associated with them; talking about "authenticity" may either be misleading or exaggerated. From eating cassava to stock fish, and wearing attire made of materials called "george" and "hollandaise," one sees how culture relies upon adaptation that it subsequently calls indigenous, not realizing that cassava is originally from Brazil, stock fish is from Norway, and the fabric is from the Netherlands and China.

Dr. Chinyere Ukpokolo has whet the appetite for more studies on this important subject. Her familiarity with the data is invaluable. She has left the door wide open for other scholars to build upon her insightful study.

The Afghan War (1979-1989) in the Cultural Memory of the Russians[1]

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Abstract
The article analyzes the process of building Russian cultural memory based on the events of the past, specifically the Soviet-Afghan conflict (1979-1989). It shows how the perception of the war developed in Soviet / Russian society among veterans, as well as in the circles of politicians and historians. It also shows how the younger generation of the Russians refer to these events now. Attention focuses on the ways memory is constructed, how various carriers of memory construct the Afghan war (including those relating to popular culture), and how popular culture has the most influence on contemporary Russian society.

Although it has been over twenty years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the events of this period still affect the historical consciousness of Russians, and constitute one of the most important traits of their national identity. Apart from the victory in the Second World War (in the Russian tradition called the Great Patriotic War), which was recognized by the Russians themselves as crucial in building national consciousness and pride, the Afghan war (1979-1989) should also be mentioned. It is much more controversial and still shrouded in many mysteries (Levinson; Левинсон 2005).[2] In this text, the process of constructing Russian cultural memory will be traced on the basis of imaging the events associated with the Soviet-Afghan conflict. How the reception of this war evolved, both in the Soviet/Russian society and among its veterans, researchers, historians and politicians will be shown. In addition, it will discuss how a young generation of Russians today looks at these past events, and how the memory of the Afghan war appears in a variety of memory carriers, particularly those falling within popular culture and thus affecting the contemporary Russian society.

The main theoretical concept in this article is the assumption that memory of the Afghan war occupies an important place in the collective memory of the Russians. The cultural memory of the Soviet-Afghan conflict consists of a number of memory carriers: literary works, memoirs, films, serials, songs, monuments, and demotivators (demotivational posters), among others. The multiplicity and diversity of memory carriers allows one to believe that the Afghan war is a factor constituting the collective identity of the Russians that is also affected by the changing position of Russian authorities to the Afghan conflict. One of the applicable methods in the article will be a systematic analysis of exemplary representatives of various memory carriers, aimed at presenting a multi-faceted process of perception the Afghan war by various layers of Russian society. A reconstruction of perceiving and judging by Russian society a series of events on the Soviet-Afghan conflict (based on public opinion polls) will be

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presented. A critical analysis of the literature and an analysis of the socio-cultural phenomena, to varying degrees related to the Afghan war will be carried out, too. The chosen methodological approach provides an opportunity for a multi-faceted presentation of the reception of the Afghan war in Russian society due to the analysis of memory carriers created by its different groups. However, the Afghan war was a war of limited impact, which, in contrast to World War II, had not marked each family; the way it is perceived is different depending on the involvement of members of each Soviet family. In this context it is worth mentioning the limitation of my selected methods, concerning varying degrees of influence of the Soviet-Afghan conflict on Russian society, which makes it difficult to reconstruct the overall picture of the Afghan war in the cultural memory of the Russians.

Memory carriers are the tools for shaping the identity of a group, strengthening its integrity and sense of value. The war in Afghanistan in a relatively short period of time, a quarter century, became the subject for many fields of art—such as literature, cinema, music, graphics—that transmitted memory about it. These specific tangible monuments are the memory of things; they encode certain messages. Marcin Kula has pointed out that the creation of memory carriers for contemporary events and people is sometimes a controversial process. The carrier will play its role and remain active when it is noticed (Kula 2002, 43-45). Memory carriers do not have to accurately reflect the events they symbolize. Nevertheless, the image they transmit is fixed in the minds of recipients (Kula 2002, 155).

Therefore, the artefacts include social memory, which, as Barbara Szacka states, constitutes a set of images about the past of the group, as well as all the characters and events from this past that are commemorated in various ways (Szacka 2000, 52). This form of memory in shaping the individual and collective identity is significant, because, as Marian Golka writes, with its participation the scattered events of the past, usually waking pride, are merged in a more or less coherent form. In addition, this form of memory recalls the values important to the group, which helps to distinguish those who are "other" and "foreign" (Golka 2009, 53). However, the most important source of social memory carriers is the collectivity which this memory concerns (Golka 2009, 67).

In the case of the reception of the Afghan war, it is justifiable to speak of memory of the witnesses—participants and observers, as well as about official and private memory. It is also reasonable to distinguish the phenomenon of transmitted memory—conveyed indirectly in historical or fictional descriptions, as well as in memories that are created, managed, inspired and directed by the authorities, and spontaneous memory (Golka 2009, 26-31). The article will consider memory carriers characterizing subjective memory (individual memory shaped and enriched during the life time under the influence of feelings and experiences), intersubjective (present in a community, and which constitutes the record of the events in the consciousness of the community accumulated during the social evolution of the community and the lives of its individuals), and objective memory (consisting of the records of evolutionary changes and changes made as a result of interaction with the environment preserved

in material objects) (Sztumski 2002, 8). Sources on the presented conflict are extremely rich; there are hundreds of memoirs, literary works, songs, dozens of films, and demotivators. The aim of the author was to present only a small segment of them, to show thematic and semantic variety of memory carriers from different spheres of society in order to prove the thesis that cultural memory of the Afghan war occupies an important place in the collective consciousness of the Russians.

The Afghan War and Official Justifications

Afghanistan lies on the border of South, Central and South-West Asia, and at the same time on the southern borders of the Soviet Union. This geopolitical location resulted in the Soviet Union's keen interest in controlling Afghanistan's internal situation. In December 1978, the Afghan government signed an agreement with the Soviet Union on mutual cooperation and friendship. It provided, inter alia, granting military assistance in case of the threat of territorial integrity of any of the parties signing the agreement. It is this point that was used by the Soviet Union a year later as a justification for intervention in Afghanistan. It started in the night of 24 December, 1979 with airborne landings at airports in Bagram and Kabul (Kowalczyk 1994, 5-7).

Artemy Kalinovksy states, "The goal of the invasion was to secure infrastructure, free up the Afghan army to conduct raids and operations, and enable the new government to function. Soviet leaders did not envision their army being directly involved in battle after initial invasion—they were their just to prop up the military of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan" (Kalinovsky 2011, 25). The arguments put forward in 1979 justifying the participation of the USSR in the armed conflict seem unreasonable today. The Soviet Defence Minister at that time, Dmitrii Ustinov, believed that the importance of even the largest army can be evaluated only through its combat experience. In turn, the KGB chief, Iurii Andropov, wanted to repeat the rapid intervention of 1968 in Czechoslovakia (Pikhoia, Kondrashov, Osipov; Пихоя, Кондрашов, Осипов). Moreover, supporters of the decision to invade proceeded from the assumption that the "loss" of Afghanistan would be a blow to Soviet prestige (Kalinovsky 2011, 24). It is worth mentioning that the Soviet military was wary of an intervention in Afghanistan. Soviet officers presumed that this involvement would differ from other interventions where they were fulfilling their "internationalist duty" by advising and training local forces. In Afghanistan their assignment would be to command Soviet troops that could end up fighting Afghan insurgents (Kalinovsky 2011, 22). According to Alexander Lyakhovsky, multi-profile analysis of the situation leads us to believe that the Soviet leaders were drawn into the war by a well-conducted disinformation strategy, which was aimed at the ultimate elimination of the socialist camp and the collapse of the USSR (Liakhovskii 1995, Ot avtora; Ляховский 1995, От автора).

The Afghan conflict generated, through military confrontation, the interaction between two fundamentally different cultures. The war was conducted by the Soviet Union on a foreign territory by a limited contingent of Soviet troops. It started in the last years of "stagnation" of the Brezhnev era and lasted until the final phase of

perestroika. Despite ten years of armed conflict it was not possible to defeat the armed *mujahideen* opposition (the Soviet soldiers called the partisans dushmans). What is more, the pro-Soviet government was overthrown by 1992. Troops began leaving Afghanistan on 15 May 1988 pursuant to the Geneva agreements concluded in April that year (Kowalczyk 1994, 43-44). The process of leading out the military forces lasted until 15 February 1989.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was the bloodiest conflict in the history of the Soviet Union since the end of the Second World War. According to Russian statistics, the total number of casualties on the Soviet side was almost 14,500 people. The financial costs of intervention should also be mentioned: to support the government in Kabul, the Soviet Union spent approximately $800 million, while or the maintenance of the 40th Army and the conduct of military operations cost about $3 billion per year.[3] For several years, the Soviet Union ignored the voices of world opinion, which opposed its presence in Afghanistan. Only after Mikhail Gorbachev's came to power did Soviet leaders decide to withdraw troops because of the rising costs of war and the deepening economic difficulties (Kowalczyk 1994, 49). According to Artemy Kalinovsky the decision to withdraw was delayed due to Moscow's desire to maintain its position:

> The single most important reason that Soviet leaders delayed the decision to withdraw for as long as they did is that they continued to believe the USSR could help stabilize Afghanistan, build up the Afghan armed forces, and make the Kabul government more acceptable to its people. (…) Soviet leaders found it difficult to disengage from the Afghan conflict because they feared undermining Moscow's status as a defender of Third World countries against encroaching neo-colonialism (Kalinovsky 2011, 2).

As Mark Galeotii stressed, Gorbachev's decision to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan proved that the USSR was no irresistible military colossus, and that its goal was simple survival, not expansion (Galeotti 2001, 1). The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had a wide impact on the position of the USSR. According to Kalinovsky, the intervention in Afghanistan had its precedents, but it also became a turning point because it forced Soviet leaders to reevaluate interventions as instruments of foreign policy (Kalinovsky 2011, 1). In Robert Miller's opinion, Gorbachev's decision was an important turning point in the evolution of Soviet foreign policy: "Particularly in regard to policy in the Third World it marked a decisive shift away from the policy of the Brezhnev years to seek out targets of opportunity to increase the compass of Soviet power by the use of the USSR's expanding military power, regardless of the economic and diplomatic costs" (Miller 1989, 117). As stated by Richard Falk, a provisional result of the withdrawal will be to signal an overall withdrawal of the USSR from active engagement more generally in the Third World (Falk 1989, 149). Lyakhovsky stressed that the experience of Afghanistan was an important lesson for Soviet leaders: exacerbation of the situation in Poland in the early 80s, when the issue of the entry of Warsaw Pact troops there was considered, was the main reason for not completing this

action was the Soviet presence in Afghanistan (Liakhovskii 1995, L. Brezhnev reshaet spasat' "narodnuiu" vlast'; Ляховский 1995, Л. Брежнев решает спасать «народную» власть).

The war influenced the people and the government of the USSR. It had a wide social impact:

> It touched more than the veterans. It touched every mother whose son served there or whose prayers or cash managed to prevent that fate. It touched every bereaved sweetheart, wife, father, son or daughter. It still touches everyone who has to live or work with the afgantsy, the veterans of this war, or care for them, or speak on their behalf. It is a powerful image in the developing debate of the USSR's and Russia's future in the world, and for many a damning indictment of its past (Galeotti 2001, 2).

However, in 1989 T. H. Rigby supposed that the withdrawal from Afghanistan was unlikely to have persistent and deep-going domestic political implications in the USSR itself. It was connected with the fact that the war has impacted far less massively and obviously the Soviet population than did, for example, the Vietnam war impacted the American population because of the media monopoly in the USSR and efforts of the Soviet regime to protect its policies from serious public criticism (Rigby 1989, 68).

Protests against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan appeared in the Soviet Union already in 1980. Andrei Sakharov called for the widest possible boycott of the Olympic Games in Moscow. His wife Elena Bonner, along with other dissidents, published a statement in which the official version of events was rejected and the international community was called to demand the withdrawal of the Soviet troops (Braithwaite 2011, 108). Within ten years, on the Soviet side 620,000 soldiers were involved (Seniavskaia, *Protivniki Rossii…*; Сенявская, *Противники России…*, 83). The obligatory censorship during the initial period of the conflict meant that many soldiers sent to Afghanistan were not aware of the events and hostilities taking place there (Seniavskaia; Сенявская 1999).

A separate problem was the low level of discipline in the Soviet troops. Widespread violence and soldier brutality, so-called "bullying" (dedovshchina; *дедовщина*) was common (Braithwaite 2011, 171-173). In addition, many soldiers and officers abused alcohol and drugs. Also, the way Soviet soldiers treated the civilian population of Afghanistan can be inferred: In 1989, the Supreme Council of the USSR announced amnesty covering all crimes committed by soldiers in this country (Postanovlenie VS SSSR; *Постановление ВС СССР…*). On the other hand, according to the statistics of the Soviet Military Prosecutor's Office, during the ten-year conflict over 4,300 people were prosecuted (Pochtarev; Почтарев). Thus, the war was also connected with crimes and offences. As Rodric Braithwaite has stressed, soldiers committing individual and group acts, even though aware of severe sanctions, could be explained as follows: "They did it to us, so we have a right to do it to them" (Braithwaite 2011, 227). It happened that crimes were one in cold blood, but most often these acts occurred in the heat of the battle or immediately after it (Braithwaite 2011, 228).

The Afghan war accelerated the erosion of the Soviet Union as a state, because the public began to inquire about the atrocities committed by their troops on Afghan civilians, in addition to reports of widespread drug abuse among soldiers and desertion (Kowalczyk 1994, 49)[4]. Philipp Casula compared the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the two Russian wars in Chechnya in order to show changing interpretations of violence. In the Afghan war violence was physical and cultural, while in the Chechen wars excessive physical violence was the main type what was connected with the character of the conflict—focused on the recapture of territory (Casula 2015, 700-718). As Jan C. Behrends claimed, the Soviet Army was not interested in enforcing international law, so Afghanistan quickly turned into a violent space. The Soviet soldiers had to adapt to these conditions: the brutality of the war and crimes committed by both sides. After their return from Afghanistan, many veterans found it difficult to find their place in civilian life (Behrends 2015, 719-734).

