CULTURAL ANALYSIS

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AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FORUM ON FOLKLORE AND POPULAR CULTURE

Vol. 18.2

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Festivals, Tourism, and Cultural Conservation:
Comparing the Livingstone Cultural and Arts Festival and the Nc'wala Traditional Ceremony in Zambia

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Abstract

This essay considers the potential for festivals to contribute to cultural conservation and economic sustainability efforts by comparing two different festivals in Zambia. The country has a lively annual calendar filled with different types of festivals that showcase "traditional" cultural forms. The two analyzed represent two distinct types. The Livingstone Cultural and Arts Festival [LICAF] is a national *festival showcasing dances from provinces across the country that takes place annually in the city of Livingstone. The Nc'wala Traditional Ceremony is an* ethnic-based *harvest festival of the Ngoni people that takes place in the Chipata District in the Eastern Province. My analysis suggests that events that are already vibrant and meaningful for a cultural group in addition to being appropriate for outside audiences are the most effective for the combined goals of economic development and cultural sustainability.*

Introduction

This essay considers the potential for festivals to contribute to cultural conservation and economic sustainability efforts by comparing two different festivals in Zambia. The country has a lively annual calendar filled with different types of festivals that showcase "traditional" cultural forms. The two I analyze represent two distinct types. The Livingstone Cultural and Arts Festival [LICAF] is a *national* festival showcasing dances from provinces across the country that takes place annually in the city of Livingstone, home to the mighty Victoria Falls, in the Southern Province. The Nc'wala Traditional Ceremony is an *ethnic-based* harvest festival of the Ngoni people that takes place in the Chipata District in the Eastern Province. My analysis suggests that events that are already vibrant and meaningful for a cultural group in addition to being appropriate for outside audiences are the most effective for the combined goals of economic development and cultural sustainability.

In the African context, cultural conservation efforts are aimed at indigenous cultural practices associated with ethnic identity and heritage that are becoming less popular or rarely occurring at all. The blamed culprit is often colonization, westerniza-

tion, globalization, urbanization, along with multiculturalism. The Zambia Tourism website expresses this perspective explicitly: "The decline of traditional customs and culture has been brought about by the infiltration of the west and western ways and the melting pot of various tribes living in the same areas" (Zambia). In Zambia and elsewhere in the region, international, government, and non-profit entities are tasked with creating opportunities for people to produce and consume cultural phenomena in an effort to sustain them. UNESCO, currently through its 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, has been impactful in raising awareness about the inherent value of cultural diversity. It has also enacted international definitions and mechanisms to promote local cultural forms, what it terms Intangible Cultural Heritage [ICH]. ICH includes such cultural practices as music, dance, games, material arts, and foodways. The term "conservation" is significant because it "registers the dynamism of cultural resources, implying that, like natural phenomena, cultural phenomena inevitably change" (Hufford 1994, 3). Conserving culture requires efforts to promote the possibility and motivation for people to continue participating in cultural phenomena while allowing for the adaptation and change that is necessary for their continued relevance. Cultural conservation typically encompasses a combination of documentation, encouraging the continuation of cultural forms through valuing and ensuring opportunities for their continuation, and education about their significance (Feintuch 1988; Ormond 1983). The opening pages of the coffee table book *Ceremony! Celebrating Zambia's Cultural Heritage* about fourteen of the country's many ethnic ceremonies articulate this sentiment well:

> We often hear the mournful cry of our elders, "the old ways are dying out"; "we need to preserve these customs or they will disappear". If it is true that the intrusions of modernity are eroding culture, then it is equally true that people are embracing progress, change and growth. This book is not about crying for days gone by, or trying to turn back the clock. It is about inspiring people to celebrate the traditions so that they may continue to grow and adapt healthily. Traditions and customs were meant to hold communities together, and this essential spirit will keep going, as long as people know and understand that the two can go hand in hand. It is an old saying that we cannot know where we are going unless we know where we come from." (Gurhrs and Kapwepwe, ed.)[1]

Cultural conservation "suggests that resource identification be guided as much as possible by those whose culture are affected" (Hufford 1994, 3). The people whose cultural phenomena are impacted should be the ones at the front and center of identifying the issues and strategizing how to sustain cultural vitality.

There has been a recent reorientation in the tourism sector in the region, as elsewhere in the world, to recognize the potential for cultural tourism to augment the industry (see Flint 2006). Previously, most of the attention in the region was on the physical landscape and wild animals. According to the World Tourism Organization, "as tourism moves increasingly towards adopting an experience economy, the tourist experience is becoming the focal point of innovative tourism business activity." Those

involved in the industry recognize that contemporary tourists "typically seek some form of cultural experience" (World Tourism Organization 2012, 1). Those in the tourist industry also recognize the potential of cultural tourism to enhance the livelihoods of a larger swath of the population, including those living at lower socioeconomic levels. At its most straightforward, cultural phenomena can provide opportunities for people to make money, thus contributing to economic development. Conversely, the opportunity to make money from cultural practices could contribute to conservation by motivating people to sustain their cultural phenomena (World Tourism Organization 2005; Ahebwa et al. 2016). Zambia, and other countries in the region, seek to capitalize on this shift and have in recent years combined their departments of tourism with that of culture into a single ministry as a strategy to develop the cultural tourism sector. The current ministry configuration is the Ministry of Tourism and Arts, which comprises the Department of Tourism, Department of National Parks and Game Management, and the Department of Arts and Culture.

Festivals worldwide have been at the center of cultural conservation efforts (see Hafstein 2018a, 2018b; World Trade Organization 2012, 33). Many festivals, such as the Nc'wala, are themselves ICH in that they serve social-cultural functions, and the cultural group considers them to be important to their heritage. Other festivals, such as LICAF, are created to provide opportunities for participation in and display of ICH for local practitioners and often outsiders. Festivals can foster pride among heritage practitioners, provide opportunities for showcasing cultural forms, and create the motivation for long-term continuation of the performance genres featured. Festivals are multi-generic in that they comprise multiple cultural forms--often combinations of music, dance, food, costumes, and material arts--at a single event, thus allowing for the efficient bundling of ICH efforts by promoting multiple forms at once. Festivals can also be productive for income-generating activities. Performers often receive renumeration, artists sell their goods, food and beverages are sold, and people attending the festival spend money in local markets, shops, restaurants, and lodges. Festivals, therefore, have the potential to contribute to economic as well as cultural sustainability.

The Context
Within local conceptualizations, cultural forms associated with rural ethnic life, particular ethnic groups, and the pre-colonial past are usually encompassed within the categorization of "traditional," or "*itambi*" [of culture/custom] in the Bemba language, the most widely spoken language in Zambia, or "*mwambo*" in the language of the Ngoni people. Other cultural forms–such as those categorized locally as popular, foreign, or religious–also often feature in festivals or other occasions. My focus is on festivals that forefront what is categorized locally as traditional, the types of cultural forms typically designated as ICH and targeted for conservation efforts. I use "traditional" following this categorization, fully aware that the term is problematic.

Within the category of traditional, the two festivals I analyze represent distinct

types. The Nc'wala Traditional Ceremony is one of the elaborate annual festivals that occur in the provinces and are associated with a ritual or calendric event for a majority ethnic group in that province. The ethnic group's leadership typically organizes these festivals in coordination with the local and national offices of the Department of Arts and Culture and other relevant ministerial departments (Guhrs and Kapwepwe n.d.). Other such festivals include the Likumbi Lya Mize, Kuomboka (Flint 2006), and Mutomboko (Gordon 2004). In addition to these ethnic-based festivals, the capital city of Lusaka and cities in several other provinces host *national* festivals, such as LICAF, that bring together performers and artists from the other provinces in the country to showcase their artistry at a multi-day and multi-ethnic event. Local and regional festivals are also common and can be associated with various occasions, including holidays, rituals, or special events, such as trade fairs. There are other festivals and special events that happen throughout the year in Lusaka that display traditional performances, including national holidays, political ceremonies, the welcoming of special guests, and the launches of new products.

Together, these festivals provide opportunities for the continuation of traditional music, dance, and other artistic practices across the country. Many Zambians are concerned that local ICH is losing to the popularity of new and foreign forms. However, these festivals provide far more opportunities for sustaining traditional cultural forms than in some other countries in the region. I was drawn to doing research in Zambia after two decades of researching in neighboring Malawi, where festivals that feature traditional cultural phenomena had been few and far between. In the last decade, Malawians interested in cultural conservation have looked to Zambia for inspiration. My first visit was in February 2013 with Professor Boston Soko, a Malawian colleague involved in the Mzimba Heritage Association, an organization promoting the cultural heritage of the Ngoni of the Mzimba District. Prof. Soko and other members of the organization had been traveling annually to Zambia for the Nc'wala to honor their Ngoni neighbors and for inspiration about how to create their own Ngoni festival in Malawi (Gilman 2017). I returned to Zambia in the summer of 2016 and was generously hosted by Mr. Prince M.F. Lamba, a Senior Officer of the Department of Arts and Culture. During this visit, I interviewed artists and cultural workers and visited tourism sites to learn more about cultural conservation efforts. In my third visit in May 2018, I traveled with Mr. Lamba and other staff of the Department of Arts and Culture to document the LICAF festival.[2]

The Livingston Cultural and Arts Festival

LICAF is an annual festival in the Southern Province that brings together cultural groups from around Zambia (and a few from neighboring countries) to perform at a multi-day event in Livingstone. When I attended in May 2018, LICAF was organized jointly by the government's Department of Arts and Culture, Department of Tourism, the National Arts Council, and the Zambian Tourism Agency, a government body "mandated to market and promote Zam-

bia as a tourism and travel destination of choice and to regulate the tourism industry" (Zambia Tourism Agency). This collaboration was an outcome of the government's goal to integrate the promotion of culture with economic development.

The World Tourism Organization emphasizes that "no tourism destination can succeed without a suitable array of attractions. Without variety, there would be little motivation for tourists to remain or to repeat their visits" (2012: 25). Correspondingly, the organizers strategically scheduled LICAF to take place in Livingstone, which has a "long history of marketing itself as a site of natural and cultural heritage, based on the attractions of the landscape of the Victoria Falls, the memory of David Livingstone and the repute of local ethnographic and archaeological collections held at the Livingstone Museum" (McGregor & Schumaker 2006, 649-50). In their promotion for the 2019 festival, organizers highlighted the combination of attractions:

> The festival is among the fastest growing in Africa, making Livingstone-Zambia an irresistible destination if you want to experience the thrill and hypnotizing power of African music and dance; 73 Zambian tribes from 10 provinces…encapsulated in one festival…all happening at a time of the year when the Mighty Victoria Falls is at its thundering best dropping down more than 500 cubic meters of water every second. As if the festival and the Victoria Falls were not compelling reason enough to go to Livingstone, the destination also offers mind blowing adventure activities such as whitewater rafting, bungee jumping, wildlife safaris, helicopter rides, steam train rides, and many more. (LICAF-Zambia)

Organizers scheduled the 2018 festival when Victoria Falls was at a peak and on the same weekend as a corporate-sponsored popular music festival, the Mosi Day of Thunder. Festival organizers hoped that combining the traditional arts festival temporally and spatially with that of the popular music festival would draw people to Livingstone to enjoy both events and also visit and pay the entrance fee to the falls, go bungee jumping, stay in local hotels, enjoy the restaurants, spend their money in shops, and buy crafts. The result would be both the opportunity to celebrate and promote the diversity of Zambia's national heritage *and* to contribute to the tourist destination's economic prosperity.

Zambia is divided into ten provinces, which are each subdivided into districts. The headquarters of the government ministries are located in the capital city of Lusaka. Offices and staffing exist for each department at the provincial level and in some, but not all, of the districts. In the months preceding LICAF, staff members at the national headquarters in Lusaka worked with those at the provincial levels to identify one cultural group from each province to travel to Livingstone to participate in the festival.[3] Some troupes were based in the provinces they represented, while a few were performance groups from a province that were based in Livingstone or Lusaka. For example, the Ngoni troupe from the Eastern Province came from Lusaka. In addition to groups

from each of the provinces, the festival also featured several from in and around the city of Livingstone, three groups from nearby countries (Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Burundi), and one representing China. The Zambia National Dance Troupe, composed of professional dancers employed by the government as civil servants, featured prominently, as did the Livingstone Acrobats, a local youth empowerment troupe.

After a long day of rehearsals and choreographing on Thursday, May 24, 2018, the festival officially launched that evening with a cocktail reception along the Zambezi River. Government officials, the staff of the varying bodies that organized LICAF, and special guests shared food and beverages while enjoying performances by the Zambia National Dance Troupe and listening to welcoming speeches by the heads of some of the agencies involved in organizing the event and elected officials. The speeches culminated with one by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Tourism and Arts, the highest-ranking government official present. The voluminous spray of Victoria Falls was visible in the distance, though not the falls themselves.