As T. H. Rigby stressed, there has been much in experience of hundreds of thousands of "Afgantsy" to bind them together. Their combat turned out to be utterly different from the war their fathers had participated against the Germans. Moreover, for years they had felt forgotten by their country, they were rarely mentioned in the official media because the Soviet government wanted to play down the role of the USSR's so-called "limited contingent" for political reasons (Rigby 1989, 76-77). After the war, it was difficult for the soldiers to find their place in society, which resulted in the fact that they began to have a devastating impact on it. The "Afghan syndrome" was a great threat: in the families of veterans, the number of divorces and family conflicts was as high as 75%. More than two thirds of the veterans were not happy with their jobs and often changed them because of increasing conflicts; 90% of student-veterans were characterized by poor performance in studying, and 60% had problems with alcoholism and drug addiction. Research conducted in the early 1990s has shown that at least 35-40% of veterans urgently needed professional help of a psychologist (Lupookov; Лупооков). Thousands of young people who learned to steal and murder in Afghanistan very easily turned to a life of crime upon returning (Feifer 2009, 259). Soviet soldiers who had served in Afghanistan often had difficulties with jobs, housing, and medical care:

> The attitude of the general public towards them was also at best ambivalent, and they often felt embittered by the contrast between what had been demanded of them and the cynical materialism and corruption of life back home. Small wonder that they tended to band together for mutual solace and protection, that they were sharply antagonistic towards the predominant semi-westernised youth culture, and that they sometimes formed themselves into vigilante groups that took the law into their own hands (Rigby 1989, 77).

As the years went by and historical circumstances changed, the reception of the Afghan conflict also changed. Initially, it was hidden in a cloud of mystery. The Political Bureau undertook measures to prevent the escape of information about the war to the public.

Soldiers who were sent to Afghanistan were ordered to be silent about the place of their service. Those who returned to the USSR were not allowed to go to Moscow during the Olympics for fear that they might talk about the situation with foreign guests. Families of those killed were forbidden to tell about the circumstances of their children's deaths. According to the official version presented on TV and in newspapers based on the official reports of the Kremlin, the soldiers had an "internationalist mission" in Afghanistan without taking part in hostilities. TV broadcasts showed Soviet and Afghan soldiers in friendly embraces, Soviet physicians treating Afghan children, soldiers distributing food, and so on (Braithwaite 2011, 235-236). Events in Afghanistan were not considered in these official accounts as war at the time, but as a kind of humanitarian aid to the allied Afghan people. Until 1987, efforts were made to conceal the very fact of war, including burying the bodies of the slain soldiers in zinc coffins, under cover of the night. There was a ban on writing memorials to soldiers killed in Afghanistan (Braithwaite 2011, 236-237). The despair of mothers, of soldiers, who fought and died in Afghanistan is noted in Svetlana Alexievich's work *Zinky Boys: Soviet Voices from a Forgotten War* (*Цинковые мальчики*), that shows how this conflict divided their life tragically into "before" and "after" the war. The author gives voice to direct participants of the war, from whose memories the brutality and cruelty of the Afghan conflict emerge, as well as psychological trauma which war has left them.

Braithwaite states:

> The fallen were not greeted on their return with military honour and municipal ceremony as […] they would have been in America. Instead, they were returned to their families by night, buried in hugger-mugger, in a miasma of threats of retribution if the shroud of secrecy was broken (Braithwaite 2011, 237).

Although many soldiers received state awards and the titles of the Hero of the Soviet Union, the press reported that they are the result of participation in the manoeuvres, battles with a conventional opponent, as well as a reward for helping the Afghans in economic activities (Seniavskaia, *Protivniki Rossii…*; Сенявская, *Противники России*…, 83).

Despite the information blockade, alternative messages seeped into the Soviet society. As the flow of credible reports about events in Afghanistan increased, public opinion gradually began to turn against the war and the army, and the anti-war attitudes became more intense (Braithwaite 2011, 237-244). However, since 1987, information about events in Afghanistan was becoming increasingly overt and the war was presented as a heroic event in the spirit of revolutionary romanticism. The tendency to portray the heroic image of "militant-internationalists" prevailed until 1989. Critical publications on the Soviet participation in the war began to appear only on the wave of glasnost (Seniavskaia, *Voiny…*; Сенявская, *Войны*…). The Soviet press sharply criticized the incursion into Afghanistan, calling the war a row. A wave of critical speeches swept through the media also when the troops were being lead out from Afghanistan. As Galeotti stressed it: "Even after Gorbachev's accession, genuine

glasnost about the war came but slowly and patchily, and losses in Afghanistan were to be hushed up, thus depriving the bereaved of even the psychological support and catharsis of public approbation for the departed" (Galeotti 2001, 85). Lyakhovsky indicated that the 40th Army did not suffer defeat, in spite of the fact that after the war it was implicitly criticized (a similar situation applied to Americans fighting in Vietnam). "Afgantsy" were soldiers in a foreign war, which was a thankless role, because their effort was not perceived by the 'liberated'. In this context, Lyakhovsky recalls Soviet soldiers who fought the Nazis during World War II—they also could not foresee that, after almost fifty years, they would be considered as "occupiers" and their monuments and graves would be devastated. Afghan veterans' fortune turned out to be even worse, because 'the Afghan war' has been declared criminal, even in the USSR, which made them outcasts in their own homeland. Media accused them of killing civilians, drug use. Such a negative attitude towards "Afgantsy" can be explained by the fact that, unlike the Great Patriotic War, which affected almost every Soviet family, the Afghan war not affected many people in the Soviet Union directly, so it not become a common misfortune for the entire Soviet people. On the contrary, for many it remained distant, alien, unfamiliar and unfair (Liakhovskii 1995, Glava X; Ляховский 1995, Глава X).

It should be noted that the Soviet army did not suffer a single defeat in Afghanistan but, in the opinion of politicians, the assessment of events was very different. This can be considered as a confirmation of the belief that a war is lost when the government and the public recognize themselves as defeated (Seniavskaia, *Protivniki Rossii…*; Сенявская, *Противники России…*, 84). The war in Afghanistan was not a military but a political defeat—not only did the Soviet government decide to withdraw the troops, but it abandoned its recent ally. When introducing the troops, the Soviet government did not consider the power of tradition defining the mentality of the peoples of this country. The Soviet leadership's mistake was introducing troops into the country, which was torn by the social and ethnic conflicts (Khodakov; Ходаков 2009). There are opinions that, during the entire post-Afghan period, Russia was not able to learn political and military lessons from the conflict and the war was a result of erroneous actions of the Soviet politicians: "В Афгане мы не понесли военного поражения и не победили. Мы просто заплатили за ошибки политических деятелей, своих и афганских, десятками тысячами человеческих жизней народов обоих государств" ("In Afghanistan we have not suffered military defeat and we did not win. We just paid for the mistakes of political activists, our own and the Afghan, with tens of thousands lives of peoples of both countries") (Musienko; Мусиенко).

In the mass-media, the negative image of the war was portrayed until the beginning of the 21st century. The impulse for that was given by an emotional speech of Sakharov at the First Congress of People's Deputies in 1989, when he stated that Soviet airmen in Afghanistan executed their own soldiers who found themselves surrounded so that they were not taken prisoners. Especially after the Second Congress, the war began to be portrayed as a defeat. A political decision was then adopted to introduce Soviet troops to Afghanistan, and its conclusion was that this decision deserves a political

and moral judgment. In subsequent years, both the right-wing politicians as well as the leaders of veterans' organizations endeavoured to invalidate this resolution (Seniavskaia, *Voiny…*; Сенявская, *Войны…)*.

Remembering War

In this context, it is worth considering the attitude of the Soviet Union as an example of a manifestation of imperial consciousness shaped over the centuries. Imperial consciousness consists of, among other things, elements of the political doctrines used by governments to justify their imperial policies and ideologies and religious ideas current at the moment. Imperial consciousness changes over time and is dynamic as the very empire changes. However, unlike the empire, consciousness does not die at once and impacts both the policy and public opinion long after empire formally ends. The concept of imperial consciousness corresponds with the idea of creating a barrier shaped from the late eighteenth century, a barrier that would protect Russia, constitute its colonies and half-colonies. (For example, at the time of Peter I, Finland was conquered to protect Petersburg against the Swedes). A similar principle was the background for the decision to introduce troops into Czechoslovakia, and then into Afghanistan (Anisimov; Анисимов).

Appealing to the past uses traditional justifications of the existing order or its individual components. As stated by Lev Gudkov, individual or collective memory is always an alternative to the "history." It is also random, episodic, and subordinated to the logic of private or group action:

> "История" как содержание времени прошлого в коллективных представлениях представляет собой относительно систематизированные или упорядоченные массовые проекции на прошлое современного положения вещей, т.е. различные версии "происхождения" и "развития" больших коллективов или институтов – государства, "народов", "искусства", "религии", философии, науки, нравов […], которые продвинули "вперед все человечество" или стали существенным вкладом отдельных народов в общий процесс цивилизации человечества ("History" as the content of the past time in collective imaginations is a relatively structured or organized mass screenings of the past that concern the modern state of affairs, that is the various versions of the "origin" and "development" of large communities or institutions—the state, "nations", "art", "religion", philosophy, science, morals [...], which pushed "forward the whole of humanity" or became a significant contribution of individual nations to the common process of the civilization of mankind) (Gudkov; Гудков 2009, 89).

Stable structures of collective identity cannot function without historical components, as they play the role of a fictional genesis of the current situation. As the research shows, social transformations in post-Soviet societies are accompanied by noticeable tensions in the structure of collective identity. This aspect is evidenced by the strengthening of mass interest in the past and the attempts to answer the following questions: "Who are

we?" or "What can we be proud of, and on the contrary, what causes our shame?" among other questions. Sociological studies indicate a steady increase in interest in historical literature concerning the past of the nation (the interest in fiction, documentary prose, memoirs). New national myths and legends are created that justify the past and the glory of a given nation. The objects of pride are war winnings. Various political forces and groups—both parties of power, as well as the Orthodox Church—compete for the right to the "right" interpretation of the past (Gudkov; Гудков 2009, 89).

It is good to discuss the mechanisms of reception of the Afghan War in memory carriers by beginning with memoirs. The Afghan war left a significant imprint on the consciousness of Russian society in formulating its cultural memory. One of the most important manifestations of memory carriers are memoirs. When considering the reception of the conflict, one should distinguish individual, private memories of war and group perceptions about it. The importance of memories depends on who their author is, and who the addressee is: "Процесс 'вспоминания'—это всегда интерпретации, выстраиваемые в более или менее явной полемике, дополнениях или иллюстрациях общепринятых риторических изложений содержания или смысла соответствующих событий" ("The process of 'recollecting'—is always interpretation, constructed in a more or less overt polemic, additions or illustrations to the generally accepted rhetorical presentations of content or meaning of appropriate events") (Gudkov; Гудков). Memories can be seen as manifestations of communication memory, which consists of active memory and experience of living generations. They are passed on in an interactive way by non-formalized actions like every day oral communication: family stories, friendly conversations between the generations (Traba 2008, 13). Communication memory includes memories of the immediate past, in which the individual shares with his contemporaries. In the case of communication memory, images of past events are formed on the basis of eyewitness' accounts, passed on in an intergenerational dialogue (Assmann 2008, 66). Yet, as Magdalena Saryusz-Wolska points out, when communication memory begins to fade along with passing away of history witnesses, the commemoration of the past is transferred to the outer spheres: ritual and material ones. Then the cultural memory begins to emerge. However, it is difficult now to separate the time of domination of the communication and cultural memory, because the commemoration process takes place simultaneously at the interactive and medial level (Saryusz-Wolska 2009, 31-32). According to Aleida Assmann cultural memory plays an important role in every society:

> pamięć kulturowa służy obywatelom społeczeństwa do komunikacji w długiej, historycznej perspektywie, wykraczającej poza okres życia, a przez to do upewniania się w tożsamości, która powstaje dzięki przynależności do ponadpokoleniowej tradycji i szeroko zakrojonych doświadczeń historycznych (Cultural memory serves citizens of the society for communication in a long historical perspective, reaching beyond the period of life, and thus for ascertaining in the identity that is created by belonging to a supra-generational tradition and extensive historical experience) (Assmann 2009b, 171).

Individual memories are associated with private history and its core values and assessments, whereas the collective ideas are constituted by values that have significance for the whole community. These are "reconstructions" of historical processes and events, the function of which is connected with the rituals of collective (national, group) solidarity, or with the presentation of collective myths, whose task is the legitimacy of the social institutions or political actions (Gudkov; Громов).

Memoires of the Afghan conflict began to emerge in the 1980s, and others were written down some time after the end of hostilities, which allowed for a greater distance to the events described. They are the expression of subjective, personal memories of the witnesses. Colonel General Boris Gromov, commander of the 40th Army offers one such perspective in his book, *Ограниченный контингент* (Limited contingent, 1994). It is an analysis of the reasons for the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, the description of the war, as well as the problems of the Soviet contingent. He expresses the opinion that in the case of intervention in Afghanistan one cannot speak about Soviet victory, nor about the Soviet defeat:

> Я глубоко убежден: не существует оснований для утверждения о том, что 40-я армия потерпела поражение, равно как и о том, что мы одержали военную победу в Афганистане. Советские войска в конце 1979 года беспрепятственно вошли в страну, выполнили – в отличие от американцев во Вьетнаме – свои задачи и организованно вернулись на Родину (I am deeply convinced: there are no grounds to believe that the 40th army was defeated, just as well to say that we won the war in Afghanistan. The Soviet Army in late 1979, without barriers, entered the country, fulfilled their tasks, in contrast to the Americans in Vietnam, and in an organized way went back to their Homeland) (Gromov; Громов, 275).

Memoirs such as this one by Gromov, constituting expressions of biographical memory, can be considered as a kind of autobiographical story. As stated by Harald Welzer, the reception of the event, which the author tells about in his story, depends on media patterns: biographical eyewitness narratives are shaped according to ready and available models, both at the level of the experience as well as the story about it. In this sense, it is rather stories that create their authors than the authors creating their stories (Welzer 2009, 43). Thus, we can conclude that the memoirs are biased, just like their reception perspectives.