The festival started the next day on Friday, May 25. The performance groups arrived at the festival site in the morning, using the same flatbed trucks and busses that had transported them across the country, paid for by the government. The Maramba Cultural Grounds, located a few miles from the city of Livingstone, was created by the provincial Department of Arts and Culture to host events and showcase local visual and performing arts. On the previous day, staff erected large tents with seating to shield the guests from the beating sun. The VIPs–local Provincial Minister, national Ministry of Tourism and Arts Permanent Secretaries, senior government officials–and other invited guests sat in reserved seating in the nicest tent, closest to the stage. The rest of us scrambled for chairs available in another. As the performances picked up, many people sat or stood in front of the stage in the direct sun, where the view was best. The minister and senior government officials' attendance signified the government's commitment to promoting cultural tourism in addition to providing an opportunity for them to make their status and authority visible locally.

Mr. Buster Tembo served as the Master of Ceremonies [MC]. He was based in Livingstone and was the President of the Zambia Adjudicators Panel, an association of arts adjudicators, and a pastor at the House of Testimony International Ministry. The MC began by welcoming everyone and honoring the special guests in the VIP tent. A series of speakers followed, culminating in one by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Tourism and Arts. The speeches emphasized the importance of economic development, cultural exchange and diplomacy, and the value of the collaboration between tourism and culture.

At the completion of the speeches, the MC ushered in one dance group after the other. The MC said little about each group other than announcing the province where they were from and sometimes the name of the dance form they performed. Each group wore elaborate costumes appropriate to the dance and performed well-rehearsed pieces choreographed for the stage. The audience watched from afar, clapping and cheering; many took photos or videotaped with their cell phones.

On the periphery of the grounds, a tent advertising local floodways sold plates of

Figure 1: Dance troupe from Northwestern Province dancing at the LICAF Maramba Grounds. Photo by Lisa Gilman

cooked food and snacks. Craft vendors displayed tables of woodcarvings, beadwork, and items made from local fabrics. Neither seemed to get much business, though people did wander by and look. The VIPs were honored with a lavish buffet lunch featuring a variety of local food items: *nshima* (cornmeal thick porridge staple food) with side dishes of meat, fish, beans, multiple different types of greens, and wild mushrooms.

As the hours passed, the MC sped up, giving the groups less and less time, intent on finishing the event by the scheduled end time of 4 PM. One group after the other entered from stage left, danced for 10-15 minutes, and then made their way off the stage when the MC indicated that it was time. At the end of the event, the vehicles transported the performers, staff, and guests back to their accommodations.

The next day, the performers gathered early at 7:30 AM to prepare for the parade scheduled to begin at 9:30. Rows of flatbed trucks, one for each troupe, lined the side of the road near a soccer pitch on the edge of town. Drummers tuned their drums on small fires, while the dancers hopped onto the back of the trucks and started dancing in place. Eventually, the VIPs arrived and lined up at the front of the procession. The parade then made its way for six miles around and through the city and eventually to the Livingstone Golf Course. The first mile or two passed through low-density neighborhoods; some people came out from their houses to watch the performers as we passed. Many pulled out their phones to photograph or videotape the moment and

then meandered back into their homes. When we made it to the center of town, people emerged from stores and restaurants, and some tourists from lodges and hotels. The performers' energy rose with the significant increase in the audience. Some hopped off the back of trucks to engage energetically more directly with their audiences. Owners of local businesses drove alongside the procession to distribute water to dancers along the way. After passing through the city center, the parade continued on a road with very few houses, and thus almost no audience. The dancers were now hot and tired; some laid down on the truck beds for quick rests or climbed into buses for a reprieve. After a while, we came through a high-density lower-economic neighborhood, where hundreds of people flocked to the street outside of houses, markets, and small stores, attracted by the sounds of beating drums and singing. Children howled at the sight of the masked dancers of the Makishi and Nyau performers. The dancers' energy picked up again, many jumping out of the trucks to dance alongside the enthusiastic audience. Some observers along the road ran alongside, following the parade to its destination.

After three hours and six miles of walking and dancing, the performers paraded into the festival arena. A group of majorettes lined the entrance of the golf course and cheered as each group entered and was announced by the MC. The VIPs were already seated in the tent, most not having completed the full parade. The general audience made their way to the non-VIP tent and sat comfortably on folding chairs. The relatively small audience was comprised almost exclusively of the VIPS and other invited guests, the festival staff, and the few people who had followed from the nearby neighborhood.

A short break ensued during which organizers ushered the VIPs to a tent for a generous buffet, similar to the day before. There were a few food vendors selling cold drinks and food on the periphery of the grounds. Unlike the day before, they did not present the food as samples of tradition, nor did it seem to be part of the official organization. I assumed that local vendors took the opportunity to make some money at this event. They sold cold coke products, snacks, fruit, and some hot food, such as plates of rice and chicken stew.

When the VIPs had finished eating and the guest of honor was back in his central position in the VIP tent, all the performance groups clustered in prearranged places on the pitch where they performed in sequence a salutation that the festival's artistic directors had choreographed at Thursday's rehearsal. We then sat through a series of speeches, longer than the day before, but similar in tone and topic. Finally, each group danced, one at a time, on the field in front of the stage, much as they had the previous day. The MC ushered each group on and off fairly quickly, as all were tired. These grounds were much bigger than the Maramba Cultural Grounds, allowing for a larger space to dance, yet creating far more distance between the performers and audience. Occasionally, a few VIPs joined the performers to dance briefly with them and probably give them small amounts of money. The general audience stayed within the designated audience spaces.

The schedule was behind, so the MC only let the groups dance about one piece

Figure 2: Livingstone Acrobats performing at the Livingstone Golf Club. Photo by Lisa Gilman

each, though a few sneaked in some extra time by ignoring the calls to leave the performance space. The event ended at approximately 4 PM. Before leaving, the organizers from the government ministries made sure everyone had received payment. There were some negotiations and disagreements about the amount. Eventually, everyone dispersed to their various lodging to rest and prepare for the long drive home the next day.

LICAF and Economical Possibilities

This festival was intended and had the potential to generate revenue for the local economy. However, very few people came to Livingstone just for the festival, which I surmised was at least partly because it was poorly advertised. During the time preceding the festival, I saw no announcements of it in national venues, nor was it obvious in Livingstone that the festival would be taking place when we arrived on the Wednesday before its launch. Incomplete information about the festival was available on the festival's website and Facebook page. The staff at the hostel where I was staying did not know about it. I also mentioned the festival to the young men that stand around Victoria Falls waiting to serve as informal guides for tourists, and they had not heard of it. Even those working in the tourist industry who could ostensibly contribute to

spreading the word did not know about it. Organizers finally put up posters and banners the day before throughout the city. By contrast, everyone I talked to was well aware of and excited for the Mosi Day of Thunder popular music festival on the night of Saturday, May 26, the second day of LICAF. The Mosi festival attracted an enormous audience, many flooding in from the capital Lusaka and elsewhere.

LICAF's setting on the first day was not in a visible nor centralized location. Traditional dance performances often capitalize on the sound of drumming to attract audiences. The distance of the Maramba Cultural Grounds from residential areas precluded this means of drawing a crowd. There was also no public transportation from town. One had to know it was happening and have a vehicle or be willing to pay for a taxi to get there. The parade on the following day, by contrast, drew a sizeable crowd as it moved through various neighborhoods. However, the distance was so long that most people did not follow the parade to its destination. The audience at the golf course comprised primarily of invited guests or those explicitly involved in the festival.

From what I could surmise, there was some economic benefit to this festival, though it was limited. There was not a flood of out-of-towners. People already in Livingstone came out for the parade, and some probably purchased cold drinks, food items, and other consumables that they might not have otherwise. The large number of people who were involved with the festival—mostly government workers and performers— did spend money on accommodations, food, and other items, augmenting the revenue for local hotels, lodges, restaurants, grocery stores, gas stations, and those selling in the informal sector. Furthermore, the attention on culture for the weekend may have inspired people to buy some crafts and food from the vendors. However, this bump in revenue for the weekend came mostly from government coffers as the ministries involved paid for most of the expenses of those officially involved: performers, provincial government officials, national government officials, and elected officials who came as guests.

LICAF Cultural Conservation

That Zambia has so many national, provincial, and local festivals creates incentives for people to continue participating in traditional cultural forms. This festival provided the opportunity for around twenty groups to perform. For many, this involved traveling across the country or across national borders, which gives them greater visibility and the opportunity to showcase their artistry to many audiences. Those who are popular at one event are likely to be invited to perform at subsequent ones in other locations, thus expanding their opportunities to continue their cultural practice and to gain recognition and visibility.[4]

Being selected to participate in a festival is a competitive process. These festivals provide incentives for performers to perfect and polish their artistry and continue to innovate so that they stand out and are chosen. There is also motivation to develop and maintain high-quality costumes and instruments, thus contributing to the conservation of multiple different cultural forms—dance, music, instrument-making, cos-

tume design, and choreography.

As is a common strategy for countries across the continent, the programming of cultural troupes from each province in the country contributed to Zambia's public image as a diverse country that recognizes and celebrates each of the provinces and ethnic groups within its borders. Having groups perform regional and culturally distinctive genres within the unified space of festivals multiple times annually and year after year is an ongoing display of cultural pluralism.

The festival also provided the opportunity for showcasing a variety of cultural forms outside of what would be deemed traditional. On the one hand, Nyau, Makishi, Chiyanda, and Ingoma were categorized locally as traditional. New emerging forms were also recognized and displayed as part of local traditional culture. The festival included the gymnastics and physical stunts of the Livingstone Acrobats, a police parody, and performance from other countries, including a Chinese dragon dance. Including new and innovative forms, along with some foreign ones, recognized the dynamism of culture and communities (cf. Kiiru 2017).

The festival also had limitations with regard to cultural conservation. While most Zambians would agree that this festival was a cultural festival showcasing traditional performance forms, the festival itself was not traditional. It was organized by the government to display national heritage, and it provided an opportunity for reifying and reinforcing institutional power structures. The festival represented what Valdimar Tr Hafstein refers to as "heritagization," a process that occurs when cultural phenomena are designed to be cultural heritage worthy of preservation (Hafstein 2018b, 128). Through staging and repetition, "performances can become artifacts. They freeze. They become canonical. They take forms that are alien, if not antithetical, to how they are produced and experienced in local settings" (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998, 64). The result, Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett writes, may be "events that have no clear analogue within the community from which they purportedly derive and that come to resemble one another more than that which they are intended to re-present" (64).

Festivals like LICAF have become their own cultural phenomenon. The dances featured have been adapted from the highly variable contexts in which they otherwise occur to fit the festival structure, which has also become traditionalized. They almost always begin with a series of hierarchized speeches, an integral part of Zambia's political culture featured at all public events where there is an official government presence. After the speeches, the MC calls out one group after the other for short snippets of performances; there are dance forms associated with rituals, weddings, initiations, or harvests that have been choreographed to be staged for audiences outside of the cultural context in which they have significance. Performances connected to spirituality, such as the masked Nyau and Makishi, are stripped of their spiritual dimension and presented only for entertainment (Phiri, V. 2008; cf. Gilman 2015; Yun 2019). Furthermore, performances that historically would have been "secret" and intended only for esoteric participants are displayed for outside audiences. Attend any such festival in Zambia, and one is likely to encounter a similar festival structure with the inclusion of bits and pieces of traditional dances presented on stages in much the same way.

The cultural education at LICAF was limited. The MC invited each group to perform, often announcing its home province, without providing any information about the cultural form or the contexts in which each would typically occur. Audience members benefited from the exposure to diverse cultures and enjoyed the artistry of the dancers, but they received little cultural education beyond what they saw and experienced.

Many of the groups that performed were not community-based groups. Though most of the dance forms were associated with a particular ethnic group and specific contexts for performance, the members of the groups that performed were not necessarily from the same ethnicity, nor did they necessarily know much about the cultural context associated with the dance form. Numerous different ethnic groups live within a single province, so it follows that the membership of provincial troupes is often ethnically diverse. Individuals from multiple ethnic groups perform dance forms that may be unfamiliar to a majority or even all of the members. One of the provincial cultural officers shared with me that the drummers in the troupe she brought were not familiar with some of the dances that their group performed. The drummers and dancers thus were sometimes performing to different rhythms. She explained that only those familiar with the dance would know, so the performances were generally accepted in the festival setting. Another cultural officer told me that a group performed a dance from the Northwestern Province, though the members were not from there. The festival thus created an incentive to continue to perform versions of dances, but it did not invigorate the continuation of the dances in their local context where most have significance beyond entertainment.

The choreography and setting of the performances also diverged markedly from the traditional. Cultural forms that would typically occur in a circle formation were redesigned to fit on stage with dancers set in place facing the audience. Performances were shortened, sometimes from something that would typically take place for hours into a short ten- to fifteen-minute segment. I asked members of the technical team, who worked with the performers to set their dances to the specific setting, whether the dancers were happy with how things were going. They said that overall, the performers were satisfied. Many complained, however, that they did not have enough time. Each group prepared many dances, and many traveled a great distance to share them. However, the M.C. often ushered them off the stage after only one or two.

A significant characteristic of Zambian traditional dance forms is that most are participatory and community-based. In many settings, a large swathe of a community can typically join and dance, or a certain segment of the population is expected and accepted as performers. For those not dancing, audience participation is typically open to a broad range of participation. People gather around, cheer, give money, join in, or otherwise engage in the performance. This festival did not conform to this participatory dimension. Organizers staged the audience to be physically distant from the performers, and they choreographed a hierarchy of audience members through the creation of different spaces: the most prestigious guests sat in the nicest seating under a tent, the next level in a tent not quite so nice, and the remaining lower status

attendees stood outside under the sun or seated on the ground.[5] Only the highest level audience members could join the performers during the salutation when the VIPs entered the arena to greet each group The rest of us were restricted to a greater distance, our interactions greatly limited. The event was structured within the social, political, and economic stratification of contemporary Zambian institutions rather than the indigenous cultural systems associated with the "traditional" contexts.

Money is an integral component of cultural conservation. Paying people for their artistic labor can enable them to take time away from other revenue-generating endeavors to engage in artistic practices. In addition to livelihoods, dancers need money to buy costume items, materials for making instruments, and props; and, they require money for food and travel to performance venues. Performers at LICAF were paid, thus potentially contributing to the economic well-being of artists and to cultural conservation. However, the amounts were relatively small and contested. From my informal conversations with cultural officers, I surmised that most groups received around 3000 Zambian Kwacha, about $300 at the time. Most groups comprised fifteen to twenty members, which would calculate to about $15-20 each for one day of rehearsing and two days of performing. For those who traveled, the total time would have been five to seven full days, not counting the rehearsals they would have held before the event.

The payment levels and rate for accommodation and food set by the government clearly indicated the hierarchy of value placed on different types of participants. The government has a stratified structure for travel allowances for different categories of civil servants. Ironically, the performers who were the main attraction were at the bottom of the compensation chain. According to Mr. Lamba, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Tourism and Arts was at the highest level because of his position as the head of the ministry. The directors of the ministerial departments were at the next lower level. Drivers and office help were at the lowest stratum. The performers who were sponsored by the ministry were at this lowest level. Though the explicit objective of this event included cultural promotion, the monetary value placed on the performers was far less than that placed on those working to organize their participation or invited as honored guests.

Nc'wala Traditional Ceremony

Unlike LICAF, which is organized primarily for entertainment, Nc'wala is an important annual tradition for Zambia's Ngoni people.[6] Zambia comprises around seventy-two different ethnic groups, each of which has its own culture, at the same time that together they comprise the culturally plural nation.[7] Though people of all ethnic groups live in city centers and settlements around the country, each ethnic group is associated with a particular geographic region. The leadership structures of the ethnic groups exist within their geographic locales and co-exist with the country's government structure. The Nc'wala is a festival of the Ngoni ethnic group who live in the Chipata District of the Eastern Province. At the helm of their leadership is the Inkosi

ya Makosi (Paramount Chief) Mpezeni. The Ngoni designation throughout southern and eastern Africa is complicated. Each group of Ngoni under a paramount chief identifies as a distinct group. Ngoni across kingdoms also recognize a shared identity, rooted in their history of having fled from Shaka Zulu in what is now South Africa in the 19th Century. Ngoni groups, each under its own paramount chief, exist in different countries across the region, including Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe (Phiri, D. 1982; Guhrs, Mtonga, and Guhrs n.d.). To complicate things further, the Ngoni under Mpezeni extend into neighboring Malawi.

The Nc'wala festival takes place annually in Mtenguleni village. It is a multi-day event organized around ritually significant activities, some of which are restricted to a small esoteric group closely associated with the Mpezeni leadership, and others that are open to a broader audience. Government ministries are involved in organizing the festival. However, unlike LICAF, it is not ostensibly a government festival; rather, it is the Ngoni's and Mpezeni's event, supported by the government and corporate sponsorship.

When I attended in February 2013, I was living in Malawi, supported by a Fulbright fellowship to teach at Mzuzu University and do research on the politics of ICH. My husband, John Fenn, and I drove with our colleague Prof. Boston Soko who was attending the ceremony to pay respect to neighboring Ngoni and to continue his information gathering for developing the Umthetho Festival in the Mzimba District of Malawi (Gilman 2017). We stopped in Mchinji before crossing the border into Zambia and met a contingent of Malawian Ngoni within Mpezeni's kingdom, who loaded onto a large flatbed truck to make the journey. Those traveling included a large group who performed the Ingoma dance at the festival. I was told a Maseko Ngoni contingent from Malawi's Ntcheu District, under Inkosi Makosi Gomani, also made the journey.

Unlike the LICAF, which I attended with festival organizers and was thus able to obtain detailed information about the mechanisms for putting on the festival, we attended this festival as general audience members, though we benefited greatly from Prof. Soko's connections and knowledge. I also gathered information more recently about the involvement of the Department of Arts and Culture from Mr. Lamba.

The ceremony lasted four days and has "both secular and religious elements that give meaning and identity to the Ngoni as a people and a nation" (Guhrs, Mtonga, and Guhrs n.d., 213). The first two days included mostly esoteric events, not open to the public. We arrived on the third day, February 22. Prof. Soko explained that this was the day designated for the chief's confinement in his ceremonial house. According to Tamara Guhrs, Mapopa Mtonga, and Miranda Guhrs, Nc'wala is a celebration of the first fruits of the harvest, and "in the first part of the ceremony, Paramount Chief Mpezeni tastes the first fruit of the land – usually sugarcane, maize and pumpkins. This is followed by a ritual rebirth of the king which involves the king being confined in his house for a period of time before blessing the fruit" (209). The ceremonial round house was next to a small covered open-air pavilion. We parked in the pouring rain nearby and entered the gate into the fenced-in area around the pavilion. Only certain guests, consisting of visiting dignitaries, Mpezeni's advisors and family members, and

Figure 3: Ingoma performers on Friday, February 22, 2013. Photo by Lisa Gilman

those helping coordinate the event were allowed to enter. Because Prof. Soko came as a representative of the Mzimba Heritage Association and of the Malawi Ngoni under Inkosi Makosi Mbelwa, we were granted entry. The open ground in front of the building had been turned into a performance arena. Many people, not allowed inside except when they were performing, crowded around the wire fence where they could peer in and watch the dancing.

The performances were exclusively Ingoma dance, the signature male-dominated warrior dance of the Ngoni people. The Ngoni were known before European colonization for their "highly centralized government and strong military organization," and symbolism associated with militarism abounded at this and other Ngoni events (Guhrs, Mtonga, and Guhrs n.d., 203). There was no MC, though someone must have been coordinating the dancers. As one group performed for twenty to thirty minutes, another gathered outside the gate, preparing to enter. Each group came from a particular locale either within the province or outside. Dancers donned the costume for the Ingoma dance made out of combinations of animal skins, cloth, rattles around their ankles, and head rings. Many carried knobkerries, swords, and shields as they entered the arena and moved into formation; for some, a line, for others, a half-ircle or row and column lineup. The characteristic movement of Ingoma is the slow and firm high knee kick followed by dramatic feet stomping, emblematic of the strength and power associated with a fighting spirit. It is mostly men who dance, while women provide

the *lishombe*, "interlocking hand-clapping rhythms and the beating of cow-hide with sticks" (Guhrs, Mtonga, and Guhrs n.d., 214). A few women joined as symbolic warriors in some of the groups. For the most part, the dancers faced the pavilion in honor of the high-ranking guests.

At some point, Mpezeni came out of the ceremonial house and joined us in the pavilion. We each went and greeted him. This occasion was informal. He wore western clothing: casual blue trousers, a blue and white striped golf shirt, and leather pointed shoes. He occasionally joined the dancers, much to their pleasure, as did some of the others seated with us. He danced energetically, made playful facial expressions, and otherwise added to the enjoyment of the occasion.

During the afternoon, four-wheel-drive vehicles carrying Members of Parliament and other dignitaries occasionally arrived and entered the pavilion to greet the chief. A contingent from Mozambique arrived and received a lot of attention. The Ngoni in the two countries have historically had very little contact. That the Paramount Chief from Mozambique made the journey was symbolic for creating a bridge between the two kingdoms.

While Mpezeni and his guests enjoyed the private performances, car, taxis, and truck after truck with dancers and other attendees arrived. Outside the fence, people socialized and danced amongst themselves. All the dancers received accommodation, many in public buildings such as schools and churches. I was told that Ingoma dancing, lishombe, and socializing within and across groups happened late into the night.

The following day was the main day of the public component of the ceremony. The event officially started at around 10 AM when Mpezeni led a procession from his headquarters to the festival grounds, about one mile away. Male warriors, covered in animal skins who fiercely lanced their spears and shouted victoriously, arrived in the arena first. The Inkosi ya Makosi then appeared in full warrior chief regalia, a lion skin draped over his shoulders with its head resting upon his head. Subordinate chiefs also dressed in warrior wear surrounded him Prof. Soko explained that the walk from his resting grounds to the arena was symbolic of the Ngoni journey from South Africa, when they fled Shaka's army. The entourage paraded around the arena's periphery, walking in front of all the tents; everyone welcomed him with enthusiastic cheering and ululating. He ceremoniously made his way to the presiding shelter that was pregnant with symbolic displays. He gallantly sat on his woven throne, surrounded by his sub-chiefs. A full-sized stuffed lion stood fiercely at the front of the pavilion. Unlike the day before, Inkosi ya Makosi Mpezeni was sartorially, ritually, and physically removed from everyone else—a visible signal of his power and authority.

As with the LICAF, there was a VIP tent for government officials and other high-status guests opposite Mpezeni's and across the performance arena. A booth with a banner advertising the Department of Tourism offered Nc'wala souvenirs for sale: tee-shirts, spears, paintings, and other crafts. Additional tents, most with big banners decorated with the logo of cell phone companies, were situated along the periphery, providing seating for thousands of people in the general audience. There was also ample space for people to stand around. The central arena was punctuated with a single

Figure 4: Inkosi ya Makosi Mpezeni and his entourage. Photo by Lisa Gilman

kachere tree, which according to Prof. Soko, was significant as a location where ancestor spirits congregate. Guhrs, Mtonga, and Guhrs explain its significance as "where the Ngoni first settled when they came to this area" (n.d., 218).

As with LICAF, the event started with a series of speeches, many of them by Members of Parliament and other elected government officials. The representative of the Inkosi ya Makosi was supposed to be last, which would have been significant because the final speaker is always considered to be the highest-ranked. Instead, the person representing the country's President spoke, which elicited some frustration from those seated around us. We overheard comments complaining that he should not have been allowed to speak for so long, especially because he did not discuss anything relevant to culture. They emphasized that this was supposed to be a cultural and not political event; and, they would have preferred for the Ngoni leadership to have been recognized as the ultimate authority with the final speaking slot.

Throughout the day, an MC invited one Ingoma group after the other to perform. The large round cement stage was situated within the arena and in close proximity to Mpezeni. As with the day before, the groups performed Ingoma and lishombe; each group tried to out-best the others with the quality of their dancing and creative innovations. Unlike the day before when all the groups were adults or mixed-age, some of the groups were school-aged children and seemed to have been organized through schools or other organizations. The dancers faced Mpezeni's pavilion, their backs to

Figure 5: People milling about spending money. Photo by Lisa Gilman

that of the government VIP stand, a clear indication of who had the highest status. This symbolism contrasted markedly from LICAF, where the government officials were the most prominently honored guests. It was also an inversion from the official power structure in everyday life, where the government's power dominates the ethnic leadership.[8] Unlike the previous afternoon, Mpezeni did not smile nor join the dancers; instead he sat regally with his counselors watching from afar.

This festival drew a few thousand people to the region. Ngoni people came from all over the country and neighboring ones, an annual pilgrimage to honor their chief and reinforce their membership as Ngoni. Foreign tourists unconnected to the Ngoni were not prominent, though there were some. The two events we attended were open to an outside audience; yet, the displays were nevertheless esoteric. They were about being Ngoni, the harvest, and reinforcing Mpezeni's rightful position as the Paramount Chief. Those Ngoni who came from other kingdoms honored Mpezeni while simultaneously bonding as Ngoni across leadership and national divides. Outsiders, such as a foreigner like myself or Zambians from other ethnic groups, were welcome to attend and watch, but we were clearly guests and observers of a culturally significant event.