As Kalinovsky stressed, it is almost axiomatic among senior Soviet officers who fought in Afghanistan, and then spoke or wrote about it, that the military was able to carry out its duty and did not lose the war (Kalinovsky 2011, 37). One of the best known books written by Afghan's veterans is *Трагедия и доблесть Афгана* (Tragediia i doblest' Afgana) by Major General Alexander Lyakhovski. His book includes a large number of primary sources, previously unpublished and secret, as well as memories of direct participants in hostilities. This made it possible to show the complex decision-making process by the Soviet leadership to start interventions in Afghanistan and an

analysis of the Soviet army's actions (Liakhovskii 1995, Ot avtora; Ляховский 1995, *От автора*).

Afghan veterans admit that their attitudes to the conflict were gradually changing. Initially, many of them believed in the official statements concerning "internationalist aid"; however, with the expansion of the sphere of hostilities the question appeared: "Why are we here?" The Soviet presence was at that time justified by the defence of the southern boundaries of the state. However, once the decision about withdrawing the troops was taken, there were frequent discussions between soldiers: "'Если эта война – политическая ошибка, то почему мы должны и дальше рисковать своей жизнью?' 'Кто мы теперь и как нас после всего этого встретят дома? Как будут называть? Жертвы политической ошибки? Убийцы?'" ("'If this war is a political mistake, why should we continue to risk our lives?' 'Who are we now, and how will they welcome us home after all that? How will they call us? The victims of a political error? Murderers?'"). In the army there was a widespread opinion that the soldiers were betrayed and were no longer needed. Thus, many soldiers began to associate the birth of democracy with treason. In the letters, diaries, and memoirs of privates who were sent to the front usually directly from the school benches, the high degree of emotionality can be noticed. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers found themselves in a foreign country, completely incomprehensible and culturally alien (Seniavskaia, *Protivniki Rossii*…; Сенявская, *Противники России*…, 87-88).

Braithwaite recalled that the "Afghans", the soldiers involved in the fighting in Afghanistan, came from all parts of the Soviet Union. Returning to normal life was for them a big challenge, with which not everyone was able to cope: "Many took years to find their feet again in civilian life. Some never did. None shook free of the memories of their common war" (Braithwaite 2011, 8). The researcher also added that the experience of the terrible things that they had observed or which the soldiers had done came back in memories that torment them. Stories of heroism and brotherhood are helpful in coping with the past. They also give the experiences a specific meaning. Some even claim that the war years were the best years of their lives (Braithwaite 2011, 336).

On the one hand, a negative attitude to the war itself in society began to affect the soldiers. Veterans of the war in Afghanistan turned out to be unwanted, useless, not only for the authorities but also for the whole society. Certain freedom of the Soviet press, introduced by Gorbachev, resulted it becoming possible to publish without restrictions negative opinions about the war. This, in turn, was associated with the critique of the army activities in Afghanistan. A difficult experience for soldiers returning home was a discrepancy between their inner feeling that they had suffered a lot while fulfilling their duty, and indifference or even hostility they encountered from the society (Braithwaite 2011, 245). Braithwaite writes, "The contrast between the reality of the fighting and the almost total inability of the civilians to understand what was really going on was sometimes too much to bear" (Braithwaite 2011, 249).

On the other hand, the Soviet society's dominant attitude was to forget this war as soon as possible, which was one of the manifestations of the "Afghan syndrome," that

is post-traumatic neurosis associated with the war in Afghanistan. This tendency was a mechanism of social forgetting, which can be regarded as a change of attitude towards the past. Only years later there began to appear more rational attempts to explain the causes, course, outcome and consequences of the war in Afghanistan, but in fact they are limited to a narrow circle of specialists, not to mass awareness (Seniavskaia, *Protivniki Rossii*…; Сенявская, *Противники России*…, 88).

Despite the passage of the years, the assessment of the Afghan conflict is still very divergent, both in the environment of the politicians, and its direct participants. After 25 years since the end of the conflict, Vasilii Likhachev, the deputy to the State Duma of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, stated that one can agree with the opinion that Russia was fulfilling then its internationalist obligation, and Soviet troops were introduced into Afghanistan at the request of the governing bodies of this country. However, if the foreign policy of the USSR was at that time conducted on the basis of a deeper geopolitical analysis, many problems could have been solved with the help of such organizations as the UN or the OSCE. The obstacle to this, however, was also euphoria induced by power and strength of the state. The history of Afghanistan has also not been taken into account, as well as the fact that this country has never been seized by anyone. According to the deputy, Russia should learn a lesson from this, namely—it should be politically and technologically strong, so that there was no possibility to break its borders from any side. Russia should be a non-aggressive country, civilized, wise, but at the same time strong and ready to fight (Andreev; Андреев [et al.]). Konstantin Sokolov, a vice president of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, views the political aspect of this conflict in a different way, stating that both, the introduction and the withdrawal of the troops was a mistake. This first step was poorly organized, but it should be kept in mind that it not only started the war, but also the beginning of the transformation of Afghanistan. After ten years, when the stabilization of the country was nearing, the withdrawal of the Soviet troops led to the transformation of Afghanistan into the powerful drug manufacturer (Andreev et al.; Андреев et al.).

Veterans Remember

The perception of the Afghan war in the veteran environment focused on diverse aspects. There are opinions that the public should not forget the direct participants of those events. As Valerii Marchenko, a veteran of the Afghan war, stated: "Их, солдат своей страны, не в чем упрекнуть—они с честью выполнили свой долг перед Родиной. Никто не должен быть забыт" ("The soldiers cannot be blamed—they fulfilled their duty to their Fatherland with honours. No one should be forgotten") ("*Kto ne pomnit*…; "*Кто не помнит*…). It is to them that Marchenko dedicated his books: *Афган: разведка ВДВ в действии* (Afghan: Espionage of the Airborne Troops in Action, 2009), *Вектор Афган* (Vector Afghan), *Там, где небо касается гор* (Where the Sky Touches the Mountains). There are also publications that interpret activities of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan with a laudatory tone. As Nikolai Marchuk, the author of *Необъявленная война в Афганистане: официальная версия и уроки правды* (Undeclared War in Afghanistan,

1993), states: the official version and the lessons of truth:

> Никакие перемены политической конъюнктуры не смогут принизить величие подвигов, совершенных советскими людьми. Жизнью и смертью своей они укрепляли авторитет нашего Отечества, утверждая верность таким святым понятиям, как патриотизм, честное выполнение союзнических обязательств (No changes in the political situation will be able to diminish the size of heroic deeds made by the Soviet people. They strengthened the authority of our Homeland with their lives and deaths, confirming fidelity to such holy concepts like patriotism, true fulfilment of allied commitments) (Marchuk; Марчук 1993, 7).

Despite many memoirs which describe the events of the conflict in detail, websites run by veterans, in the minds of the public, journalists, and filmmakers there still persist beliefs about the "mindless bloody war", "mountains of corpses", "rivers of blood", as well as veterans, many of whom had mental problems and then fell into addictions (alcoholism, drug addiction) before finally becoming bandits. In contrast to the Chechen campaigns, the Afghan conflict was a secret and the public had little information about it, which contributed to the shaping of myths and distorting the image of the war. Their analysis was undertaken by a journalist and a veteran of the Afghan war, Aleksei Kozlachkov. According to one of them, it was a thoughtless and criminal war. This slogan is repeated by both, the veterans and the authors of books about the conflict. From this myth other ones originate. Kozlachkov stresses, however, that the control of border territories is the basis of geopolitics. The introduction of troops was dictated by the real danger that the Afghan government would enter into an alliance with the U.S., so it is unreasonable to speak of thoughtlessness of the conflict. The loss of life was also smaller than the American losses in Vietnam and the Russian losses during the first Chechen campaign. In a historical perspective one can even say that the Afghan campaign was one of the best organized wars of the USSR, and perhaps of the Tsarist Russia (modern Russia was considered to be much less organized in the military sense). The lives of the soldiers were under special protection, and commanders were responsible for the loss of life. The perception of poor training is also false: every soldier who landed in Afghanistan had a minimum half-year training. In over two years of service, Kozlachkov did not witness any act of violence or plunder. In his opinion, war was a more natural state for humanity than peace, therefore, not every participant in the Afghan war had to lose his mind, get addicted, or become a criminal. He admitted that among his friends, only one veteran fell into alcoholism, and the rest without a problem found their place in a country free from war. Many of them had additional war experiences, after which they have been educated, and currently lead a successful life (Kozlachkov; Козлачков).

However, soldiers' return to civilian life was in fact very difficult: there was no work, prostheses, wheelchairs, cash benefits were low. The biggest problem was the issue of housing. The veterans had to deal with the trauma and abandon their (not uncommon) brutal behavior acquired in Afghanistan. In February 1989, the

"Afgantsy" received the formal status of "Warrior-Internationalists". However, they wanted to gain the same status as veterans of the Second World War (Braithwaite 2011, 313-315). The demands of veterans also included a review of a negative assessment of the political conflict. In their opinion, a too-hasty assessment of the war led to a reduction in their social security benefits (*7 istoricheskikh…*; *7 исторических…*). The Act on veterans, revised in 1995, granted the "Afgantsy" full status and the title of "veterans." Although it guaranteed them extensive social benefits, the issue related with paying the benefits was for a long time complex (Braithwaite 2011, 318).

Social organizations uniting former soldiers, including The Union of Veterans of Afghanistan (Союз ветеранов Афганистана, 1989), the Russian Fund for Invalids of the War in Afghanistan (Российский Фонд инвалидов войны в Афганистане, 1991) —now called All-Russian Society of Afghanistan War Invalids and War Injuries —"War Invalids" (Общероссийская общественная организация инвалидов войны в Афганистане и военной травмы - "Инвалиды войны"), the Brotherhood of Arms (Боевое братство, 1997, under the leadership of General Gromov) engage in the struggle for the rights and benefits for veterans (Braithwaite 2011, 358-359). Organizations of veterans from Afghanistan began to be formed around 1985, and in some regions as early as in 1983. Since 1986, the governing bodies began to call for the establishment of such organizations just as such needs emerged (Danilova; Данилова). In 1990 a social organization was established, the Russian Union of Veterans of Afghanistan (Российский Союз ветеранов Афганистана), a member of the World Veterans Association. It has about 500,000 members and has 78 regional offices throughout Russia. Its task is to fight for improved conditions of veterans' lives, commemorating the fallen, the military-patriotic education of youth, the creation of clubs with the military-patriotic and sports profile, as well as youth ranger clubs (*Rossiiskii Soiuz…*; *Российский Союз…*).

One of the first web servers devoted to the Afghan war was started in 1997 by veteran Vladimir Grigoriev, www.afgan.ru. The server provides a platform for contacts between veterans, a database of their rights, as well as a place of commemoration of fallen comrades. The website also collects works of veterans and photographs of the conflicts in which they participated. The online project "ArtOfWar" (www.artofwar.ru) is also worth mentioning. It is dedicated to the veterans of various wars, including Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Chechnya. The site was opened in 1998 and consists primarily of multi-profile veterans' literature works. It also allows one to find comrade-veterans and resolve legal issues regarding the post-war existence.

These institutions and websites were created in order to protect the memory about the dedication and commitment of the Soviet soldiers, which can be justified by words of Aleida Assmann: "Historyczna trauma wspólnego doświadczenia bycia ofiarą osadza się w pamięci zbiorowej jako niezacieralny ślad i zapewnia silny związek dotkniętej grupy" ("The historical trauma of the joint experience of being a victim is deposited in the collective memory as an unfading track and provides a strong relationship of the affected group") (Assmann 2009b, 166). The above mentioned organizations are examples of direct communication in a social group, associated with the mission to

pass on personal experience in the community memory. Today the Internet allows veterans to skip organizational structures and to establish direct contacts between themselves, as well as to search for brothers in arms (Braithwaite 2011, 325-326). It is worth mentioning that individual memory could not exist or continue without frames of social reference. An individual, who would grow in complete solitude, would not have memory because memories, including those of a personal nature, are created through communication and interactions within social groups. The individual memory is formed by the participation of an individual in the processes of communication. Thus, we can conclude that memory lives in and is due to communication (Assmann 2008, 50-53).

The Public Remembers: Carriers of Russian Social Memory

Considering the impact of the Afghan war on the cultural memory of the Russians, it is worth analysing public opinion surveys devoted to this conflict. Public opinion surveys from different years show evidence that in Russian society the memory of the war in Afghanistan is considered painful chapter of the native history; moreover, the perception of the war is very different depending on whether or not a person had a direct experience of war in Afghanistan. According to a survey conducted in December 1989 among approximately 15,000 respondents (half of which experienced the war in Afghanistan), the presence of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan has been assessed as "the fulfillment of internationalist duty" by 35% of respondents who were veterans and only 10% of respondents from non-military groups. 19% of the veterans and 30% of non-soldiers considered war as "discrediting the notion of internationalist duty," whereas 17% of veterans and 46% of non-soldiers described it as "our disgrace." On the other hand, 17% of veterans chose the answer "I'm proud of it!" Only 6% of non-soldiers selected this answer (Seniavskaia, *Protivniki Rossii…*; Сенявская, *Противники России…*, 88).

In 1991, the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Centre conducted a survey aimed to analyse the evolution of the attitude of the Russians to the events in Afghanistan. The study showed that as many as 89% of Russians thought that it had been unnecessary to introduce the Soviet army to Afghanistan. Only 3% believed that these actions were necessary. One percent more said that the war should have been conducted up to a victorious end. On the other hand, 83% of respondents did not agree with this opinion. A many as 69% of respondents stated that sending the troops to Afghanistan had been a national crime. According to 57% of the Russians, this step was primarily a political disturbance, and 19% said that it was necessary to protect the geopolitical interests of the Soviet Union (*Voennye avantiury…*; *Военные авантюры…*).