The festival's periphery was covered with merchants selling Ngoni-specific items, such as knobkerries, shields, and headpieces made from animal skins. Others sold cold drinks, food items, second-hand clothing, cell phone units, and anything else

they hoped someone might buy. The thousands of people attending the festival milled around, many of them spending money.

The ultimate ritual of the day was when men, dressed as warriors, brought a black bull to be slaughtered under the kachere tree. After the ceremonial slaughter, warriors brought a bowl full of blood for the Inkosi ya Makosi to drink, a ritual intended to ensure a good harvest. After he drank, his praise singer repeated "the traditional praises in an old surviving form of isiZulu," the language that the Ngoni brought with them when they "came across the Zambezi" (Guhrs, Mtonga, and Guhrs n.d., 209).

We left shortly after in the early afternoon. Prof. Soko explained that the dancing would continue all day. At some point, Mpezeni returned to the resting house where he slept for one more night. In the morning, Prof. Soko told us that guests would come to say goodbye, and groups would give him a final short dance in farewell. People would then disperse, marking the end of that year's ceremony.

Nc'wala and Economic Possibilities

Mpezeni, members of his kingdom, cooperate sponsorship, and the Zambian government provided the funding for this event. According to Guhrs et al., part of the preparations for this festival annually is the gathering of food and money donations from every village, clan, and chiefdom within Mpezeni's kingdom. Each chief must contribute animal(s) to be killed and consumed during the ceremony. There are also Nc'wala organizing committees within towns and cities that coordinate the travel of people living in urban areas to Mtenguleni for this ceremony each year (n.d., 214).

In addition to financing from within the kingdom, the government also contributed significantly. In an email on February 9, 2020, Mr. Lamba explained to me that the Ministry of Tourism and Arts and the Ministry of Chiefs and Traditional Affairs indirectly contribute to organizing the ceremony each year "by ensuring logistical, material, financial and expert services/needs for/of the ceremony." The ministries "facilitate official invitations to Government VIPs including the President and help to finalize speeches and related protocols." The Ministry of Tourism and Arts "also holds exhibitions on Ngoni material culture as part of the ceremony." The government provides travel allowances and stipends to those performers that have been "officially invited to provide entertainment." The Ministry of Tourism and Arts also sometimes issues endorsement letters that organizers can use in fundraising efforts.

Unlike the LICAF where the Ministry invited and paid for every dance group , some of the dance groups were self-funded. According to Mr. Lamba, the Ministry of Tourism and Arts supported the groups that traveled from Lusaka, while other groups came on their own or local sponsors supported them . The groups from other countries under different paramount chiefs were sponsored by their own leadership. A young man, who was among the contingent that came from Mchinji in Malawi, told me that a group of eighty men and women had prepared for the Nc'wala by rehearsing and raising money for food and transport. They rented the truck for 90,000 Malawi Kwacha, at the time $257. This amount was a lot of money given that the average laborer at the

time might have made 10-20,000 Malawi Kwacha/$28-56 per month. They purchased food, gathered firewood, and brought pots and pans so that they could cook while at the festival.

The large number of ministerial staff came as part of the organizing contingent; government paid for their expenses. The corporate sponsorship was obvious and included the Zambia Electricity Supply Company (ZESCO), Airtel, Zamtel, MTN, and the Energy Regulatory Board. Large banners, flags, tee shirts, painted vehicles, and other advertising were visually prominent throughout the festival site and interacted with ceremonial dimensions to create a mosaic of symbols.

Hotels and lodges in Chipata, the city closest to the festival grounds, were packed; restaurants were brimming with customers, as were local grocery stores and markets. Those involved in the formal and informal sectors in Chipata and the surrounding areas enjoyed a boost in their sales as out-of-towners sought accommodation, fed themselves, and purchased items from vendors and businesses. The masses of visitors at the festival were visibly spending money purchasing the many items sold by the vendors. This economic boom was just for a few days, but it was nevertheless significant to local businesses and individuals who could benefit from the increase in sales to add to their capital, buy goods, or otherwise meet their economic needs. Because it happens annually, they can anticipate the increased revenue annually.

Nc'wala Cultural Celebration and Conservation

The reason this festival drew such a large crowd who then spent so much money was that Nc'wala is anchored in Ngoni ritual and is deeply associated with Mpezeni and his kingdom. The majority of people came, whether from within the district or far off, because it was culturally significant to them. For many, in their day-to-day lives, they identify primarily as Zambian and do not do much that would be identifiable to them or anyone else as Ngoni. This festival provides the opportunity for the intensification of Ngoni identity (Toelken 1991). Some people came as performers. They donned animal skins and rattles and stomped aggressively in the characteristic moves of the Ingoma dance while facing their leader whose ritual and political potency was fully displayed for all to see. Those who did not perform sat or stood side by side with other Ngoni within the heightened festival frame. Many were inspired to buy small symbols of Ngoniness such as knobkerries and head rings, which they wore proudly at this event. They moved through the festival space together, ululated in positive response to the performances and their leadership, and otherwise affirmed not only their Ngoniness, but the value of traditional cultural practices. On this day, Ingoma trumped whatever might typically occupy them, such as work, family obligations, television, or a football/soccer match.

I spent most of my time at the official festival where Ingoma groups were scheduled to perform. However, what made the most impact in terms of cultural conservation, most likely happened behind the scenes. Groups of Ngoni gathered outside of the officially designated arena to dance and get to know one another. Performers

wandered the event space and bought bits and pieces of paraphernalia that they could incorporate into their costumes. Dancers were inspired and challenged to stand out by watching one another's innovations. All of these activities contributed to strengthening Ngoni identity. It also motivated people to continue participating in Ingoma, and to do so in new and creative ways to impress the audience, with the ultimate audience member being Mpezeni himself.

All who participated contributed to the continuation of a traditional cultural form, rooted in a long history. Yet, the festival was relevant in the present, as was evident from the hybridity of various elements of informal and formal performances. Women dancers and audience members wore elaborate make-up, and men and women wore fashionable shoes that integrated with their animal skins. Many attendees wore western-wear that they elaborated with small pieces of Ngoni paraphernalia, such as a head ring, beaded necklace, or Zulu hat. Their self-presentation was an expression of contemporary Ngoniness, a cosmopolitan identity that inhabits complex intermixing of hyper-ocal and global cultural and physical spaces.

This annual event would probably not occur, at least not as elaborately, without the government's efforts to promote culture. It is striking, for example, that neighboring Malawi, which shares a similar history and has some of the same ethnic groups, does not have such well-established festivals.[9] The government's support incentivizes ethnic groups to continue to hold these annual ceremonies, create new ones, and embellish existing ones. Its involvement thus infuses what is already an important cultural event with funding, incentives, and visibility that ultimately contributes to this event growing and becoming a way for Ngoni people to come together, celebrate, perform their identities, show their allegiance to their chief, and otherwise reinforce their cultural identity. Interacting with Ngoni who come from Mozambique, Malawi, Botswana, and elsewhere creates a more extensive cultural network across national borders that articulates unity across the region.

Conclusion

What lessons can be learned from comparing these two festivals? Both events provided opportunities for artists to participate in local performances, thus contributing to the promotion and conservation of culture. Both events, to some extent, also helped the local economy. Both bundled cultural and economic products to create opportunities for a broad range of constituents to make money, including performers, artisans, cooks, hotel and restaurant owners, and vendors. However, because of its cultural significance, the Nc'wala was far more successful at drawing multitudes both to the region and the festival grounds. The draw for LICAF was far less but could be augmented with increased advertising and more effective linking with the flow of outsiders who come to see the falls and other local physical and cultural attractions.

Festivals are culturally significant because they provide opportunities for people to participate in a variety of cultural forms as both insiders and outsiders. Furthermore, since performance groups are selected based on the quality of performance, there is an

incentive for groups to innovate and be creative in order to be selected. This opportunity was true for both the ethnic-specific Nc'wala and multicultural national LICAF. The events also provided opportunities for individuals and groups to see other groups perform, which could inspire the artists and give them new ideas.

Both festivals made visible the diversity of cultural forms. For festivals, such as the Nc'wala that featured only performances by a single ethnic group, that parallel festivals occur for ethnic groups around the country produces an annual calendar of events that is a national performance of the country's ethnic diversity. For festivals like LICAF, troupes from around the country are brought together to showcase the country's diversity at a single event.

Both types give exposure to artists, who can subsequently be invited to perform at other events. The more opportunities artists have to perform, the greater likelihood that the traditional form will continue. However, neither of these festivals provided significant remuneration to artists, which is a significant component of both economic and cultural sustainability. In a country where poverty is rampant, if artists could gain income from their performances, it would improve their economic well-being, and it would make it possible for people to devote more time to participating in artistic practices, thus contributing to cultural conservation.

Returning to Mary Hufford's quote earlier in the essay, cultural conservation efforts should be driven by "those whose cultures are affected" (1994: 3). From this perspective, Nc'wala was more effective for cultural conservation than LICAF because it was Ngoni people who were front and center of not only organizing this annual event but also its cultural significance. LICAF, and other national festivals like it, contribute to some level of valuing of traditional culture and provide opportunities to participate in it. However, the popularity of these types of national festivals is doing less to promote the continuation of discrete cultural forms in context; instead, it contributes to the development of new folklorized forms that have emerged to fit these types of events in which short choreographed pieces referencing specific ethnic dances are presented to a general audience for the purpose of entertainment.

While those performing at LICAF and similar national festivals keep dance forms alive as a folklorized form, those participating at the Nc'wala contribute to the vitality of Ngoni cultural identity and phenomena, an impact that extends far beyond the festival. The Nc'wala ceremony is itself ICH, in as much as are each of its component parts. It is the motivation of the Ngoni people that contributes to the conservation effort. This model aligns with the World Tourism Organization's recommendation that "local communities should never be passive recipients of tourists but rather active decision makers in tourism development" (2012, 85). By putting on this annual festival, Ngoni people contribute to economic develop through tourism *and* assert their cultural identity, reaffirm their connection to a place, reinforce their allegiance to the ethnic leadership structure, bolster the tradition of their dance practices and costume making, invigorate local food traditions, and reinforce the importance of numerous rituals.

The experience of tourists at these two types of festivals was markedly different.

A majority of the tourism efforts in the region emphasize the importance of attracting foreign tourists in order to boost the economy. From what I have learned from my conversations with colleagues who work in the tourism sector in Malawi and Zambia, little effort has been made to develop domestic tourism outside of building hotels and lodges, often envisioned for those traveling for work. The idea of encouraging citizens to travel within their own country to learn about local history or enjoy different types of cultural phenomena has not been a priority. It is therefore significant that a majority of the tourists who made the journey to Nc'wala, and who travel annually to other such ceremonies in the country, such as the Kuomboka, are Zambian (Flint 2006). These festivals indicate that building domestic tourism around culture and heritage has the potential to contribute to economic development, and significantly, to spread the wealth outside of city centers.

The experience of foreign (and domestic) tourists at the two types of festivals is also very different. At a festival like LICAF, a tourist enjoys a taste of cultural performances as entertainment; yet, they have limited direct experience of the culture or the people. One watches from afar, receives little explanation, and then leaves either entertained or tired from watching one group after the other perform short pieces. At Nc'wala, by contrast, outsiders might not understand much about what is going on, but they experienced culture in motion, something that is significant to the people involved. It allows for a more immersive experience, rather than just distant observation, and thus more "depth of experience" (World Tourism Organization 2012,19).

As has been widely documented, inviting tourists into esoteric cultural spaces to generate income can be problematic in settings where the tourists' presence is inappropriate, is disruptive for insiders, or otherwise overly impacts what is happening. Valdimar Tr Hafstein writes that "folklorization threatens intangible heritage with objectification and once objectified, with commodification, exoticizing heritage for consumption by outsiders and alienating it from the practicing community, or at least transforming the community's relation to its practices" (2018b,135). With these concerns in mind, the Nc'wala model is well suited to tourism because outsiders have limited impact. The festival is large and absorbs "tourists with ease" because of the throngs of Ngoni who are there because of their personal connection to the event (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998, 61). Outsiders interspersed with insiders does little to change what happens in the public portions of the ceremony or what meaning they have for Ngoni attendees. The more esoteric dimensions are carefully guarded and restricted to those who should have access under Ngoni culture and strictures. The addition of outsiders as tourists only adds to the energy. The larger the audience, the more energetic the performances, and the more revenue that is generated

Scholars writing about ICH initiatives are rightfully critical about the commodification of traditional culture both because of what it can do to cultural forms and concerns about who actually benefits economically (see Bendix 2009; Scher 2011). However, many people in Zambia and across the continent ,where there is extensive poverty, are enthusiastic about the economic prospects of developing the cultural sector. Artists of all kinds welcome expanded opportunities to make money from their

art. And some businesses and government entities recognize the potential of culture in economic development. My analysis of these festivals suggests that finding ways of injecting energy and resources into cultural forms or events that are already vibrant and culturally significant to the communities associated with them in order to increase the meaningful roles they have might be the best way to *also* find ways to expand the economic potential (Foster 2013; Yun 2019). People value the Nc'wala Ceremony. Because the government has infused it with additional resources, it has grown to be even bigger and more exciting, and thus significant to the Mpezeni Ngoni, even expanding to the Ngoni outside his chieftaincy. Because it has grown so much and is so vibrant, people choose to come and see it, which leads to domestic and potentially international tourism, and thus to economic development.

I will conclude by repeating that a striking problem with both festivals is that those who perform, and thus contribute the most to cultural conservation efforts, are ironically the ones to benefit the least economically. As mentioned already, cultural tourism has the potential to enhance the livelihoods of a greater swath of the population, including those living at lower socioeconomic levels. Aligning the monetary remuneration or benefit with the cultural value of participation would go a long way toward enhancing conservation objectives *and* addressing the economic needs of those who most need it.

Notes

1   There is no publication date listed for this volume. I purchased it from the Department of Arts and Culture in Zambia in the summer of 2016, shortly after it was published.

2   I am grateful to the Department of Arts and Culture for hosting me during my 2016 and 2018 visits. Mr. Thomas Mubita, then Acting Director of the Department within the Ministry of Tourism and Arts, was generous in allowing me access to department staff, transport, and events. I am indebted to Mr. Lamba, who hosted me during both visits, introduced me to Department staff, arranged for me to interview artists and cultural workers, took me to relevant cultural events, always answers my never-ending questions, and read drafts of this essay.

3   Coordinating national dance events that include performance troupes representing each of the provinces in a country has been widespread across this part of Africa since the colonial period. Scholars have analyzed these types of festivals in specific geographic and historical contexts in order to determine the ways in which they have been used as a strategy to accomplish multiple, sometimes conflicting objectives, such as controlling populations, mobilizing political movements, creating national identities, fostering ethnic and regional pride, educating youth, raising money, and so on. For some examples, see Castaladi 2006, Gilman 2009, Kiiru 2017, Schauert 2015.

4   Organizers of a Zimbabwean festival who accompanied the Zimbabwe troupe that performed at LICAF officially invited several of the Zambian groups to join them at their festival in Zimbabwe a few months later, all expenses paid. This is an example of how successful cultural events can snowball into other cultural and economic opportunities.

5   See Gilman 2009 for a detailed discussion about how performance events are used to display and reinforce power relationships.

6   This and other such ceremonies in Zambia grew out of complicated combinations of pre-colonial, colonial, and postcolonial political and socio-cultural dynamics (Flint 2006, Gordon 2004). In contemporary Zambia, people consider this festival to be strongly rooted in Ngoni leadership and identity.

7   The categorization of "ethnic group" in Zambia, and elsewhere on the continent, is complex and the result of a long history of power struggles, migration, colonization, shifts in the socio-political environment, inter-marriage, and so on (see Kashoki 2018; Lutz and Kula 2008). Recognizing its complexity, for the purpose of this essay, I use the term loosely for the commonly designated cultural groupings in contemporary Zambia.

8   The performance of power and authority by government officials, local leaders, and dance performers at each of these festivals of outside the scope of this essay, though it deserves much deeper analysis.

9   From the time of this research into writing in 2020, Malawians have been actively developing ethnically-based festivals.

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Responses

Exploring a Win-win Approach Between Cultural Conservation and Economic Development

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I was extremely fascinated and in deep resonance when reading Professor Lisa Gilman's essay, "Festivals, Tourism, and Cultural Conservation: Comparing the Livingstone Cultural and Arts Festival and the Nc'wala Traditional Ceremony in Zambia." The author and I obviously share a similar interest: we are trying to explore how to safeguard intangible cultural heritage (ICH) and at the same time promote the economic sustainability in contemporary societies from the perspective of folkloristics; we both hope to find a possible way to achieve a "win-win" result at this point. This dilemma is challenging in all countries and communities in today's world, and it needs to be explored jointly by all governments, scholars, tradition-bearers and other stakeholders. In view of the close relationship between folkloristics and the ICH safeguarding projects, folklorists should be contributing to this issue.

However, within the limited observations I have been able to made, folklorists have not achieved much in the exploration of this issue: most folklore scholars are reluctant about promoting economic development. This hesitancy was evident in the statement made by Madame Noriko Aikawa-Faure, former director of the Intangible Cultural Heritage Unit, UNESCO. At the International Symposium on Intangible Cultural Heritage Safeguarding and Rural Revitalization in Belt and Road Countries held at Beijing Normal University at the end of 2018, Aikawa-Faure surveyed how discussions on "development" evolved in the ICH discourse of UNESCO:

> Since the Convention entered into force in 2006, the Intergovernmental Committee for the Safeguarding of the ICH (hereafter called the Committee) has taken up this topic with prudence. At the outset, the Committee was concerned about the adverse impacts of the commercialization of the ICH on its safeguarding. The discussion then progressed towards an acknowledgement of the contributions that the economic exploitation of the ICH could make to its sustainability and revitalization and the economic and social development of related communities. (Aikawa-Faure 2020)

Into the time of writing in 2020, in the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage and relevant documents, it is still emphasized that tourism is a double-edged sword, and that we should be vigilant in dealing with tourism and the related over-commercialization of ICH. In China, most folklorists share negative attitudes towards the commercialization of ICH; as a result, the comprehensive research on the role of the tourism industry in cultural safegarding has been limited. In one of the few projects on this topic, grounded on my long-term fieldwork, I proposed that the community-driven model is fundamental for the combined goal of ICH safeguard-

ing and rural revitalization (Yang 2020). By comparing three cases of utilizing oral traditions to develop tourism in China, Germany and America, I put forward a "1-2-3 model" to achieve a win-win goal between protecting oral tradition and developing local tourism (Yang 2014).

Based on the background above, I am greatly inspired by Professor Gilman's paper. Due to limited space, I would like to highlight three points in particular.

First, the paper integrates the purport of theoretical folklore and public folklore. Through in-depth, informative ethnographic research, the author explores the potential and then provides suggestions for solving the dilemma of simultaneous cultural safeguarding and economic development facing the whole world, and adding a strong impetus to this field which lacks enough exploration by the academic community.

Second, by comparing two Zambian festivals, the paper points out that community-based and ethnic-based festivals have greater potential in terms of achieving win-win results. Similar ones to both the two types of Zambian festivals can be found in China as well as other countries, and, as the festival economy has been drawing increasing attention, governments and businesses have been increasingly interested in the *national* festivals. This paper, however, convincingly depicts that locally-rooted and community-based festivals are more likely to achieve the combined goals of economic development and cultural sustainability. It thus reminds the stakeholders about the different types and diverse roles of festivals, and especially the potential of community-driven festivals in safeguarding ICH and developing the economy. This conclusion is not only important for governments and companies around the world, but also beneficial for festivals to get more established in communities.

Third, it provides an exemplary model for studying tourism from the perspective of folkloristics. My students always ask me, when many disciplines study the tourism industry, what are the advantages of folkloristics? In my opinion, the key features of a folkloristics' perspective includes (but is not limited to) emic perspectives and ethnographic methods. Professor Gilman's paper provides such an excellent example. Taking festival as the focal object and Mary Hufford's viewpoints as the basic attitude, it emphasizes that "cultural conservation efforts should be driven by 'those whose cultures are affected.'" By observing, comparing, and describing various members from within and outside of the communities as well as their attitudes towards cultures and economic benefits, this paper presents a distinct emic perspective. Through ethnographic research, the author vividly displays comprehensive aspects of cultural heritage safegaurding and economic development in the two festivals in a detailed manner, which delivers immersive feelings and persuasive conclusions. All these show the value of folkloristics in studying and depicting the world.

In addition to these, I am also very interested in two other points in the paper, which may be worthy of the author's further attention and exploration.
One is that I noticed the author pointed out at the end of the paper, "a striking problem with both festivals is that those who perform, and thus contribute the most to cultural conservation efforts, are ironically the ones to benefit the least economically…" Indeed, how to fairly benefit the whole community is an important part of the ethics

of all safeguarding projects. Folklorists should work closely with the communities to discover successful practices and methods that could benefit those living at lower socio-economic levels. In a Chinese case I studied, the villagers who lost their land because of urbanization took the initiative to develop folklore tourism, which benefited the villagers and lifted the village out of poverty. Similarly, an Indian NGO exploited the tourism industry to help local artists in a poor village and improved their lives and promoted female artists' access to more equal social status (Ananya Bhattacharya 2016).

The second is the author seems to be critical of folklorized forms, which is understandable in the context described in the paper. However, it is also necessary to notice that folklorized forms can play new roles and functions in new contexts. John H. McDowell demonstrates in his study in Northern Ecuador that folklorized forms can give rise to richly multivocal discourse in expressive contact zones and that they canstimulate and reinforce local discursive practices when they inspire acts of cultural reclamation (2010). My research in Northern China also shows that the "mythologism"[1] produced by the local tourism industry actually originates from the mythical traditions within the community, and the mythologism performed by the tour guides eventually become a resource for tourists to express themselves and communicate with others—in this process, mythologism circulates back to the community and becomes a useful source for further communication and creation. Therefore, folklore and folklorized forms are not necessarily contradictory, but instead, they can also be mutually transformational in an endless succession (Yang et al 2020).

Notes

1   According to my re-interpretation, the term "mythologism" mainly refers to the reconstruction of mythology in modern cultural industry and electronic media. For more explanation and discussion about this term, please see Lihui Yang et al. *Mythologism: Reconstructing Mythology in Heritage Tourism and Electronic Media* (in Chinese). Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2020.

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Paying to be the show? Rethinking Festivals and Tourism in Cultural Conservation Policy

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"People from other cities can't believe we spend money to dance in the festival," told me once Edwin Loza Huarachi, a middle-aged practitioner of Diablada, one of the dances performed in the *Festividad de la Virgen de la Candelaria* in Puno, Perú. Just like him, every year, around eighty thousand dancers spend large amounts of money in outfits, transport, and other expenses to participate in this celebration. Why would people pay to be the show, especially in areas as economically challenged as the Andes?

This old question was the first thing that came to my mind after reading Lisa Gilman's piece entitled "Festivals, Tourism, and Cultural Conservation: Comparing the Livingstone Cultural and Arts Festival and the Nc'wala Traditional Ceremony in Zambia." Indeed, her text sounded oddly familiar: what she said about festivals and its multiple participants in Zambia could have also been said about my home country Perú. Moreover, her compelling piece brings up a concern of global relevance: In which ways, and under which circumstances, are festivals relevant for people? And how can this relevance translate into forms of safeguarding that are also economically viable for practitioners?

Putting scholarly attention onto festivals is not an odd choice from the perspective of heritage conservation and safeguarding. Alongside craft fairs, music and dance festivals are arguably the most widespread metacultural operations (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2004) for the safeguarding of expressive culture around the world. As such, they are often a repository of a whole lot of different expectations, including cultural affirmation, heritage conservation, authenticity display, entertainment, community creation, and economic dynamization, among others. It is thus no surprise that festivals have received their fair deal of attention from scholars in the arts and humanities, ranging from appreciation for their role in cultural safeguarding and community creation to critiques toward the power relationships embedded in them and the aesthetic transformations they entailed. More technical debates on how to organize them, how to align them with policy objectives, or how to make them economically viable, seems to have been left for cultural entrepreneurs, policy makers and public humanists.

Seen from this stance, Gilman's article offers a refreshing perspective. While engaging with such debates, her piece points in a different direction: the viability of festivals for economic sustainability via tourism. This matter of concern speaks directly to some of the expectations we tend to have over festivals, complicating the often taken-for-granted relationship between expressive culture, festivals, and income by tourism. At the same time, her perspective expands from current critical heritage studies scholarship by exploring whether heritage regimes (Bendix, Eggert and Peselmann 2013), despite being problematic, can at least potentially provide poverty alleviation

to grassroots practitioners. In sum, it is a piece that engages with the concerns of cultural policy practitioners from the perspective of critical heritage scholars, providing a much-needed bridge between both realms.

One important contribution of this article is that it points out that not all festivals are created equal, and it establishes (or at least I like to think it does) differences between state-organized and community-based festivals of traditional music and dance. We in Peru tend to make a similar distinction between *festividades* (which are community-based) and *festivales* (which are organized by public or private organizations). I always found it disturbing that both are named "festivals" in English, as they entail completely different dynamics. While *festivales* tend to be organized by particular entrepreneurs and the practitioners are mainly the show being shown, in *festividades* the practitioners are part of a community that produces the event together. This is why Edwin Loza Huarachi would pay to dance in Virgen de la Candelaria: he is not an attraction but a grassroots participant.