It is worth noting that despite the passage of time, the majority of Russians negatively evaluated the discussed conflict. A public opinion poll conducted at the beginning of 2014 (by Iurii Levada Analytical Centre) among 1,603 people living in 45 regions has revealed that the Russians are convinced that there was no need to conduct this war: as many as 68% believed that it was not necessary to introduce Soviet troops to Afghanistan, while 9% believed it was the right step and 23% were not

able to clearly answer the question. 44% of respondents believed that the introduction of troops was a state crime, 22% was of a different opinion, and 34% did not choose any of these options. Almost half of the respondents (45%) agreed with the statement that the introduction of the troops was a political disturbance into which the Soviet Union was involved by its leaders. 23% of respondents felt it was a necessary step to protect the geopolitical interests of the USSR, to prevent the strengthening of American influence in this region. Every tenth respondent was of the opinion that the Soviet army in Afghanistan fulfilled its internationalist duty, helping the local population. Only 7% believed this war to be fair (*Rossiane schitaiut…*; *Россияне считают…*).

The previously mentioned studies show that the Russians' social memory is actively processing this difficult history period even in the present. As Golka stated, the continuation of the social memory is a manifestation of the continuation of the community and culture (Golka 2009, 7). At the same time, such a reception of the Afghan conflict in Russia proves the words of the researcher that this kind of memory is usually prone to change; social memory creates social order, but its stability is dependent on this order (Golka 2009, 8). The war in Afghanistan has found its place in the metaphorical cultural memory of the Russians. This type of memory is expressed in a conscious relationship of the group to the past, embedded in a specific cultural space, passed through various forms of social communication: writings, holidays, rituals, images, and so on. This form of memory is distinguished by a more sacred, symbolic or abstract nature, therefore it cannot be created by individuals but by organized institutions. They form a system that constructs a group identity. Through a conscious choice of the remembered past and modified forms of communication, a specific awareness of the past is created (Traba 2008, 15). According to Jan Assmann, this kind of memory is inherited from generation to generation through cultural communication (Assmann 2008, 68.104).

Currently, living memory more often gives way to memory constructed by the media. This type of memory is backed by some material carriers, such as monuments, memorials, museums and archives (Assmann 2009a, 106). Memorials honouring soldiers fighting in Afghanistan are in many cities of the former USSR, including Yekaterinburg, Norilsk, Ulyanovsk, Khabarovsk, Kiev, Odessa, Vilnius. They form a kind of a communication system that points to the commemoration policy of the state, society, and veterans. Monuments do not serve practical purposes. They are symbols, social memory carriers, constructing cultural memory (Traba 2008, 36-37). Through them the memory of the Afghan conflict is supported and passed on. As it will be shown below, the memory carriers—in this case, monuments—do not carry the same memory of all the people. Joanna Kabrońska indicated that the content of collective memory is the subject of disputes both within a community, as well as between communities and nations. Therefore, the canon of memory, by which the generally accepted version of historical events is to be understood, must be negotiated. This applies both to the content of memory and the interpretation of events (Kabrońska 2008, 38). Memorials can also be considered a place of forming and educating successive generations, whose task is to fill empty places in the collective consciousness of the community.

Kabrońska called the ritual of building a monument to commemorate the victims as the deep need of spiritual healing, stressing the fact that only commemoration can ease the pain of loss (Kabrońska 2008, 98-108).

Nataliia Danilova, a sociologist, emphasized that the war in Afghanistan has become one of the first experiences to commemorate a military conflict, which generally is not regarded as heroic. War memorials may be considered in this context not only as the embodiment of national history, but also as symbols, reflecting the parameters of modern society functioning. The culture to commemorate the Afghan war can thus be understood in the following way: "одновременно, как конструируемый и в то же время структурно обусловленный феномен, зависимый от политики государства в отношении войны и ее участников, а также от коллективного чувства утраты, испытываемого участниками коммеморации" ("[A]t the same time, as a constructed and simultaneously structurally conditioned phenomenon, dependent on the state policy towards the war and its participants, as well as on the collective sense of loss, experienced by commemoration participants") (Danilova; Данилова). Brothers in arms feel the duty and responsibility towards those who died. Families painfully feel the inability to compensate the loss of their relative. Therefore, the participation in commemoration allows them at least to some extent to feel compassion of the society by recognizing the symbolic significance of their loss. From the moment of establishing the veterans' organization, the sacralisation of memory of the fallen has become their most important task. This type of activity is even more important than the fight for the protection of the rights and benefits of participants of the war. In order to collect funds for the construction of monuments, public events are organized that are intended to attract public attention to this problem. In the early 1990-ties, veterans almost could not count on help from the federal government, which explained its lack of commitment by the fact that it is not responsible for sending troops to war. This approach of state authorities changed at the end of the decade, when political reassessment of the Afghan conflict started. In 1999, according to statistics of the Russian Union of Afghan Veterans, there were 332 monuments in Russia (Danilova; Данилова).

The researcher distinguished three types of monuments, showing different approaches to commemorate the war: brotherhood of war; repentance or political contract; triumph of power or a small version of the "big" war. Monuments dedicated to the theme of brotherhood are the typical form of the memory of the fallen. It should be emphasized that in these monuments there are no symbols depicting society, parents of the dead, and the weeping mother—a traditional theme in the Russian commemoration culture. Thus, the locality and the closed nature of the group is emphasized. The sense of betrayal on the part of civil society was manifest in the abandonment of symbols of public involvement in the war. Personages used in these representations are those grieving alive and fallen soldiers, rescuing the wounded (a combatant is carrying out the wounded from the battlefield), and symbols of death ("The Black Tulip"[5]). The monument in Murmansk contains a touching epitaph: "Простите нас за то, что мы остались живы" ("Forgive us that we survived"). The symbolism of airborne forces is often used.[6] Danilova drew attention to the fact that in some cities, monuments

are located at a military cemetery or opposite of a monument to the heroes of the Great Patriotic War. This way they fit into the space of commemorating the Second World War, which symbolizes the succession and the connection of experiences. The second group of monuments shows religious subjects using the symbols of the dome, a contour of the Orthodox Church, the cross (for example, at Omsk). Religious themes can be interpreted as a kind of "repentance" of society towards the participants of the war. Also, it is noteworthy to mention the political role of the Orthodox Church: monuments with religious themes appear from the late 1990s, the time when Orthodoxy began to occupy a permanent place in the political space of Russia. Thus, the Orthodox Church has been instrumentalized by the authorities to strengthen their position in the society. The third group of monuments includes those that reproduce the war, which is traditional for the Soviet context as far as commemorating the dead is concerned. They are monumental. They use the symbols of eternal fire and the figure of a weeping mother. They are located in public places next to monuments of soldiers of the Second World War. In this context, a monument to the fallen in Afghanistan begins to function as a tool of the state ideology and its national project re-shaping memory of the Afghan war (e.g. a monument at the Prospect of Glory in St. Petersburg). The formality of such compositions makes them less popular among veterans and relatives of the dead. This is because there is a clash of official form of sacralisation of memory and the individual memory of the participants in the war (Danilova; Данилова).

Important memory carriers which will be also analysed in this text are works of literature, songs, films and TV series. They have the possibility to deliver their message to a wide variety of diverse audiences, which makes them having a significant impact on the formation of the cultural memory. Literature is an essential medium shaping cultural memory, serving as the medial framework for the construction of autobiographical memories taking place in social contexts (Erll 2009, 226-228).[7] The stories *Жизнь и смерть сержанта Шеломова* (The Life and Death of Sergeant Shelomov, 1992) by Andrei Zhitkov and *Десантная группа* (The Landing Group, 1992) by Vladimir Rybakov describe the Afghan war. Both were published in 1992, and both were most likely written by eyewitnesses to the events. The stories end in tragedy; the main characters die. These works are examples of the prose of the soldiers and officers, continuing the tradition of military literature, especially the one devoted to the Great Patriotic War. As noted by Paweł Malov-Boichevskii, it is a completely different war and completely different soldiers taking part in it. The first story presents the phenomenon of bullying in the army. Evocative descriptions of violence between soldiers stand in vivid contrast to the efforts undertaken for years by the authorities aiming to convince the public that in Afghanistan this pathology has not occurred due to the brotherhood of soldiers which flourished there. Zhitkov shows, however, that older soldiers bully those of lower rank, beat them, force them to work beyond their strength, and stand at the checkpoint in a different order. The story also presents other negative aspects of the war in Afghanistan: drunkenness, drug addiction, and marauding. Nevertheless, the main character of Rybakov's story—Lieutenant Borisov—cannot accept the fact that soon he will have to leave Afghanistan. Such concepts as honour of uniform, the

prestige of the state, soldier's duty are key factors for him. He still naively believes that the Soviet army in Afghanistan fulfils an internationalist duty. In contrast, the soldiers surrounding him want as quickly as possible to return home, which results in his inner protest. This work also abolishes the myth of a righteous Soviet soldier: after each battle the soldiers searched the killed dushmen and the money found was spent on bribes for senior officers, purchasing of vodka, and aiding families of soldiers fallen in Afghanistan. These books not only denounce and expose the cruelty of war, but call to draw political conclusions from the Afghan events (Malov-Boichevskii; Малов-Бойчевский). Another important work dedicated to the war in Afghanistan is a novel *В двух шагах от рая* (Two Steps To Paradise, 2006) by Mikhail Evstaf'ev, who went to Afghanistan as a volunteer. The work shows a panoramic view of the war conflict, presents numerous figures of soldiers at different levels of the military hierarchy, the fate of which served as a canvas to create a saga about the fate of Russia. The novel is an expression of the author's pain, highlighting the dramatic spiritual and physical experiences of soldiers involved in the war (Stebelev; Стебелев). These three works suggest that literature plays a central role mainly in the memories of the individual life experiences.

The songs of Soviet soldiers fighting in Afghanistan are an important memory carrier about the Afghan war. They create original soldiers' folklore containing such motifs as fatigue by fighting, memories of severe battles, the desire to survive and return home as soon as possible, uncertainty about the future, but also courage and heroism of the soldiers. They reflect the moods, feelings and reality of the war, for example,

> Под небом чужим:
> (...) Ах, как хочется мне,
> Заглянув в амбразуру,
> Пулеметом глушить
> По России печаль
> (Under foreign skies:
> (...) Oh, how I want,
> Glancing to the porthole,
> Suppress with a machine gun
> The sadness over Russia) (*Afganistan v ogne*; *Афганистан в огне* 1985, 59)

As emphasized by Alla Sergeeva, in the Russian culture, love of one's country is inseparable from love for the native land, the landscape, and even the state. This is connected with the fact that for centuries the Russian soldier fought "for faith, tsar and fatherland," therefore these elements are closely related (Sergeeva; Сергеева 2004, 17).

One of the first Afghan war-related songs by Victor Verstakov, a war correspondent of "Правда", was *9 рота* (The 9th Company). The song was banned, and customs officials confiscated copies of the text and removed the recordings from cassette tapes

(Ivanov; Иванов 1993). Such songs were the first to reveal the truth about events in distant Afghanistan:

> Войну мы тогда называли работа,
> а все же она оставалась войной.
> Идет по Кабулу девятая рота,
> и нет никого у нее за спиной
> (We called then the war our work,
> and yet it remained the war.
> The 9th company walks around Kabul,
> and there's no one behind) (Verstakov; Верстаков)

The Afghan motifs are a dominant of the pieces of the group "Голубые береты", the cult band of the Russian Airborne Troops. The band began its activities in Afghanistan in 1985 by performing the songs of various artists. Its founder was a senior sergeant, Oleg Goncov. The most popular songs that have become standards of the "Afghan songs" are, for example, *У опасной черты* (At a Dangerous Line) and *Десант уходит в прорыв* (Airborne Troops Interrupt the Front). The band has also become an important instrument of patriotic education of youth. The band's music focuses on the themes of war, male friendship, fidelity, honour, and home country. It is worth noting that the money from the concerts was passed to local veterans' organizations for the purpose of construction of monuments, to help invalids and families of the fallen. The band's songs provided moral support for the troops, especially in the face of widespread criticism of the army. After 1990, observations of negative situations (that were noticed during performing in different parts of the country) were included in the group's repertoire while performing in different parts of the country: the disintegration of the country and the army, opposition to negative public perceptions of veterans from Afghanistan, armed conflicts (*Вы нас туда послали!* [You've sent us there!], *Погоны России* [Russia's Shoulder Boards] ("Голубые береты"). In 1996, Goncov founded the group "РОСТОВ" (Российское творческое объединение ветеранов [Russian Creative Union of Veterans]) that also focused on patriotic and military education of youth (Kukharenko; Кухаренко 2008). Iurii Slatov songs were popular, e.g. *Ордена не продаются* (Medals Are Not for Sale), *У трапа самолета* (At the Steps of the Plane), *Пароль – Афган* (Password – Afghan). Slatov's song *Память* (Memory) became the anthem of the airborne soldiers from Afghanistan. Slatov has also performed with the band "Голубые береты".

References to the motifs of the Afghan conflict are also present in popular music, especially the kind referring to patriotic feelings.[8] The themes of war are mentioned in the works by Aleksandr Rozenbaum, a representative of stage songs, a Distinguished Artist of Russian Federation (1996) and National Artist of Russian Federation (2001). Most of the songs of this trend are related to the Great Patriotic War (*Я часто просыпаюсь в тишине* [I often wake up in silence], *Проводи-ка меня, батя, да на войну…* [Walk me to the war, Dad...]). Some works have been devoted to the war

in Afghanistan: *Караван* (A Caravan), *Дорога длиною в жизнь* (Way of Life), *Монолог пилота "Чёрного тюльпана"* (A Monologue of a "Black Tulip" Pilot). The last song is a poignant story about the feelings of pilots carrying the coffins of killed Soviet soldiers in their twenties back to the Soviet Union. Rozenbaum frequently performed in the Soviet military units located in Afghanistan. Iurii Shevchuk, the founder and leader of the "ДДТ" group, appeals to civic and patriotic motifs in his works and the need for moral self-improvement, rejection of violence, and overcoming hatred. In 1982, the band won the contest "Золотой камертон", announced by "Комсомольская правда", with the song *Не стреляй* (Do Not Shoot), calling for pacifism and showing mental trauma of the veterans.

Songs dedicated to the war in Afghanistan receive very different comments (some are offensive). Here are some examples of such statements that emphasize admiration for the courage and bravery of Soviet soldiers, the pride of their dedication, as well as unjust attitudes towards them from the authorities:

> (as sas) Слушаю песню слезы не сдержать ВЕЧНАЯ ПАМЯТЬ ВСЕМ КТО БЫЛ ТАМ И НЕВЕРНУЛИСЬ!!!!! это незабыть некому никогда! (I listen to the song, it's difficult not to cry, ETERNAL MEMORY TO ALL WHO WERE THERE AND DID NOT COME BACK!!!!! no one can ever forget it!)
> (Farkas013) воевали за страну которой нет!!! жаль что правительсива многих бывших союзных республик чуть ли не преступниками ветеранов афгана считают... (They fought for a country that no longer exists! It's a pity that the governments of many of the former allied republics think of Afghan veterans almost as criminals.)
> (OlshDeflagration) Старшие братья с честью прошли свой путь, верю и мы не осрамимся, если время придет вновь, а оно придет.... (Older brothers with honour went their way, I believe that we will not disgrace ourselves, if the time comes again, and it will come.)
> (Ivan Z) НАстоящие сыновья своей потеряной РОДИНЫ ... (The true sons of their lost HOMELAND)
> (Maxim 499) Слава Всем Солдатам воевавшим в Афганистане! (Glory to All Soldiers fighting in Afghanistan!)[9]

One memory carrier that processes and transmits the memory of the war in Afghanistan, especially to the younger generation, is the cinema. Films focused on the Afghan war began to emerge in the '80s – on both sides of the Iron Curtain (e.g. *Rambo III*, dir. by Peter MacDonald, 1988) depicts fictional events during the Afghan war). One of the best films of the presented conflict *Афганский излом* (Afghan Breakdown) of 1991 directed by Vladimir Bortko is considered. This war drama film reveals new and unexpected trials that war situation put before soldiers; another scene of this hell on earth during the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Many veterans regard this movie as the best account of the Afghan war. Also worthy of mention is Vladimir Khotinenko' film *Мусульманин* (A Moslem, 1995). This philosophical movie shows the drama of a man who spent seven years in Afghan captive, converted to Islam,

and returned to his homeland did not find understanding. Thus, the film presents the formation of the personality, faith, different perceptions of good and evil, difficulties in accepting what is new and different.

One of the most popular films on the war in Afghanistan still is *9 рота* (*The 9th Company*) directed in 2005 by Fedor Bondarchuk. The film presents the fate of a group of recruits who began their military service in the late 1980-ties and after a few months of training were sent to Afghanistan. The film shows the events that occurred during the Operation "Magistral" in the beginning of 1988, when the 9th Company fought at a height of 3234 meters. At that time the Soviet authorities decided to withdraw the troops, but due to confusion, the authorities forget the 9th Company. After heavy fighting against the prevalent forces of the enemy, almost the entire contingent was killed. Liutyj, the only soldier who survived, however, is sure that his company has won its war. In many details the film is different from the real events (a different season of the year, a different place and time of the battle, a different number of the killed). However, for the film director, the message of the film was the most important:

> Это фильм о моем поколении, о войне, о товариществе. Про мужскую любовь, про подвиг, предательство и верность. Та правда, которую я стремился показать в кадре, возможно, не понравится генералам. Но наши консультанты—солдаты, которые были в Афганистане,—после просмотра выходили в состоянии эмоционального подъема. Для меня это имеет огромное значение. Я готов к тому, что эту картину будут ругать высокие чины, которым не понравится мой взгляд (It is a movie about my generation, about the war, about the camaraderie. About men's love, heroic deeds, betrayal and loyalty. Perhaps the generals will not like the truth, which I have tried to show in the picture. But our consultants—the soldiers who were in Afghanistan—came out in a state of emotional agitation after watching the film. For me it is very important. I realize that this picture will be criticized by those with high rank who will not like my point of view) (*Interv'iu i statti*, part 3, 1; *Интервью и статьи*, ч. 3, 1.).

In one of his interviews, Bondarchuk said that today many people do not know about that war to which young boys right after graduating from school had been sent. When 18-year-olds were sent to the Chechen front the public was outraged, but no one thought about the fact that a similar situation took place in Afghanistan within the same 10-year period. The director stressed that the Vietnam War haunts the U.S. to this day. In contrast, the Soviet Union participated in the war in Afghanistan for ten years, but after perestroika the war was forgotten. In the film, Bondarchuk was looking for the "hero of our time" and—as he says—it seems that he has found his. While shooting this picture, he thought of youthful idealism and illusions that are then lost. These illusions have been used by the authorities by sending young men to war, who were eager to see if they would be able to do a heroic deed (*Interv'iu i statti*, part 3, 1; *Интервью и статьи*, ч. 3, 1.). According to the director, the film is about how boys were becoming men. But not everyone is convinced whether Afghanistan could actually transform young people in the real patriots. The film is compared to the film

production *Они сражались за родину* (They Fought for Their Country, 1975) by Sergei Bondarchuk, Fyodor's father, which is one of the most poignant films about the Second World War. It is easy to notice the similarity of the subject, situations, characters—their tragic death as a result of irresponsible commanders (Bykov; Быков).

The film was a box office success that also had a deep effect on viewers. Sergei Minaev, a journalist, admitted that after watching the film he was in a state of trance. He saw many men who smoked cigarettes in silence and wept after the screening. He emphasized that the film presents the characters who—most importantly—want to believe. It was also important that for the first time since the early 1990s the characters of a domestic film were not criminals or drug dealers. It turned out that national heroes can be ordinary boys from different parts of the Soviet Union, who then joined the army and died for their country. Thus, the film illustrates the national idea and the tragedy of the young generation (Minaev; Минаев). The film can be considered a tribute, a monument in honour of those who sacrificed their health, youth, and life to fight in Afghanistan.[10]

The tragic fate of the Soviet soldiers who were captured was told by a war drama *Пешаварский вальс* (the Peshavar Waltz, dir. Timur Bekmambetov and Gennadii Kaiumov, 1994). The film was based on real events and shows an uprising of the Soviet and Afghan soldiers held captive in a Pakistani camp. These 'unofficial' soldiers, unrecognized by the Soviet Union, heroically sacrifice their lives so that the dushman camp could be abolished. Despite the numerous awards won at foreign film festivals, the film was not very popular in Russia. Much information about the rebellion shown in the film, during which all the soldiers (over twenty) were killed, is still shrouded in mystery. The governing bodies of the Soviet Union did not want to admit that Soviet soldiers were being held in camps, because according to the official version, the contingent of Soviet troops did not take part in combat operations (Shkurlatov; Шкурлатов). Another film was made based on the motifs of the novel by Aleksandr Zviagintsev *Русский Рэмбо* (Russian Rambo, 1996). Called *Дезертир*/*Русский Рэмбо* (The Deserter/Russian Rambo, dir. Iurii Muzyka, 1997), this film shows the conflict between a soldier's duty and love for wife kidnapped by the dushmen. Lastly, the war film *Черная акула* (Black Shark, dir. Vitalii Lukin, 1993) presented the operation of the new Soviet military helicopter Ka-50 in the combat conditions in Afghanistan. It was the ideological predecessor of *9 рота* and the first movie filmed in the genre of Russian military-patriotic propaganda.

In addition to the cinema, television has been an essential medium shaping life attitudes about the Afghan war, especially of young audiences. The war was shown in a series *Охотники за караванами* (The Caravans Hunters, dir. S. Chekalov, 2010). That war drama was based on the works of Alexander Prochanov *Охотник за караванами* (The Caravans Hunters, 2003) and *Мусульманская свадьба* (Muslim Wedding, 1989). It presents the events of 1987, focusing on the Soviet Army's attempt to take over the new types of weapons ("stinger"). A war documentary series with the elements of historical reconstruction *Афганская война* should be mentioned (The Afghan War, dir. Aleksei and Tatian Krol, 2009). At the core of the screen-play is the book *Трагедия и*

доблесть Афгана (The Tragedy And Heroism of the Afghan, 1995) by a retired Major-General Aleksandr Liakhovskii. The film focuses on the struggle of Soviet troops with international terrorism and presents the points of view of all parties to the conflict. The production shows how a relatively small regional conflict can lead to a global problem of drug trafficking (*V Rossii snimut…*; *В России снимут…*).

The subject of the war in Afghanistan also reached the Internet, which provides a lot of possibilities for the development and popularization of the cultural memory. On the one hand, it can be said again, after Marian Golka, that the Internet is a boundless ocean of oblivion, which reduces individual memories to little remains. On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that it is also a gigantic archive, collecting various data about the past and present and a very effective tool for their categorization (Golka 2009, 115-118). The motifs of the Afghan war appear on websites such as those featuring "demotivators" that are especially popular among and created mostly by the younger generation. According to Golka, young people "do not celebrate the collective memory anymore, and it happens that they distance themselves from it—they often distance themselves from tradition, seeing it as a burden and an obstacle" (Golka 2009, 66).

One of the demotivators shows a young veteran of the Afghan war with medals on his chest. Under his photo, there was a description: "Афганистан. 'Афганистан, грохочет где-то пулемет'. Они сражались достойно и про них забыла родина" ("Afghanistan. 'Afganistan, a machine gun roars somewhere'. They fought with dignity and their homeland has forgotten them") (*Afganistan*; *Афганистан…*). The commentary provides a clear criticism of the attitude of Russian society towards soldiers-veterans. Another picture shows the pain and tragedy of veterans who, despite the passage of decades, still experience what they experienced during the war. The demotivational poster shows a kneeling well-built veteran who is holding a blue beret in his hand. He looks at the burning fire, while holding the other hand on his heart. The description is very significant: "Афганистан болит в душе моей" ("Afghanistan hurts in my soul") (*Afganistan bolit…*; *Афганистан болит…*). The next composition shows the sands of the desert reaching to the horizon: "Красиво и страшно... Афганистан..." ("Beautifully and terribly... Afghanistan…") (*Krasivo i strashno…*; *Красиво и страшно…*). This clearly shows the threat which from the beginning was the war in Afghanistan, a country that has never been captured by anyone. Another demotivator presents two pictures: on the top picture one can see a column of Soviet troops withdrawing from Afghanistan; on the bottom a drug addict injects heroin. The commentary explains that the war was not pointless, and the withdrawal of troops contributed to making Afghanistan a powerful exporter of drugs: "Мы ушли из Афганистана, но что лучше—15 000 погибших за десять лет войны или миллионы погибших от афганского героина" ("We walked away from Afghanistan, but what is better—15,000 who died within ten years of war than millions killed by Afghan heroin") (*My ushli…*; *Мы ушли …*).

Demotivators can be considered as specific depreciation acts, communication events carrying axiological meaning. Małgorzata Majewska recognized depreciation as a linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour, deliberate or involuntary, the aim of which is to threaten the positive aspect of the interlocutor's view, and is an attack on

his positively integrated self-image. In the context of the above-mentioned images, we can talk about the deliberate pursuit of the addresser to cast doubt and insecurity in the mind of the addressee, to force him to consider the difficult aspects of the late-Soviet history and the fate of those whose lives were ruined by war (Majewska 2005, 7).

As stated by Gregory Feifer, the war in Afghanistan affected not only those who have personally experienced it: "For many Soviets, it represented a last senile folly of the Brezhnev era. Gorbachev's 'bloody wound' highlighted the system's bankruptcy and undoubtedly to some degree helped speed the collapse of the Soviet Union" (Feifer 2009, 257). According to Braithwaile, most difficult for veterans was awareness of the difference between how they were treated and how their fathers and grandfathers, returning as heroes after a victory over Hitler, were greeted. However, the reception of the Afghan war changed over time: President Vladimir Putin restored a sense of pride in the history of Russia in the 20th century, and especially the history of the Soviet Union. Patriotism and glory of Russia's military history began to be emphasized. Consequently, the war in Afghanistan was looked at as a heroic episode, during which the soldiers fulfilled their military duty and defended the interests of the Soviet homeland (Braithwaite 2011, 324). In this context, celebrated anniversaries should be considered another important memory carrier.

The 20th anniversary of the withdrawal of troops was very solemnly celebrated in February 2009 at the Olympic Stadium in Moscow. About five thousand veterans and their family members came to the stadium. On Sunday, February 15—the anniversary day—there was a momentous ceremony in the Kremlin. Veterans could feel then, that after two decades of service and suffering in Afghanistan, that they had finally gained some recognition, even if the state for which they had fought, no longer existed (Braithwaite 2011, 326-327). This way the review process of memory took place, although one can also see elements of its instrumentalization. Memory can in fact very easily become the subject of political battle, an instrument of manipulation by politicians. Referring to the issue of official memory, Aleida Assmann emphasized its weak point, which consists in reliance on censorship and artificial animation. This contributes to the fact that the persistence of this type of memory is exactly like the durability of power that supports it (Assmann 2009a, 134). Also, it should be remembered that the collective memory is the memory of politics. Moreover, as long as communication memory is distributed and forms by itself, as well as falls apart by itself, the collective memory is directed from the outside and is characterized by a high degree of uniformity (Assmann 2009b, 164). At the same time, according to Golka: "Polityka pamięci jest niezbędna do uzyskania (czy odzyskania) spójności danej zbiorowości i skonstruowania jej tożsamości oraz w celu nakreślenia jakiejś perspektywy przyszłości – słowem, do stworzenia określonej formy ładu zbiorowego" ("The politics of memory is needed to obtain (or recover) the consistency of a given community and construct its identity and to outline some prospects for the future—in a word, to create a particular form of collective order") (Golka 2009, 125).

Gregory Feifer noted that the attitude of the Russians themselves towards to the war in Afghanistan changes. This is connected with the fact that Russia, rich in raw materials, wanted a new confrontation with the West in the twenty-first century, seeking to regain the lost position in the world:

> And in Moscow, outward displays of patriotism and political loyalty again have become the going currency for getting ahead in business and politics. Veterans and students of the war are increasingly looking back at the conflict through a Cold War prism, speaking less about Moscow's mistakes in Afghanistan and more about the war's lessons for dealing with the United States. […] Many veterans are proud of their service, fiercely loyal to their comrades, and highly critical of how the conflict was fought (Feifer 2009, 278-279).