While one might argue that in the eyes of tourists they are both attractions, this article does a fantastic job in showing how the quality of participation of practitioners is completely different in both festivals. While practitioners participate of *festivales* mainly out of economic gain, they take part of *festividades* out of more culturally meaningful incentives. Based on this, the article identifies a relationship between quality of participation and economic success: while the outcome of *festivales* respond to variables such as organization and marketing, *festividades* seem to attract people (and their resources) out of their own rooted communal meaning. As the author mentions, *festividades* are not events where intangible cultural heritage is displayed, but rather events that are intangible cultural heritage themselves.

This is, in my opinion, the main scholarly contribution of the article, and one that could be potentially impactful in heritage and tourism policy. It encourages both scholars and policy practitioners to think of festivals-as-metacultural-operations in a different manner. If what seems to engage people is the nature of the event and not the specific dances it features, perhaps the latter are less significant than the former for safeguarding effects. In that case, it would require us to switch the attention of safeguarding and promotion efforts from music and dance itself to the communal frame that allows them to reproduce and thrive on the ground. A community-oriented safeguarding approach aimed to supporting the grassroots development of *festividades* themselves would probably be an ideal strategy, reserving *festivales* for safeguarding practices that lack the community support of a thriving *festividad*.

What makes sense for safeguarding, however, does not necessarily do so for tourism, as the sustainability of a cultural practice says nothing about its appeal to visitors. The article suggests a way out of this dilemma by referencing an immersive experience as a central attraction of *festividades*, observation congruent with her assessment of the visitor's outcome of both festivals. The piece, however, also allows us to think of tourism in the *festividad* in a more meaningful way. Indeed, Gilman identifies that tourism in festivals works better when the former adapts to the dynamics of the latter. This is important, as it allows the community to maintain control over how visitors

engage with their cultural practice, hence overcoming the risk of commodifying their heritage (Kaul 2007). However, a point that the author hints at but that could have been better highlighted is the fact that many of the practitioners of the *festividad* are tourists themselves. Indeed, as Gilman points out, many of these community participants come join their *festividad* from out of town, injecting resources and dynamizing the local economy. So yet another merit of this article is that, in asking how festivals and tourism can engage in a productive synergy, it also invites us to think of tourism itself in new ways.

To sum up, I find this article to be a significant contribution to intangible cultural heritage and tourism policy from the perspective of folklore and critical heritage studies. Such contributions are as uncommon as they are necessary, as they reveal critical problems within interventions that could otherwise benefit grassroots communities via safeguarding. By asking whether (and how) intangible cultural heritage tourism can deliver tangible benefits for practitioners, Gilman meets the concerns of multiple local authorities and community advocates that struggle to navigate a heritage regime not always aligned with grassroots needs. Perhaps as much as critical perspectives they also need rigorous academic research that helps them make the most out of the arrangement we currently have.

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The Black Dog: Origins and Symbolic Characteristics of the Spectral Canine

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Abstract

The Black Dog is a folklore staple, easily recognizable by its mangy back hair, ominous presence, and ember-filled eyes. It is also a symbolic narrative tool in pop culture, as seen in Arthur Conan Doyle's The Hound of the Baskervilles. *However, it did not emerge from a void; Black Dog lore stems from Ulysses' Argos, continues through the Aesopian dogs, and borrows thematic nuances from werewolves, but its foundations stand firmly on the backs of mythology's noble hounds: Cerberus and Fenrir, who provide literary and psychological symbolism via their representation of the subconscious triumvirate (superego, ego, and id), temporal triumvirate (past, present, and future), and the Jungian shadow. Furthermore, Cerberus' role—whose image, I argue, is most influential—as a guardian, not of the boundary between life and death, but between reality and fantasy, is the primordial father of the allegory of self-perpetuating imagination, of which the Black Dog is a vital fragment.*

Keywords: Black Dog, cultural chaos, fantasy, myth, narrative, Cerberus, symbolism

Introduction

In the 1943 winter-issue of the *Hosier Folklore Bulletin*, Robert G. McGuire, a local journalist, recounts a curious story of a man named Johnnie, who at the time of the telling of his tale was older. While a young lad in Detroit, Johnnie accompanied his mother across the Irish section of the city, dubbed Corktown, to visit her friend, Mary. Johnnie recounts,

> We'd not gone far…before Mother said, "Something's wrong, Johnnie," and a few steps after that, we saw a black dog running in front of us. He was a great big son of a gun, and all black as tar. First, he'd run before us and then behind us, but he never left us alone for a minute. "We're turning back," says Mother, "for when my father died, a black dog ran along the roof and howled the whole night." (McGuire 1943, 21)

The next day, someone murdered Mary; witnesses sighted a black dog at the scene.

Such stories are uttered throughout Western Europe and within immigrant communities in the United States. Great Britain is often the setting of these tales, many of which were compiled by folklorist Ethel Rudkin of Lincolnshire and published in a 1938 issue of *Folklore* under the title "The Black Dog." Her study—unnoticed by academia and overshadowed by research on other more prominent folktales, such as the Little Red Riding-hood, Krampus, or Snow White's Mirror—is essential in under-

standing why the mind is unwilling to comprehend a commonplace animal such as a dog within the context of the supernatural.

I hope to furnish Miss Rudkin's observations their rightful dues and will do so by analyzing what the Black Dog is, why its symbolism matters, and the origins of its form through the study of literature's royal dogs: Ulysses' faithful Argos, Hades' hellish Cerberus, and Loki's fiendish Fenrir. Along the way and to understand how their tropes relate to Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung's idea of duality and the shadow, I will detour into lore on Aesop's dogs, werewolves, and Anubis, the Egyptian judge of the dead. However, before I do so, a quick note on the structure of this paper: after a short introduction, I will describe the Black Dog—physical portrayals and variants, associated locations with the creature, its role in folklore—then look at its derivative symbolism and aspects taken from Argos, Anubis, the werewolf, Cerberus and, finally, Fenrir. All the while, I will weave the psychological and narrative concepts expressed by Freud, Jung, and Joseph Campbell, among others, into the spectral tapestry that is the ebony canine.

Regarding the methodology of this study: besides looking at such primary sources as Ethel Rudkin's commentary, I am using Mark Norman's recent work on Black Dog encounters in Great Britain. Theo Brown's 1958 work on the importance of reoccurring Black Dog locations such as crossroads, churchyards, borders, supplements these studies. By drawing on popular retellings of *Aesop's Fables*, Dante Alighieri's *The Divine Comedy*, and Ovid's *The Metamorphosis*, I give context to Black Dog's symbolism via its progenitors. I chose popular retellings over academic ones (although I do use them in some instances, for example, to better this paper's narrative flow) because popular retellings remain in the public's collective imagination more so than scholarly ones. Additionally, they are concise without much analytical meandering, which is helpful when recounting an essential mythological beat—for example, the chaining of Fenrir—as clearly as possible without the need to dive into what the author of the academic retelling meant by analysis x, y or z.

Furthermore, the Black Dog is a folktale staple drenched with *folk*lore; hence it is only appropriate to adhere to the popular retellings. All theoretical works, such as Jerold Franks, "Loki's Mythological Functions in the Tripartite System," Michael Haase's "Nietzsche and Freud: Questions of Life and Death," or Marina Warner's *Once Upon a Time* are meant to enhance and illuminate the ancient symbolism of Cerberus and Fenrir, and provide a thematic mirror to that of the Black Dog—reflecting its past in the present while forecasting its future. The works of Freud (*The Uncanny* or *Civilization and its Discontent*) and Jung (*Man and His Symbols* or *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*) are meant to enrich the connection between the Dog's symbolism and the trickster archetype in the age of cultural chaos—a term defined below. Furthermore, the essence of these texts is present throughout this article.

Regarding the cited online sources: each of them is written by an authoritative author, including two Egyptologists, a scholar of Norse mythology, the staff at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the staff of an award-winning occult encyclopedia, who present their work with credible sourcing. Additionally, these online sources act as

secondary supports for academic foundations that form the base of this work. Regarding the presentation, I wish to keep it in the style of the works that comprise this paper. In other words, the format and style are complementary to its subject matter and stays professional throughout.

I invite all those who read this work to contact me if they so choose, to further the dialogue concerning the Black Dog and its role in contemporary storytelling. With that out of the way, let me begin with defining, dissecting, and deliberating this paper's primary subject matter, and there is no better place to start this analysis than by looking at the most famous contemporary version of the Black Dog: Sirius Black.

Characterizing the Black Dog

When J.K. Rowling's *Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban* were published in 1999, it became an instant classic, selling, as of the 2020 count, approximately 65 million copies (Atkins 2020, 1). Among the cast of colorful characters was Harry Potter's godfather, the aforementioned Sirius Black, who was capable of transforming into a scroungy black dog, or as professor Trelawney, Harry Potter's Divination lecturer, explained, "The Grim, my dear boy, the Grim…The giant, spectral dog that haunts churchyards. My dear boy, it is an omen—the worst omen—of death" (Rowling 1999, 107). Though rare, black dog transformations do appear, and there is some precedent for them in folklore, a fact detailed below.

While prof. Trelawney keeps in line with one of the traditional slants on the Black Dog as a premonition of doom. The hound's history and inspirations suggest that the apparition is a symbol of human indecisiveness, fear of failure, and time. When *Prisoner of Azkaban* received a 2004 silver screen adaptation, the image of the Black Dog engraved itself onto the collective imagination of a generation through Warner Brothers', the film's distributor, inspired merchandising campaign. While Black's plush canine alter-ego sold well, the origins of the creature's image and its allegory were lost in the resonant whirlwinds of popular culture.

Illustration 1. The coal-black Hound. Illustration by Sidney Paget. From *The Hound of Baskerville*, by Arthur Conan Doyle, 1901. CC-PD-Mark.

Since the Middle Ages, both gossiping serfs and high-minded nobles whispered of the shadow hound that emerged from the abyss during the depths of night. Its legend grew, especially in the United Kingdom. Popular among Renaissance and Victorian storytellers—be they the crones of the village or court jesters—fairytales, local myths, and anecdotes of the woodland witches hiding amid civilization tended to have a sinister familiar in their narratives. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle took his inspiration for the now famous 1902 detective story *The Hound of the Baskervilles* from the English folk legend. His description of the "foul thing, [the] black beast, shaped like a hound" with "hell-fire shooting from his mouth and eyes" (Doyle 2015, 12) has been reported hundreds of times throughout the British Isles. The creature's notoriety is such that "photographer and researcher Nick Stone…has so far collected between 400 and 500 accounts" (Prickett 2015, 1) of the creature, mapping out and posting all sightings online (Stone 2015, 1), while author Mark Norman cataloged 719 such sightings (Norman 2015, 185-242). Even the creature's numerous names—among them, Padfoot and Gytrash, which come from Gaelic for "the curious sound made by the hound's footfall" (Norman 2015, 20)—are plentiful in literature, one prevalent example being Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre*.

Besides being a black dog, what else defines the creature? Theo Brown, along with Ethel Rudkin, and W.P. Witcutt, paint a very detailed image of the specter. What is called Barguest, Shuck, Black Stag, Trash, Shriker, or Hooter, "is always black, and is always a dog and nothing else. It may appear like a normal dog, sometimes a retriever, smooth or curly-coated" (Brown 1958, 178) sometimes "smooth and gleaming" but "more often shaggy, like a bear" (Brown 1958, 180). Furthermore, the Black Dog "is often heard, for when he disappears into a hedge, the leaves rustle loudly, or the 'twigs crackle as if they were afire.' In one description, his coat is wiry 'like pig-bristles'—in another, he is 'tall and thin with a long neck and pointed nose" (Rudkin 1938, 130). The creature "varies in size from normal—so that it is mistaken for a real dog—to enormous" (Brown 1958, 178). W.P. Witcutt adds that some describe it as "black with staring eyes" (Witcutt 1942, 168).

In certain areas, such as Suffolk and Norfolk, England, the creature is "frequently one-eyed…and always ominous;" meanwhile in Westmorland, "it…appears without a head" (Brown 1958, 176). According to accounts compiled by Rudkin, the Black Dog is

> always 'table high,' sometimes spoken of as being 'as big as a caulf' (sic) which often produces a muddled idea as to whether he is a calf or a dog… No matter how dark the night, the Dog can be seen because he is so much blacker. He seems to have a tendency to appear on the left-hand side of the spectator, he crosses the road from left to right, and he is definitely looked on as a spirit of protection. (Rudkin 1938, 130)

Brown seconds the blackness of the Dog in an account that states, "The Lincolnshire dog always looks blacker than the blackest night, can cross water, but does not cross parish boundaries, though he sometimes seems to be connected with them" (Brown 1958, 179).