Undoubtedly, the state and Russian society needs a fair settlement with the past, which is demonstrated by the number of contradictions in the evaluations disclosed in the Russians' opinions about these events. Considering the difficult process of dealing with this aspect of the Soviet past, Golka's words are worth recalling, which remind us that the past as the content of social memory is one of the components of the present which is most difficult to measure and determine. The evaluation of its impact on the future seems even more complicated (Golka 2009, 20). As Vladimir Kutiavin noted, the approach of the Russian state to the Soviet heritage is characterized by eclecticism, because on the one hand the Soviet anthem, rooted in the consciousness, is restored (with a small text change), while on the other hand, the very 'own' revolutionary holiday of November 7th is abolished (Kutiawin 2008, 39).

The above mentioned memory carriers proved that the history of the war in Afghanistan is a component of the social memory and an important element in the process of constructing cultural memory of the Russians. The multitude and variety of memory carriers, storing and transmitting to subsequent generations of Russians the memory of participants and observers shows that for a considerable part of the Russian society the Afghan conflict is an element of the constitution of identity. Moreover, the events of several decades ago became the subjects of interest to a younger generation of Russians, which is another link in the chain of transmission of an appropriately modified cultural memory clothed in symbols.

In summary, we can identify the following mechanisms and procedures currently used by Russians to position information about events surrounding the Afghanistan war:

- emphasizing the heroism and courage of the Soviet soldiers (since taking office by President Vladimir Putin)
- noting the lack of stability in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the inability to control the situation in the country by U.S. and European forces
- commemorating fallen soldiers (monuments, obelisks)
- celebrating anniversaries associated with the Afghan events (withdrawal of Soviet troops)

- dispelling the assertion that in Afghanistan the Soviet Union was defeated
- on the part of some veterans, convincing the public of the false, distorted image of the Afghan war; denial of reports of poor Soviet military preparation; and the cases of violence from their side against the civilian population
- a firm belief among most of Russian society about the lack of justification for the conduct of that war
- reprocessing of the Afghan war experiences in memoirs, literary works, songs, films and series
- attempting to present the conflict in Afghanistan as a platform enabling young "boys" to become "men" (the film *9 рота*)
- creating demotivators as a way to present the Afghan events to the younger generation of Russians.

Thus, one can consider that the aim of constructing memory about the Afghan war is to shape a collective identity for Russian people, focusing closely around the pride and mighty power of the Soviet state. Its political functions revolve around the intention to continue the imperial tradition of the Soviet state in contemporary reality while rejecting the negative connotations for the former regime. However, the social functions of the formed identity consist of a quest to unite the diverse Russian society around the idea of a strong state, providing its citizens with stability and a sense of security (especially external one), which sharply contrasts with the politically and economically staggering Russian state after the fall of the USSR.

Notes

1 This article was supported by funding from the Jagiellonian University within the SET project. The project is co-financed by the European Union.

2 Both the military actions in Afghanistan and in the North Caucasus have not received the official name "war".

3 R. Braithwaite reports 15,051 people were killed in Afghanistan, or 2.4% of all in military service. Over 50,000 soldiers were wounded, and more than 10,000 became invalids (Braithwaite 2011, 329-330). For comparison, the total number of casualties as a result of the Vietnam War on the American side was more than 57,500 people. The war has cost the Americans $165 billion (*Общие людские…*).

4 To read about the massacre of civilians in a village in northern Afghanistan, see *Czardara. Zapamietaj*, Vanves 1985. About the demoralization of the Soviet contingent, manufacture and use of alcohol (even making moonshine), and drugs (marijuana), see Feifer, 182-184. One of the former Soviet Afghan prisoners mentioned the murder of an Afghan captive, who was lashed to a cannon when a bullet was fired. He also admitted that the violation of military discipline was tolerated. *Афганистан в огне*, 37-39.

5 "Black Tulips" were four-engined transport planes carrying from Afghanistan to the Soviet Union coffins of fallen soldiers. Containers in which the coffins were transported were labelled with the cryptonim "Cargo 200." Braithwaite, 253-257.

6 A landing uniform became a symbol identifying a participant of the war. Gradually,

August 2 (Ranger's Day) has become a holiday and a specific Victory Day for Afghan veterans. This date was chosen because the official date for the introduction of troops was not announced for a long time; moreover, the official dates had ideological significance, and the airborne troops in Afghanistan were the most numerous (Данилова).

7 A rich collection of novels and short stories written by the participants of the war in Afghanistan can be found on the website: *Афганская война*, http://lib.ru/MEMUARY/AFGAN/ [accessed 7 April 2014].

8 About the music at the front, soldiers bards (e.g. Igor Morozov), see Braithwaite, 192-195.

9 See the comments under the video clip on the website: *Афган*, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-mTvPwAv2oI [accessed 20 March 2014].

10 Eventually, the popularity of the film was used by the creators of computer games. A strategy game was created, called *9 рота* (The 9th Company), and a documentary game *Правда о девятой роте* (The Truth About the 9th Company), which is an interactive reconstruction of the historical battle of 7th and 8th January 1988. For the creators, such games were intended to form young people's patriotism and provide them with knowledge about the military issues, history and geography (*V ramkakh XII VRNS…*; *В рамках XII ВРНС*…).

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The Experience of Afghanistan and its Relevance for Post-Soviet Russia

Some Remarks From a Historical Perspective

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It has long been argued that the war in Afghanistan played a crucial role in the downfall of the USSR. It undermined the credibility of the old regime under Brezhnev and his successors and, perhaps more crucially, it also delegitimized Mikhail Gorbachev's reform policies (Sapper 1994; Galeotti 1995). Roughly three years after the last Soviet soldier left the Hindu Kush, the Soviet Union disintegrated. As Mark Galeotti quipped, the Sovietization of Afghanistan had failed—but what about the Afghanization of the USSR (1995, 1)? Today, in the light of frozen conflicts on Georgia's northern borders, in Karabakh and Transnistria as well as the ongoing war in the Donbas, this question remains relevant. The legacy of the war in Afghanistan is manifold but its lasting impact on the post-Soviet space is the spread of irregular violence and wild wars. The essay by Anna Kadykało shows, convincingly, how war and violence have left its imprint on the public imagination in Russia. Yet, crucially, I would argue that in the case of the Afghanistan War, the representation of the war in popular culture can hardly be separated from violent practices and the crisis of statehood that have shaped post-Soviet societies in the past decades. When it comes to violence, the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan may be interpreted as a crucial caesura, because it formed a milieu of veterans and experts that gained influence on politics as well as culture. The war marked the beginning of the end of the more peaceful era of late socialism.

Any modern war is first fought and then remembered in the media. World War II or Vietnam may serve as examples in the Western world. They both left a deep imprint on popular culture. Much of the same holds true for Russia. The Stalinist invention of the "Great Fatherland War" has come to dominate official memory of war and conflict in the USSR and in Russia. Its narrative about love of the homeland, struggle against the fascist invaders and, most importantly, victory, came to legitimize Leonid Brezhnev's rule and was revived under Vladimir Putin. Today, the carefully administered myth of the "Great Fatherland War" is used to legitimize Russian statehood and authoritarian rule (Behrends 2015b). Simultaneously the narrative of Afghanistan—once in opposition to the official military culture of the USSR—is gradually finding a place in the official discourse. The controlled and scripted public sphere of Russia also shapes the way the Soviet past and its wars are remembered (Satter 2012; Pomerantsev 2014; Dubin 2011, 47–164). Yet, the representation of war and violence changed over time.

In the beginning, under Brezhnev and Andropov, the war in Afghanistan was kept secret. Officially, Soviet troops were simply fulfilling their "internationalist duty." Even under Mikhail Gorbachev it took a couple of years before *glasnost* would change the way the Soviet public could discuss the war in the Hindu Kush. In 1985, there was even an official document which laid out what could be

said about Afghanistan—and what had to remain secret. His policies opened the debate about the war and, more broadly, Soviet military culture. During the final years of the USSR and immediately after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the war was often scandalized. The defeat weighed heavily on the reputation of the Soviet Army, but on top of that came stories about dysfunctionality, corruption, misconduct, abuse and war crimes committed in Afghanistan. The war was portrayed as a senseless endeavor: Young Soviet men had been sacrificed for a lost cause. Generally, the war in Afghanistan had contradicted Gorbachev's civilizing mission in the USSR. Under Stalin and during much of the Cold War the Soviet population was kept in a state of constant struggle and mobilization. Indeed, under communist rule the distinction between war and peace was often blurred (Lewada 1993, 116–138). Gorbachev and his team promoted civil values and tried to put an end to the glorification of war and military in the USSR. Yet, his reforms from above were not necessarily supported by large segments of society. Many *afgantsy* were frustrated because they did not gain the status of those veterans who had fought against Hitler (Fedor et al. 2015; Edele 2008). Rather, they often found themselves at the margins of society and had to struggle for recognition and material compensation. They frequently refuted the criticism of Soviet military culture. At the end of 1991 the empire they had served disintegrated and the Soviet Army was succeeded by more than a dozen national Armies—the Russian one being, of course, the largest and most important one. Still, from then on there would be not just one narrative about the Afghan War. Rather, each of the successor states of the USSR made sense of the Afghan experience in its own way. Depending on where they lived the veterans of the war had to adapt to different circumstances and found themselves in different positions. Furthermore, each former Soviet republic attempted to regulate official memory of the Afghan War according to its own priorities. The imagined community of the Soviet *afgantsy* fell apart before it could establish itself as a political factor. Still, the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s were a short period where the disturbing and violent memories of the war in Afghanistan were discussed—in Russia and beyond. Svetlana Alexievich's iconic "Zinky Boys"—first published in 1991—represents this period (Alexievich 1991, 719–734; see also Behrends 2015a).

In the Russian Federation the prestige and the performance of the military remained low under Boris El'cin. While the first Russian president kept paying lip service to Gorbachev's project of civil reforms, he began to use the military widely against internal foes. In October 1993, El'cin moved tanks against the rebellious Supreme Soviet and its building was bombarded. Only months later, El'cin ordered the invasion of the break-away republic of Chechnya in the northern Caucasus. His attempt at retaking Chechnya was the first full-scale military operation of post-Soviet Russia. It was fought on its own soil and against its own citizens. The military violence in the Caucasus killed thousands of combatants as well as civilians (Tishkov 2004; Gilligan 2010). It failed to re-establish a more positive image of the armed forces. To the contrary, the tendency to harshly criticize the Army's conduct continued in the rela-

tively free press of the 1990s. The prestige of the Russian Army sank to a new low. The de-legitimization of the military tradition could have opened the way for a more civil Russia, where the Army would no longer be one of the main pillars of the state. But the process of civil reform from above—begun in 1985—ended during El'cin's presidency and his successor, Vladimir Putin, used the Russian state and controlled mass media to promote the image of the Armed Forces and to and to re-militarize society.

As part of this process, the Russian leadership also tried to change the way the Afghan War was remembered. A strong and heroic Russia, it was claimed, had only fought just and heroic wars. This claim had to be extended to the Afghan War. Over time post-Soviet Russia chose to remember the fallen conscripts as victims of a failed policy (Oushakine 2009, 130–201). The disturbing memory of violence of the war and the atrocities committed were increasingly filtered out of the picture. Beginning at the end of the 1990s the *afganets* was gradually turned into a nihilistic hero who did his duty in difficult times. The popular movie *deviataia rota* from 2005, mentioned by Kadykało, may be interpreted as one manifestation of this broader trend. Today we find an extensive literature in Russia on those who fought in "hot spots" ("*goriachie tochki*") and their heroism. And, as Anna Kadykało correctly points out, the very fact that the USSR withdrew from Afghanistan and lost the war is nowadays often disputed. She shows how the memory of the war was and continues to be determined by political circumstance. The state and its institutions continue to be a powerful actor in the field of history politics. Similar to Soviet times, conformity with the official narrative is once again expected in Russia. Those who resist the re-writing of history and state-induced myth making are being pushed to the margins of society.

The Russia of Vladimir Putin has seen a renaissance of the culture of violence and heroism that had characterized the USSR. The Russian leadership is the main sponsor of this trend. This may be observed in pop culture as well as the mass media in general. Many in the elite have a background from the military or the secret police—often including service in Afghanistan or Chechnya (Taylor 2011, 26–70; Kryschtanowskaja 2005). The official ideology of the state and Russia's ruling class once again glorify the military and war (Eltchaninoff 2015). The "normalization" of the Afghan experience is part and parcel of this larger process. Military culture has once again entered the realm of education and sports. The process of re-militarization of the public sphere became especially pronounced after Vladimir Putin returned to the president's office in 2012. It reached new heights during the conflict with Ukraine. The annexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014, the hybrid invasion of the Donbas and most recently the Russian air campaign in Syria were supported by emotional mobilization in state controlled TV. Russian citizens are expected to support government policy; dissenters are openly threatened and sometimes severely punished. Boris Nemcov, the opposition politician who attacked the Kremlin for the aggression against neighboring Ukraine, was murdered on the streets of central Moscow in February 2015. Resisting national mobilization and spreading the facts about Russia's military is once again dangerous.

Like during the Cold War, Russia is once again portrayed as a besieged fortress; in this cultural context a permanent state of war legitimizes aggression against neighboring states as well as internal repression. In many ways, Russia has gone full circle: the critical discourse triggered by the Afghan War has been replaced by state controlled militarization of politics and societies similar to the Soviet past.

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Reviews

The Blind Man and the Loon: The Story of a Tale. By Craig Mishler. Lincoln, NE and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2013. Pp. vii + 246, list of illustrations, foreword, preface, acknowledgements, introduction, conclusion, afterword, appendices, notes, references, index.

The result of forty years of research, Craig Mishler's *The Blind Man and the Loon* is a significant example of what twenty-first-century folklorists do. Mishler's text is an auto-ethnography—a work in which Mishler acknowledges his role as a "curator, biographer, interpreter, and friend" of the story as well as those tellers whose continual reiterations span across the subarctic from Alaska and Northwest Canada to Labrador and Greenland (xx). The narrative, in variation, spans eight regional groups or "oicotypes", "moving fluidly across the continents of North America and Greenland like gigantic herds of caribou" (xxv). Mishler gives ample evidence of the "livingness" of the tale as it has emerged from time immemorial (when loons could speak with people) into popular media: films, compact discs, radio broadcasts, a ballet, a composition of chamber music, theatrical performances, and various literary adaptations (119-20). Mishler says that an estimated 33 million people have seen the abbreviated film adaptation/revision *The Loon's Necklace* (123). Mishler has also "discovered . . . eighty-six artistic works "based on the tale created by no less than fifty-four different artists"—paintings, etchings, sculptures, woodcuts, and masks (96). Contemporary Native storytellers Annie Blue (2009), James and Maggie Gilbert (1973), and Kenny Thomas (2000) are included under Mishler's designation of artists.

The text includes Mishler's commendable discussion of the contributions and shortcomings of well-known folklorists Hinrick Rink, Emile Petitot, Franz Boas, and Knud Rasmussen, as well as criticisms of semi-literary variants by such notable authors as N. Scott Momaday. The ethics of collecting, translating, and redacting are brought into question. Mishler calls Native storytellers cartographers. He contends that "the story of the Blind Man and the Loon is a cognitive map of ancient Indian and Eskimo cultures, plotting systems of knowledge, emotion, belief, and value" (154). The tale is, in many respects, a cautionary tale. "Even when corrupted" by ignorant, unaware, unethical collectors who don't acknowledge their informants, edit out portions (the violence) of the tale, or mash versions together, the story remains "a vibrant, protean piece of culture, a life force," says Mishler (155).

If anthropologists, ethnographers, folklorists, and mythographers can be called scientists, Mishler's text is dense with the stuff of scientific investigation: data, facts, maps, folkloric structures (the morphology and molecular structure of the narrative), and linguistic analyses (original native renditions set alongside translations). Drawing on an analogy from Darwin's study of groups of finches, Mishler groups various versions of the tale into eight "regional oicotypes." However, it is in the chapters discussing the function and possible meanings of the story that Mishler's text takes flight and travels with the loons. The story is troubling in any Native variant (popular redactions tend to leave out the violent reci-

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procity). A blind man (often a shaman) in a subsistence culture is tricked out of his kill for food by a selfish, cruel, and angry grandmother or wife. Often left to survive on his own, or with the help of a sister, loons take pity on the medicine man and restore his sight through their healing medicines or rituals. With his sight restored, the man returns to his people and wreaks vengeance on the woman who betrayed him.

The above oversimplification of the narrative runs counter to what Mishler advises for any retelling; but the essential disturbing details are there—void of the ethnopoetics typical of the telling by Maggie Gilbert rehearsed in Chapter Four. Of particular delight is Mishler's reference to a YouTube site where Maggie's voice can be heard speaking the story in Gwich'in with the sound of her clock chiming in the background (86). Maggie's Gwich'in version of the tale includes the children of the medicine man who collude with their mother in the betrayal of their father. The shaman kills his wife and abandons his children because of their mutual treachery. The shaman's relatives are not happy with his behavior; and Maggie believes the man's behavior is too "harsh" (82, 88). Such a telling seems to demand commentary. The narrative has mythic import and, therefore, reveals a female as instigator of the disruption of a problematic yet harmonious cultural ethic. The creation of violent reciprocity ensues—a role given to a male of some spiritual stature. Is gender hostility foundational? That the tale has endured through time is referenced by Maggie's continual punctuation of the story with "they say." And "they say" is a typical reference to mythic/historical/psychological truth.

Mishler is "convinced" that the story is told "by Natives everywhere in the North because it weaves together several basic themes or tenets of indigenous Native American and First Nations life" (137). Among these themes are: the necessity of sharing food in subsistence cultures, the significance of kinship cooperation, the conflicts that can dismantle families and cultures, the obligation of Native peoples to care for the disabled, and the sympathy that must endure if tribal peoples are to endure. Of particular interest to Mishler are the transformative elements in the tale: "the transformation of a blind man into one that sees, the transformation of a wicked woman into a narwhal" and the ritual transformation brought about by the power of the loons to heal. The killing of various animals—polar bear, moose, deer, buffalo—by the shaman might also indicate a passage into manhood, including the arrival of "sexual potency." Dimensions of psychology, sociology, ethnography and social justice rise up in Mishler's commentary. The durability of the tale can be attributed to the fact that "the tale offers practical and symbolic solutions to complex social problems such as the breakdown of the nuclear family and the destruction and loss of kinship rights and obligations" as well as decoding the formulation of the ethical demands of cultural identity formation (155). Additionally, the tale teaches while it entertains.

While Craig Mishler insists that folktales like the Blind Man and the Loon be "respected as the private property of the storyteller, of the community, or of the indigenous tribal group" from which they come, they are also models of human

communities' efforts to establish meaning that transcends boundaries and provides insight into collective archetypes that contribute to our cross-cultural humanity. Essential to such insight is the unveiling of violent reciprocity that appears to be deep-rooted in many mythologies—an insight continually discussed by René Girard in the multiple conferences dedicated to Girard's thought. Such violent reciprocity can be seen in numerous instances in contemporary political and religious practices. When Maggie Gilbert ends her story with, "That's what is said about it./And so that's it./That's the end of the story" and her husband adds, "Nothing more," could that be an indication of the discontinuity of cultural life-ways or the loss of cultural integrity brought about by violent reciprocity? The publication of *The Blind Man and the Loon* by the University of Nebraska Press is yet another contribution of the press to the world's body of knowledge. The text could be used in university classes within various disciplines: anthropology, sociology, psychology, and, of course, the humanities.

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The Undiscovered Country: Text, Translation, and Modernity in the Work of Yanagita Kunio. By Melek Ortabasi. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2014. Pp. xiv + 329, list of figures, acknowledgments, abbreviations, introduction, notes, bibliography, index.

Casting a long shadow in folklore studies in Japan, as well as numerous other countries, Yanagita Kunio (1875-1962) has often been the subject of historiographic studies in both Japanese and English. Yet, as Melek Ortabasi observes in the introduction to *The Undiscovered Country*, these accounts have tended to filter their understanding of Yanagita's works through certain reductive positions. Some, especially those that grew out of the Post-War scholarship on Yanagita in Japan, approach the study of his works primarily through his notoriety as an ideological maverick who "even during his lifetime...was regarded as an eccentric, domineering crackpot almost as often as he was labelled a brilliant, versatile iconoclast" (4). Others, by contrast, beginning with the English-language scholarship following Ronald Morse's 1974 doctoral research and extending into later Japanese language works, "have gravitated toward a deconstruction of his text, treating them as natural though not particularly desirable symptoms of larger historical, political, and cultural trends" (8). This "Jamesonian stance," the author observes, tended to read Yanagita's texts "against the grain, thus 'disclosing the absent cause that structures the text's inclusions and exclusions...[and] restor[ing] to the surface the deep history that the text represses.'" Not necessarily wholly rejecting either position, Ortabasi instead envisions this book as "part of a new category of scholarship on Yanagita that continues to examine his significance in the political/cultural discourse on nation and modernity in Japan, but by shifting to a focus on what his writing *does* do" (9). The intervention Ortabasi offers, in other words, is to "privlege both the historical context and the materiality of [Yanagita's] texts," rather than seeking to submerge these texts into a reading of either the author or the socio-politics of late 19th and early 20th century Japan (9-10).

Despite its basic aim to intervene in the scholarly analysis of the works of Yanagita, *The Undiscovered Country* is one of those rare academic works that is successfully able to produce both a deep analysis of a limited group of materials and a much broader set of critiques that resonate well beyond the study's subject. In particular, Ortabasi's exploration of "translation" as "both a literal practice and an extended metaphor," offers readers a fascinating analytical lens through which to approach both the ethnographic process and the works of ethnographic scholars more broadly. To begin with, it illuminates Yanagita's efforts to "look outside mainstream domestic discourse, or the metaphorical target culture, 'eschew[ing] fluency for a more heterogeneous mix of discourses' in his texts by showcasing archaic and obscure localisms to write *his* version of the Japanese cultural narrative" (12). Yet, while this approach has often been critiqued for its connections with Japanese nationalism, Yanagita's methodology also unintentionally "repeatedly expose[d] the constructedness of cultural identity, thus

undermining his own quest to repair the fissures he perceived in the national body" (13). Finally, Ortabasi argues "[n]ew approaches have much to gain by judging Yanagita's writing on its ability to reinterpret and resist more powerful cultural discourses, rather than how it conforms to them" (19).

Each of the work's five chapters picks up this exploration of the process of translation in Yanagita's works, focusing on different aspects of the meaning of this term and how it played out in different periods of his scholarship. In the first chapter, one of the best argued sections of the work, Ortabasi examines Yanagita's translation of orality, that central concept in 20th century folkloristics, in the context of his well-known *Tales of Tōno* (1910). Although long considered the founding text of folkloristics in Japan, Ortabasi notes (following Marilyn Ivy) that this interpretation only emerged after the text was republished in an expanded edition in 1935, once folk studies had already come into its own, largely through Yanagita's efforts. Instead of reading the text as the opening salvo in the battle to create folk studies, Ortabasi argues that it should instead be considered in relation to the contemporary literary movements, of which Yanagita was an important, if sometimes erstwhile, part. For instance, Ortabasi argues that Yanagita's conscious choice to adopt the neoclassical *bungo* style of language in this text was not nostalgic rejection of the more popular vernacular style associated with modernist naturalism. Rather, it was a rejection of the privileging of the internalized and psychologized subject in modernist literature, in favor of a view of consciousness as "something socially, even communally, constructed." This socially constructed consciousness was only accessible, in Yanagita's view, through an "unironic and frank depiction of people who recognize their ties to each other and to the landscape" (41, 46). As such, by setting up his text with a reader-directed yet personified narrator who can guide the reader through this socially-constructed landscape rather than filter it through his own internal perspective, Yanagita, as translator rather than author or observer, offers a "model for modern subjectivity...a modern analog of the storyteller, who weaves the narrative to link traveler with villager, individual with community" (54).

Working both thematically and in loose chronological order, Ortabasi's remaining chapters apply the concept of translation developed in the beginning of the book to examine a variety of other aspects of Yanagita's work. These include, in chapter two, his reinterpretation of pre-modern genres of travel literature as translation to bring forth "the awareness of the foreign within the self" (97) and, in chapter three, his attempts to develop a methodology for folk studies as interpretive "self-translation." In chapter four, Ortabasi deftly outlines Yanagita's rejection of the standardization of Japanese in favor of dialect speech that did not "spring fully formed from the heads of scholars but would emerge over time through a communal process of self-aware play and experimentation with language" (169). In doing so, Yanagita argued, this language could better "translate" the diverse experience of meaning in everyday living into speech. In the fifth chapter, Ortabasi addresses the ways in which Yanagita attempted

to apply his radical critique of modern subjectivity and his formulation of folk studies methods to break down the existing disciplinary approaches in school textbooks and create a more accessible and open-ended textual pedagogy.

Like the works it studies, Ortabasi's book is a densely layered and deeply erudite affair. Though clearly written and not overly laden with technical discussions, it is not a text that could be easily approached by students or non-academic readers. It is, however, a book that should be read widely in the fields of literary studies, translation studies, and folkloristics. The richly theorized interpretive work presented here, in the context of the works of a single, if extraordinary, scholar, offers a stimulating reappraisal of the possible relations between the ethnographer and the ethnographic text, as well as an intriguing view of the nature of modern subjectivity.

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Seeking the Promised Land: Mormons and American Politics. By David E. Campbell, John C. Green, and J. Quin Monson. New York City: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Pp. xiv + 294, preface, acknowledgements, data appendix, bibliography, index.

On October 9, 2014, in the midst of a particularly contentious midterm election, the First Presidency of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints issued a letter to be read to Church congregations throughout the United States urging members to register and regularly exercise their right to vote. This letter, like those circulated each election cycle, admonished Latter-day Saints to study the candidates and support wise, honest leaders, but it did not recommend specific candidates. Instead, the Church maintained its political neutrality and clarified that admirable characteristics could be found in candidates across the political spectrum. Despite the Church's political ambivalence, its membership is markedly not. In fact, 65% of Mormons in the United States identify as part of, or lean towards, the Republican Party, making Mormons the most Republican religious group and one of the most Republican subcultures in the United States. This has not always been the case. In *Seeking the Promised Land*, political scientists David E. Campbell, John C. Green, and J. Quin Monson trace the evolution of Mormon political preferences from Joseph Smith's 1844 presidential candidacy to Mitt Romney's bid in 2012. In this excellent work of social science, the authors examine the intersections of Mormonism and American politics by mining twenty-eight surveys and public opinion polls to reveal the political preferences and peculiarities of Mormons in America. These findings expose a paradox in the Mormon experience that is central to the text: have Mormons become both "quintessentially American" and a "peculiar people," simultaneously occupying a spot in the American mainstream and one along the fringes of American society?

The book is divided into the three sections: "Mormons as an Ethno-Religious Group," "Political Behavior of Mormons," and "The Consequences of Distinctiveness." In section one, the authors outline a framework for best understanding the above-mentioned paradox by examining Mormonism as a religion and Mormons as a people, with overviews of their doctrine, culture, and history. As an ethno-religious subculture, Mormons, the authors argue, thrive in a state of tension with the broader culture, at odds with both secular society and other religions. This tension and the perception of peculiarity nurtures a strong sense of internal cohesion among Mormons and tight-knit religious communities throughout the world, which, in turn, "enable Mormons to thrive even in the face of a culture they perceive as a threat to their beliefs" (42). While not all Mormons within these communities (or, as the authors call them, "sacred tabernacles") are alike, differing in levels of religious activity, compliance to institutional authority, insularity, and self-conscious affinity with the group, the authors conclude that levels of religious activity are the most significant indicator of "Mormon-ness" and serve to reinforce political affiliation.