Its habitat too is a curious thing, as it is split into three sorts: 1) areas near water, such as rivers, streams, ponds, coasts, or bridges, with a total of over 100 recorded hauntings (Brown 1958, 182); 2) roads and crossroads, which Brown states, "seem to be the natural home of the Black Dog" with at least 55 examples cited in his study, 25 of which were in Lincolnshire alone (Brown 1958, 182); and 3) churchyards and cemeteries, which are often home to the Barguest variant that "goes out of its way to show the beholder it is no normal dog, but a monster from another world, having no one definite form—though it favors the black dog—and is malevolent in character" (Brown 1958, 178). Witcutt notes that these Black Dogs "guard the graves of those who died by violence" (Witcutt 1942, 167). Grave guardianship goes hand in hand with the accounts given by Brown, where

> a number of isolated burials are haunted by Black Dogs, such as fallow old battle-sites. Jacobite graves round Swinscoe, Staffordshire, are haunted by a Black Dog. This, of course, is a symbol of the person buried there. Two gallows sites are also haunted. One at Tring, Hertfordshire, commemorates a man who falsely accused a woman of witchcraft, so that she was drowned in 1751, and he was afterwards hanged near the spot. Which is the dog—the witch or the man? The other gallows site is at Castle-town, Isle of Man. (Brown 1958, 185)

While folkloric accounts keep the territoriality of the Dog rather vague, with parish borders marking its broad haunting grounds, the thousand-plus accounts gathered by Mark Norman and Nick Stone suggest that, generally, the same Dogs are seen around the same areas, implying an incomplete region-wide dominance of specific Dogs. Rudkin's research seconds this assertion.

Witchcraft is a rare facet of the Black Dog mythos, being a common misconception popularized by Bram Stoker's *Dracula*, among others, that magic about brings forth the creature. While cases exist where "the symbol of the Black Dog is used by the Devil, by the familiar, and by the witches themselves in transformation" (Brown 1958, 178), the likelihood is that the *image of* the Black Dog is connected to witchcraft and not *the* Black Dog itself. Brown notes that "[a]t Stogursey in Somerset, Miss Ruth Tongue has noted an instance where the witch has continued her transformation in death, and it is generally understood that the Black Dog is the witch herself" (Brown 1958, 178). This occurrence suggests that a black dog and the Black Dog are separate entities: one being a human transformation, the other a supernatural entity in its own right. Fairy tales are one example of this folkloric precedent, where villainous witches transform into dogs or wolves. In the case of the Slavic fairytale 'A Tale of Trasovich Ivan, the Firebird and the Gray Wolf,' it is hinted that the wolf aiding the noble Ivan is an angel or Fate transformed (Suchanek 2001, 175-176).

Furthermore, the fairytale transformation has precedent in superstition and history. Historian Louis Martin notes, "it has long been believed that both demons and sorcerers could transform themselves into the shapes of animals," exemplified by the 1566 trial of Elizabeth Francis of Chelmsford for making a pact with a familiar for 'metamorphic prowess' (Martin 2016, 49). With that said, when a witch transforms

into a black dog, she is in no way summoning the Black Dog or any of its variants. The Black Dog, throughout hundreds of examples outlined by both Rudkin and Norman, always acts independently and of its own accord, and much like the triumvirate of time, manipulated by one thing: special boundaries.

Rudkin was the first folklorist to note that most Black Dogs are found on or near parish boundaries (Rudkin 1938, 127 & 129) but do not cross them (Rudkin 1938, 130). Others associate the phantasm with county borders. For example, Brown notes, about the Rudkin study, that

> on the Essex-Surrey border, the dog crosses from Middleton to Boxford at Sudbury. On the Norfolk-Suffolk boundary there is a group of dogs, based on the valley of the River Waveney, comparable, perhaps, to the Trent-Tributary settlements in Lincolnshire. The Dog of Bungay is very near the same border, and is remembered on both sides. It does not seem at all certain that the dog is connected with county delimitations. At Uplyme in Devon, the Black Dog used to patrol the Dorset boundary along Dog Lane, behind the Black Dog Inn. In North Devon, Mrs. Carbonnel believes that Black Dogs are intimately associated with certain parish boundaries—Bow, Down St. Mary, and up to Torrington, Frithelstock, etc. (Brown 1958, 183)

Borders act as symbolic chains and fetters, and many of the Dogs reported adhere to haunting specific areas, which may be due to the Black Dog being "a deity of his own right…a phantasmagoria of rural England…and race-memory of the pagan gods" (Witcutt 1942, 167). These pagan connections are not far off from Rudkin's research that "suggested that the dog-tribe which found itself so much at home in Lincolnshire may not have been welcome in the surrounding areas, which might well account for the supposed 'death, disaster, and ill-luck' that parts of East Anglia associate with the dog" (Brown 1958, 179). The Black Death, a paradigm-shifting disease that ravaged Western Europe in the 14th century, also lends "itself naturally to the canine death imagery of the hellhound, blended with that of the werewolf and *cynantrophy* (White 1991, 68). Packs of hungry dogs often accompanied the piles of corpses that overflowed cemeteries and churchyards, giving folklore fertile ground to borrow and mold from history. For example, in "Messina, where the plague first appeared, 'demons in the shape of dogs' moved among men. 'A black dog with sword drawn in his paws appeared among [the people], gnashing his teeth and rushing upon them and breaking all of the silver vessels and lamps and candlesticks on the altar and casting them" around (White 1991, 68). Consecrated parish grounds, and by extension county borders, which often align themselves along flowing waterways (a folklore staple), keep Dogs within their domain.

> Domesticated animals sense the creature's presence. Brown notes that horses and dogs are terrified when they see the Black Dog. At Willoughton, Lincolnshire, a little dog was petrified by a ghost dog which, to the human being present, was not seen but felt. A case from France describes a series of Black Dog visitations in a house, culminating in two police dogs being set at it when it was invisible to humans; one dog was cowed, the other died from the encounter. (Brown 1958, 187)

Meanwhile, Rudkin recalls a story from the 31ˢᵗ of October, 1933, when Mr. M (who chose to stay anonymous) was walking his dog, which uncharacteristically began barking and growling at something in the hedges before backing off and exemplifying fearfulness. When Mr. M went to check the hedge, the man's faithful companion pulled with such might that Mr. M let go of the leash and the dog ran home as fast as it could. The fence gate near the incident opened, and Mr. M attempted to shut it but "was forced on to the gate post by something pushing on his shoulders from the front. Finally, he got the gate shut and went in the house, when he told his wife that it was just the sensation of a large dog, as big as an Alsatian, with its front paws on his shoulders having pushed him back on to the gate post" (Rudkin 1938, 123).

The polymorphic nature of the Black Dog is easily explained by local variants on shared myths, legends, historical events, and, of course, the cultural diversity of the population. Mark Norman, like his predecessors, points out that the United Kingdom has the widest diversity of Black Dogs, therefore, it acts as the best case study of its polymorphism (Norman 2015, 17). The sometimes-headless Barguest is a reoccurring sight in Northern England; Staffordshire and Warwickshire are home to the shaggy Padfoot; the calf-sized Freybug is a Norfolk lore staple; the folk of Yorkshire and Lancashire stay indoors when they hear the screeching of the Skriker (also known as a Trash); meanwhile, the coastlines and countryside of East Anglia are the stalking grounds of the large-eyed Black Shuck.

Finally, the Black Dog's color and its association with malevolence, ill fate, and bad luck may stem from the black cat and its heavy association with witchcraft, misfortune, and familiars. The cat and Dog associations are rather superficial; however, Barbara Hannah makes an interesting point when she notes that "Egyptian gods melt into each other and reappear confusingly, amazingly like the way our own figures of the unconscious behave" (Hannah 2006, 26). Perhaps the same is true here, as Anubis' relations to other dogs appear and disappear throughout the rest of this article. The Black Dog often exemplifies traits of superficial malevolence—such as its appearance—but acts like a stereotypical guide, protector, or harbinger of the future.

On Lesser Progenitors: Argos, Anubis, and Aesop's Dogs
Michael Fox, the former vice-president of the Humane Society of the United States, points out that "the nature of the dog is such that it would not be an overstatement to say that the dog helped civilize the human species" (Hausman 1998, 3). While it is widely known that a dog is a *Man's best friend*, the lesser-known adage states that dogs are a gift from the gods, or as author Ferdinand Mery notes, "In the beginning, God created Man but seeing him so feeble, He gave him a dog" (Hausman 1998, 5). This sentiment echoes throughout much of Western mythology, going as far back as Ulysses' faithful companion, Argos, who, after twenty years of his master's absence, recognized him joyfully before passing away. From Homer,

The dog, with ticks (unlook'd to) overgrown.

But by this dog no sooner seen but known
Was wise Ulysses; who new enter'd there,
Up with his dog's laid ears, and, coming near,
Up he himself rose, fawn'd, and wagg'd his stern,
Couch'd close his ears, and lay so; nor discern
Could ever more his dear-lov'd lord again.
Ulysses saw it, nor had power t' abstain
From shedding tears.
   (Homer, *Odyssey*, XVII. 305-313)

The theme of choice, a Black Dog staple, is exemplified in these lines, for both Ulysses and Argos recognize each other, and yet to keep the hero's mission secret, they do not go to one another, instead of reveling in their reunion from afar. The symbolism that Homer lays upon the dog's shoulders is that of the difficulty of choice and fear of failure. The tics upon its body are symbolic of time, both past and present problems and pains they caused that suck on what remains of the future. The passage of time is central in *The Odyssey*, and Argos' passing upon seeing his master, represents the perseverance and patience associated with reaching one's goal.

Illustration 2. *Ulysses Disguised as a Beggar, Recognized by His Dog, Argus*. Etching by Theodor van Hulden, c. 1630. Source: www.philamuseum.org

Argus, in this sense, is loyalty, be it to another person, task, or, as I discuss later, duty and eventual destiny. Argos is an embodiment of the point in time when contentment enters the soul, the moment before death. However, in the context of cultural chaos—from the Greek *khaos politistikós* (χάος πολιτιστικός), translated as 'civilizational chaos'—which I define as a complete or partial malaise or breakdown of ideas, customs, traditions, and social behaviors in a society which, after experiencing a folk, political or civilizational paradigm shift, recedes into an intellectual or creative primordial void, the death of Argos *is* that paradigm shift. His death is the precursory omen of the incoming violence and wrath that Odysseus will volley upon Penelope's suitors. The Black Dog's constant fading in and out of reality and sight is a reminder of that ever-shifting border between order and chaos, the explainable and the unknown, the things-as-they-are and the ever-present sword of Damocles hanging just out of sight.

Argos' role is vital in understanding Ulysses' crossing the border from the su-

pernatural into that of the familiar, and the diplomatic to the violent. While suiters overrun Ulysses' household, the atmosphere of home is familiar. Argos signifies the milestone of what Joseph Campbell calls the crossing of the return threshold. The Black Dog in its very essence is that threshold: an always moving milestone pursuing the hero, in other words, destiny: a theme prominent in many of Aesop's *Fables*, such as the *Dog and the Oyster* or *The Hounds in Couples*, in which the dog plays a role of an unaware mentor. For just as much as Argos acts as a symbol of Ulysses' return, he is also a Cambellian helper: he does not betray his master's return to Ithaca. He gives him the advantage of surprise against Penelope's suitors, much like the Black Dog's signaling of a nearing of anguish and death, not as horrors to be feared, but as eventualities that have to be faced as mortals.

In folklore, dogs are often presented as otherworldly, related to the gods and protectors of wild places such as abandoned ruins and deep woods, yet, primarily, they are assessors of justice, as in Aesop's *The Ass, the Dog and the Wolf*. The fable's theme of choice teaches that "favors beget favors." So, when the famished dog asks the ass to "stoop down" so that it may feed itself, it provides the donkey with a choice, to which he turns a deaf ear. Thus, when the wolf—a symbol of wildness and knowledge—comes and begins devouring the ass, the dog replies with the same line the ass used, "Wait till our master wakes, he will come to help you without fail" (Aesop 2013, 66-67). The simple act of negligence on the donkey's part results in swift judgment from both facades of the canine, the civilized dog, and the wild wolf: Cerberus and Fenrir. The act also hints at the Jungian shadow: the duality of Man; the duality of the Black Dog: a domesticated nightmare. The key theme is the negligence of choice. The fable's dog and the Black Dog act as heralds of choice and, like Argos, by their inaction force the hero to face the consequences of past actions or future inactions via anxiety.

Deities often take on the form of dogs to do battle or pursue their enemies, as in the tale of the Welsh adventurer Gwion Bach. After Gwion accidentally tastes three drops of inspiration from a cauldron of the goddess of poetry and letters, Caridwen, he flees, transforming into a hare, while the goddess gives chase in the guise of a greyhound (Campbell 2008, 172-73). The simple transformation of the otherworldly (the goddess) into the every day (the dog) exemplifies the power that canines have on the human imagination, providing Man with an infinite scope of associations linked with dogs. Moreover, the dog's link with the celestial signifies its understanding of things that are beyond Man's comprehension of, for example, the divine, or as sociologist Gerald Hausman puts it, a "dog has a close relationship with God, while man is just begging to know him" (Hausman 1998, 6).