Section two traces the development of partisanship among American Mormons, arguing that during the nineteenth

and twentieth centuries, Mormons have evolved through three distinct political periods in response to particular political, historical, and cultural stimuli: periods of exclusion, re-involvement, and partisanship. Prior to Utah's statehood in 1896, Mormons, and by extension Utah, participated in a state party system that differed from the rest of the country, eschewing the Democrats and Republicans in favor of the Utah-bred People's and Liberal parties. Throughout much of the twentieth century, as they sought to accommodate the social, cultural, and political demands of the nation, Mormons affiliated for periods with both the Democrat and Republican parties. Since the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, though, Mormons have overwhelmingly supported the Republican Party and have been, arguably, the most politically distinctive religious group of the twentieth century. The authors link Mormons' extreme partisanship with changes in both the political parties and in Mormons themselves. First, reiterating the ideas of Armand Mauss, the authors argue that in the post-World War II era, Mormonism shifted its assimilationist views in which they actively removed sources of tension with society to a policy of retrenchment, doubling-down on distinct beliefs and practices. In so doing, Mormons returned to nineteenth century levels of political cohesion and aligned with the conservatism of the Republican Party at a time when Republicans and Democrats took sides in the cultural politics of gender roles, sex, abortion, marriage, religion, and race. Despite Mormons' strong support for the Republican Party, the authors make an important observation about the central role of religious doctrine in shaping Mormon opinion: "[Mormon] religious beliefs and culture shape their political opinions, even if this means that they are slightly out of step with other politically conservative groups… [W]hen LDS leaders make explicit the connection between Mormon teachings and political views, Mormons generally follow their leaders' cues" and not necessarily the party line (127-128). In other words, when the LDS Church leadership makes the Church's position on an issue known, Mormons will align themselves with that view even when such an alignment puts them at odds with their ideological predilection.

The final section shifts the narrative's focus to examine the evolving public opinions and political ramifications of Mormons' distinctiveness. The authors use the cases of LDS presidential candidates including George Romney (1968), Morris Udall (1976), Orrin Hatch (2000), Jon Huntsman, Jr. (2012), and Mitt Romney (2008 and 2012) as historical gauges to trace how American attitudes towards Mormon candidates' faith have evolved and been politicized. These attitudes have largely changed for the better with Americans gradually becoming more accepting of Mormons as they learn more about Mormonism or have personal relationships with Mormons. However, whether or not these more accepting attitudes signal a new period of political acceptance for Mormons remains uncertain. While public opinion polls conducted during and after Mitt Romney's 2008 and 2012 bid for the presidency show a growing positive public perception of the LDS Church, the authors warn that Mormons' political cohesiveness may ultimately prove to be a deterrent for the

non-LDS public. Echoing the findings of a variety of sociologists and political scientists, the authors point to the growing disaffection among Millennials towards religion as a reaction to merging of faith and conservative politics. As more and more Americans follow suit, eschewing ethnic, cultural, and religious communal associations, the authors contend "the Church's perceived affinity for the Republican Party could limit the effectiveness of LDS leaders' voices in the public square. Prophetic voices are most likely to be heard and heeded when they rise above the partisan fray" (261).

The authors make clear in their title that this book and its arguments are limited in their geographical scope to America. Mormonism began as an American religion, some have called it the American religion, and as such the authors rightfully examine the link between American Mormon beliefs and practices and American politics. How, I wonder, would the authors' arguments differ if examined in context of the international LDS Church? Are Brazilian Mormons, Korean Mormons, or Ghanaian Mormons as politically cohesive or as distinctively conservative as American Mormons? What factors influence a country's Mormon political leanings? Size? Longevity? Ratio of converts to those born into the Church? While these questions are outside of the scope of this book, Campbell, Green, and Monson have demonstrated a model that bears repeating for transnational comparative purposes.

Furthermore, in their explanation of the reasons Mormons gravitated to the Republican Party, the authors drew upon numerous case studies and surveys in order to link Mormon doctrines with social issues. While I certainly agree with their conclusions, the argument would be more persuasive had the authors also discussed why, when aligning with a political party, the party's views on social issues trumped other political policies such as immigration, national security, or poverty for Mormons. This issue is especially significant today in light of the Church's recent statements on immigration and poverty, suggestive of a growing fissure between the Republican Party's platform and the LDS Church's teachings.

For all the graphs and complex quantitative statistical analysis, *Seeking the Promised Land* is surprisingly readable. The prose is refreshingly to-the-point and Campbell, Green, and Monson have done well to eliminate potential linguistic and departmental barriers by avoiding an over-abundance of discipline-specific terminology. As such, students throughout the humanities and social sciences will find the work's arguments accessible. Furthermore, researchers interested in understanding contemporary Mormon issues, their political attitudes, and the rationale behind these attitudes, will find this book a much needed contribution to the otherwise scant shelf on Mormon political attitudes and the attitudes of others towards Mormons.

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Neoliberalism, Interrupted. Edited by Mark Goodale and Nancy Postero. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013. Pp. 317, acknowledgements, abbreviations, editors and contributors, notes, references, index.

Neoliberalism, Interrupted presents Latin America as a global laboratory for new forms of governance, economic structures, and social mobilization. The volume's title signals a repeated theme throughout the chapters: in Latin America, neoliberalism is simultaneously being challenged and naturalized. At present, Latin America is a site of social, political, and economic experimentation on the one hand and intractable structural vulnerability, violent resistance, and retrenchment on the other. New forms of contestation render other potential ideologies for radical social change unthinkable.

In the introductory chapter, the editors write, "In contemporary Latin America, real challenges to the 'neoliberal world order' coexist with and even reinforce enduring patterns of exploitation and violence" (4). Under these conditions, revolution can appear anachronistic and structures perpetuating inequality often seem inevitable, even as social change and contested governance are underway: the idea of revolution seems out of place in some Latin American contexts, thereby naturalizing social inequality even in the face of social transformation. One of the strategies of the volume as a whole is to resist black-or-white judgments about whether or not transformations are substantive or merely aesthetic.

The contributors to *Neoliberalism, Interrupted*—both Latin American and Latin Americanists—privilege the categories of everyday lives and social practice in order to explore the meanings, consequences, and possibilities associated with regional reactions to neoliberal hegemony and what can be described as "maturing neoliberalism," as well as the construction of alternatives. Through a collection of ethnographic observations, the volume illustrates the complexity of how neoliberalism is unfolding in Latin America. With respect to neoliberalism, "maturing" does not necessarily mean "entrenched"; instead the authors describe various, often contradictory, ways in which neoliberalism is both challenged and re-inscribed, depending on shifting political circumstances and the historical/geographic context.

The authors employ an ethnographic lens to explore how individuals are identified as neoliberal and postneoliberal subjects. The volume attempts to deconstruct binary oppositions that are commonly used to describe social change and contested governance in Latin America: indigenous/mestizo, national/transnational, and neoliberalism/socialism. However, the authors are unable to resist other types of grouping. On one hand, they use a tripartite model for categorizing Latin American countries: 1) classic neoliberal states that delegate legal and moral responsibilities to non-state agencies (Chile, Colombia, and Argentina), 2) democratic authoritarian states where the power of the state has been reinforced, and, 3) states that have fueled exploitation, exclusion, and violence, but have been reconstituted as essential agents of social and political change (Brazil, Costa Rica, and Paraguay). While Goodale and Postero identify Bolivia, Ecuador, and

Venezuela as "arguably postneoliberal," they emphasize that this does not necessarily indicate the withering away of the state. On the other hand, the authors employ a binary model to divide Latin America into countries characterized by conservative neoliberal resistance to political and economic realignment (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru) and revolutionary governments (Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador). In the former case, neoliberal subjectivity is aligned with citizenship; in the latter, a shift to "postneoliberalism" has meant that neoliberal governmentality no longer defines individual subjectivities.

In these various ethnographic examples class inequalities are not discarded; rather, class relations are re-contextualized into new power structures. For example, while the traditional political class has in some cases been displaced, "revolutionaries" are positioning themselves as the new elites and are consolidating power even as they pursue revolutionary goals. While a robust human rights framework is emerging (and with it, an emphasis on economic equality, political participation, and state responsibility), this framework leads to new forms of inclusion and exclusion. Thus, the authors are not making an argument about how neoliberalism is resulting in net gains or losses in equality—they are pointing to how power structures are reconfigured by shifting contexts.

The second chapter of the volume is dedicated to Nancy Postero's examination of how neoliberal reforms were extended in Bolivia in the mid-1980s. Privatization of state-owned enterprises, the dismantling of social services, and the lowering of barriers to foreign capital led to increased unemployment, massive rural to urban migration, and greater poverty. Indigenous and peasant groups responded to neoliberal policies by using ethnicity to frame their demands for territory and recognition. Despite racism, indigenous activists wielded political reforms to their advantage and the first self-identifying indigenous president, Evo Morales, was elected to office. Despite ongoing resource extraction on indigenous lands and neoliberal engagements in global markets, the discursive link between anti-neoliberalsm and decolonization initially legitimized the Movement Toward Socialism (MTS) government's efforts to indigenous constituents. With Morales' 2009 reelection, the MTS government is now attempting to implement a far-reaching new constitution. Both right-wing elites and indigenous communities who have supported the Morales regime express skepticism about its full realization. That is to say, although some initial advances have been made in the realm of human rights, Postero notes a generalized hesitance with regards to overly hopeful projections about the future.

In Chapter 3, Sujatha Fernandes reaffirms Hardt and Negri's 2000 assertion that populations impelled by hybrid rhetoric of the post-Cold War era can be subversive in creative ways that both support and undermine the construction of postneoliberal states. In Venezuela, state rhetoric of resistance to U.S. imperialism is reconfigured by community activists as resistance to *all* forms of power, including the anti-imperialist Bolivarian state. Thus, Fernandes describes how wide-spread resistance to power can simultaneously have productive and

counter-productive effects.

In Chapter 4, David Gow draws our attention to a series of challenges to the hegemony of maturing neoliberalism unfolding on a small scale in Colombia. Modest alternatives are being developed in the interstices between the discursive frame of the nation state and the ideology of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). While these interstitial challenges are often obscured, Gow uses ethnography to reveals the important role ethnicity places in how responses to neoliberalism are framed.

Ethnographic observations in Chapter 5 on neoliberal reforms and protest in Buenos Aires underline how the role of the state is changing but has not diminished. Marcela Cerrutti and Alejandro Grimson document the shift from social movements focused on housing and land tenure in the 1970s and 1980s to demands resulting from neoliberal reforms and massive unemployment in 1990s. While millions were employed at soup kitchens and community centers during Carlos Saúl Menem's presidency, Cerrutti and Grimson argue that heavily subsidized unemployment and government provision of food are examples of how much the poor rely on the Argentinian state.

Analiese Richard's, in Chapter 6, underscores a telling dichotomy: NGOs in Mexico are either criticized for being market-oriented, or hailed as incubators of democratic values. She points to sharp contradictions between the class orientation of NGO founders and their populist goals. NGOs form strong connections with political elites and in an attempt to be "taken into account" in policy decisions, but at the same time surrender their capacity to openly challenge the neoliberal model. That is to say, the very mechanisms that allow NGOs to have any impact incite hypocrisy by not allowing NGOs to live up to populist rhetoric and instead reproducing neoliberal frames.

Chris Krupa describes how the president of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, has instituted a truth commission meant to uncover violence and terror unleashed during former President León Esteban Febres-Cordero's time in office. Febres-Cordero is considered Ecuador's "neoliberal founding father;" thus Krupa underscores Correa's strategic attempt at having the truth commission usher Ecuador into a "postneoliberal" epoch.

In Chapter 8, Veronica Schild describes how industrialization destroyed rural production, leading to a new class of urban poor in Chile. She portrays Chile as an "enabling state." The state's approach is two-fold: the "caring state" targets poor women and aims to transform them into responsible citizens by teaching them to claim their rights to health, pensions, and education, while also exercising their choices as consumers and workers. The "punitive state" disciplines workers who are deemed non-compliant or dangerous. Similarly to Richard, Schild demonstrates how neoliberal reforms in the past twenty years have restored capitalist class power and control since many on the Left are more concerned with pragmatic politics than prior hopes of overarching social change.

In Chapter 9, Elana Zilberg emphasizes the partnership between violence and the diffusion of market logics. In the context of "neoliberal securityscapes," new categories of neoliberal subjects—poor migrants, service workers, and

"gang youth"—are both constructed and disciplined. The U.S border is an important site of discursive production since it produces migrants as "illegal aliens" and "disposable people" upon whom state violence can readily be enacted. Zilberg argues that as transnational criminality becomes a target for U.S. intervention, these interventions in turn breed more violence. Zilberg points to El Salvador's inability to control citizen security and, thus, draws attention to the decentralization of the El Salvadoran state. At the same time, transnational global market relations have also produced transnational migrant entrepreneurs who gain political and economic power upon returning to their home countries.

In the postscript, Venezuelan sociologist Miguel Ángel Contreras Natera obscures the line between politics and scholarship. He coins the term "fractured tectonics" to point to how contemporary examples of experimentation and contestation in Latin America are intimately associated with the very exploitative practices that they seek to overcome. This notion reiterates an important conceptual thread that runs throughout the volume: as discursive layers shift in Latin America, what meaningful challenges to neoliberalism are occurring in the present day?

Contreras Natera coins the term "the colonial-modern logos"—shorthand for the dominant discursive and epistemological framework ordering social relations in postcolonial societies. He argues that for alternatives to hegemony to be long lasting, the foundations of "the colonial-modern logos" must be uprooted. That is, in order for a new model of insurgency to arise in Latin America, "critical and deconstructive thinking" about the logic behind social relations in postcolonial societies must occur.

Neoliberalism, Interrupted will be of interest to Latin Americanists, ethnographers, economists, and scholars focused on social and political change. The edited volume is a rich collection of ethnographic examples that bring to the fore the complex in-weaving of contradictions, disjunctures, and creative ferments underway in neoliberal and "postneoliberal" Latin American countries. The volume's weakness is that it does not clearly define the contributors' understanding of neoliberalism nor postneoliberalism. While the editors cite Foucault, Rose, Postero, and Rudnyckyj when they briefly mention that "scholars have argued that a central element of neoliberal governance is the encouragement of a civic identity in which individuals are urged to take responsibility for their own behavior and welfare," (8) they do not elaborate on how they themselves are employing neoliberal governance.

The volume should be commended for pointing to complex cases that "interrupt" totalizing notions of neoliberalism; but by the same token, this "muddying the waters" may leave readers without a clear understanding of how neoliberalism operates. The core theme of the book is the dubious and uncertain nature of neoliberalism in Latin America. Thus, the volume aims to use ethnographic examples as gray-toned correctives to black and white portrayals of neoliberalism, thus resisting both overtly hopeful and pessimistic outlooks for the future. The book does not offer a series of positive and negative case studies—rather, as the title suggests, the cases collectively

suggest that neoliberalism is constantly being challenged, rearticulated, and re-inscribed.

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