Furthermore, dogs symbolize guidance and act as guardians of the boundary between reality and fantasy, be it heavenly or hellish, as is the case with the Egyptian deity, Anubis. "The dog that swallows millions" (Tyldesley 2011, 110) is a progenitor guardian of shadows at the border and acts as a vital clue to the Black Dog's symbolism. Natalia Klimczak, an Egyptian Mythology scholar, notes that to "date, archaeologists have not unearthed any monumental temple dedicated to this god. His 'temples' are tombs and cemeteries" (Klimczak 2016, 1). Much like the Black Dog's haunts—

churchyards and crossroads—Anubis' mysticism lies in places associated with fear and the premise they espouse on our imagination that is associated with time. As Lyn Green from the Marshall Cavendish Reference puts it, Anubis "was originally the most important deity linked to funerals and death. Over time, however, this role was taken over by the god Osiris, and Anubis became associated with preserving dead bodies and guiding the dead in the underworld" (Green 2012, 1); a trait similar to that of the Black Dog who acts as a shepherd into the afterlife: a chilling helper, not much different from Argos. Thus, the subtlety of Anubis' metamorphosis from the god of death to the guide of the dead is akin to Black Dog's duality as an omen of doom and a benevolent guide, as expressed by Rudkin. This duality as a psychopomp is also present in the Hindu god Yama and his dogs.

Similarly, Jungian psychology sees psychopomps as mediators between the conscious and unconscious—the real and the fantastic—a point discussed below. Barbara Hanna, a Jungian analyst, notes a rather gripping dog-as-guide tale of the Samoyeds of Siberia, who "usually gave their god Ngaa (death) the form of a wolf. When someone was very ill," the villagers would send for a shaman who would place "an image of the wolf at the side of the tent and then sacrifice" the sick man's dog. Then the shaman would kill "another dog and as this one" died, the healer would pray to "Ngaa to accept the sacrifice in place of the life of the sick man." If Ngaa was unsatisfied, then another dog was killed on the grave of the deceased, only for it to be hung with its tail hangs down towards the grave. The idea being that when resurrection occurred, the soul would safely enter the land of the dead under the guidance of the dead dog (Hannah 2006, 75-76).

Poet Susan Lasher expands on the Black Dog's role as a guide into the afterlife and, through a beautiful metaphor, compares the creature to the night itself,

> Strange, bright blackbirds will call to us,
> and smooth black stones will clatter.
> The black mare and the black colt
> will come at a gallop, mane blown black.
> Night: lie down beside me, black dog
>   (Lasher 2000, 271)

It is a very curious comparison, as often night—much like the Black Dog—is associated with fear, darkness, the unknown, and a loss of hope. Lasher subverts this trope to show that the Black Dog is a comforting force, meant to guide the dying into a sublime shadow of the afterlife. I understand that the Black Dog is a metaphor for courage, which one must have when accompanied by fear, to enter death with dignity.

Much like the Dog, Anubis's "fur was generally black (not the brown associated with real jackals) because black was associated with fertility, and was closely linked to rebirth in the afterlife" (Hill 2016, 1). Jenny Hill, an Egyptology expert from Glasgow University, also notes that "Anubis' name is from the same root as the word for a royal child, *inpu*. However, it is also closely related to the word *inp,* which means 'to decay." Thus, "[b]y the time of the New Kingdom (c. 1540-c. 1075 BCE), Anubis

had become a familiar figure in coffin paintings, where he is depicted bending over the bodies of the dead. In addition to his role in preserving the dead, Anubis helped judge" them (Green 2012, 1), a characteristic often associated with Cerberus. Joyce Tyldesley, Egyptologist at the University of Manchester, points out that Anubis plays a central role in the Court of the Truths—an Egyptian 'final judgment' of sort. She notes that "[v]ignettes show Anubis leading the deceased…it is his duty to place the heart [of the judged] in the pan of the scales so that it might be weighed against the feather of Maat, the symbol of truth and justice" (Tyldesley 2011, 163-164). Again, courage toward objective judgement surfaces, along with the motif of the guide dog of potential resurrection.

Illustration 3. "The Black Dog of Newgate," from the book *The Discovery of a London Monster called the Black Dog of Newgate* by Luke Hitton & Samuel Rowlands, 1638. CC-PD-Mark.

The Black Dog, too, is often referenced as a judge of the living and a road marker that leads them to their destination: the afterlife. An exciting example of this is the Black Dog of Newgate Prison, where after the cannibalization of a scholar accused of sorcery during a famine in the mid-1250s, only the inmates who ate of the scholar's flesh saw a Black Dog before their death. Unlike Anubis, the Dogs judge *when* one enters death, not where he goes after. Hill continues, "Tombs in the Valley of the Kings hold one of his epithets, *tpy-djuf* (he who is on his mountain) refers to him guarding the necropolis and keeping watch from the hill above the Theban [cemetery]" (Hill 2016, 1). Egyptians, a civilization practicing mummification, hoped for eternal life for their bodies, but "between the hungry feral dogs and ill-guarded cemeteries full of shallow pit graves" (Tyldesley 2011, 111) what guarantee did they have for that outcome? Thus, they prayed to the jackal god for physical protection of their future empty husks. "He was also given the epithet *khentyamentiu* (foremost of the westerners i.e., the dead) because he guarded the entrance to the Underworld" (Hill 2016, 1), an important fact to note when relating it to the Dogs of Yama and Cerberus—both their relationships to Anubis are discussed below in their respective sections.

Additionally, Tyldesley notes that Khentyamentiu was the name of the "original canine god of the Abydos cemetery and the patron god of the Old Kingdom" (Tyldesley 2011, 110), whose name was monikered then usurped by Osiris. Many Black Dogs are guides into the afterlife and continue the work of their mythological predecessors, especially Anubis.

Furthermore, the Egyptians believed "that the jackal sought the company of the dead and so gradually promoted it to the rank of a god in the form of Anubis" (Norman 2015, 129). This is quite a promotion: from a carrion-eater to a god, and as noted above, must have happened due to the Egyptian's fears of losing their mummified remains to feral dogs and theft. The wild dog becoming domesticated via deification brings it one step closer to the intergradation into the human experience. It also sees the creature on the sidelines and ushers it into the living room, where it can be understood, and its knowledge is taken and infused with our own. Such was the role of Anubis and the Aesopian dogs, unlike that of the human-wolf hybrid, the werewolf.

The Werewolf and the Fear of Hidden Knowledge

It is redundant to mention what the werewolf is—a man given the power (willingly or not) to be one with the uncanny—but it is important to note that in dream association, the werewolf is symbolic of "seeing a whole new side to someone" and "wild sexual activity" ("Dream Symbols…" 2016, 1), aspects related to duality. Pagan rituals often shackled wild nature and tamed Man. The werewolf is a personification of these motifs: the wild wolf hidden in the guise of a domesticated dog. While the symbolism is quite clear, the secondary undertone is that of the dog taking refuge in the wildness of the wolf. Nature is made whole in the form of the humanoid beast. This duality has a direct link to the Sun and Moon, to the hidden parts of ourselves emerging under the veil of distorted sunlight. The Sun and Moon are significant aspects of Cerberus and are discussed in finer detail further down in the article.

Some of the first accounts of werewolves come from Greek mythology, and their ties to duality play an imperative aspect in defining the Black Dog. Plato recounts a story in his *Republic* (Book VIII) in which Pausanias states that atop Mount Lycaeus stood an altar to the Wolf God, *Zeus Lycaus*, where once "a year a mysterious sacrifice was offered at the altar, in the course of which a man was believed to be changed into a wolf" (Frazer 1890, 169). During the ceremony, the bowels of the sacrificed were mixed with that of an animal, and "the man who unwittingly ate the human bowel was changed into a wolf" (Frazer 1890, 169). There is another account of this tale, where "lots were cast among the members of a particular family, and he upon whom the lot fell was" to become the werewolf. The chosen would strip naked, be led along to a tarn, and after "swimming across it, went away into desert places" where he would be "changed into a wolf and herded with wolves for nine years" (Frazer 1890, 169). If, during this nine-year period, the man tasted human blood, "he had to remain a wolf forever. But if during the nine years he abstained from preying on men, then, when the tenth year came round, he recovered his human shape" (Frazer 1890, 169). Pausanias' tale is essential in outlining several concepts already discussed: divine association of

dog/wolf with the gods, choice, duality, and the negligence to take responsibility for one's choices.

An interesting symbolic duality of meaning comes in the form of the word *warg*, or wolf, which "denotes an outlaw or the state of outlawry," thus referring "to those who have committed crimes that are either unforgivable or unredeemable"—such as cannibalism for example—"and who are cast out from their communities and doomed to wander until they die," oftentimes in the woods (Stone 1994, 1). Unlike the Greek lycanthrope, the Germanic warg *metaphorically* becomes "a wolf in the eyes of his fellows…by being outlawed, for murder or oath-breaking; or he can be ou[t]lawed for what he already is, a warg, a worrier of corpses" (Stone 1994, 1). In this sense, the domesticated reverts back to the wild and acts a back-engineered duality in the same sense that Fenrir became wilder as more imprisoned he became by lighter and more 'civilized' forms of bondage, as discussed below.

The hidden duality of the wild and domesticated creature is a direct metaphor for the Jungian shadow. However, before exploring the shadow, a quick side note on Joseph Campbell's monomyth, also known as the hero's journey. The monomyth a standard template in narrative construction that involves a set of events that a hero experiences during his adventure that end in a climactic victory over an enemy—external, natural, internal, imagined—and acts as a preamble to the hero's transformation from *the state of ignorance to a state of knowing*. Campbell's metaphor of the hero's journey is both a physical and imaginative trek best noted as "…Aladdin caves. There not only jewels but also dangerous jinn abide: the inconvenient and resisted psychological powers that we have not thought or dared to intergrade into our lives" (Campbell 2008, 5). In other words, the tradition of the Black Dog has its origins not only in the mythology of the journey but also in the collective psychology of humanity, in their deeper seeded, and often, hidden granules of, what Sigmund Freud called, structural models of the psyche: id, ego, and super-ego. In that respect, both the Black Dog and the structural models have a dualistic role for either good or evil. Freud notes in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* that

> when individuals come together in a group all their individual inhibitions fall away and all the cruel, brutal and destructive instincts, which lie dormant in individuals as relics of a primitive epoch, are stirred up to find free gratification. But under the influence of suggestion groups are also capable of high achievement in the shape of abnegation, unselfishness, and devotion to an ideal. (Freud 1959, 15)

Additionally, when discussing Freud's *The Ego and the Id*, philosopher İlham Dilman notes that the "ego stands for reason and circumspection.' It 'represents what we call reason and sanity, in contrast to the id which contains the passions.' It can face the demands made on it by the id, the super-ego, and the environment, from a position of strength or one of weakness" (Dilman 1984, 195-96). Pausanias' werewolf is a metaphorical and mythological embodiment of the structures of the psyche: the ravenous wolf being the id, the human desires inside being the ego, and the domesticated dog that mediates between the two is the super-ego. These structures have been mytho-

logically synthesized into the Black Dog, who acts as a super-ego that must contain the id and ego: it is a manifestation of the shadow, both a horror and a guide to both the individual and the group. In other words, the Black Dog derives the concept of the shadow, a Jungian idea that an unconscious part of the psyche does not identify with the human but with the other, the dark side of being, from the werewolf.

The werewolf in its very essence "is compelling evidence that some archetypal elements of the shadow are not simply split-off personal experiences, but represent a common human experience that the religious traditions associated with an archetypal adversity, whether it be Satan or Iblis or Ahriman" (Moore 2003, 37). The werewolf is a personified rebellion against the domesticated self, but it is also the toying with the remaining feral. Humanity scapegoats this savagery onto the ghostly and uncanny—in all its definitions, for as Freud notes, it is "beyond doubt that the word is not always used clearly definable sense, and so it commonly merges with what arouses *fear in general*" (Freud 2003, 123). Meanwhile, Jung notes that to "all that is in any way out of the ordinary and that therefore disturbs, frightens or astonished [Man], he ascribes what we should call a supernatural origin. For him…these things are not supernatural; on the contrary, they belong to his world of experience" (Jung 1933, 127). Pausanias tells of the nine-year curse of the wolf becoming one of eternity for the cursed; it may not be a phase but an end in itself. Besides being the shadow, the werewolf also hints at being a fragment of the Freudian death drive, Thanatos. While discussing Eros vs. Thanatos, Professor Moshe Halevi Spero mentions that this "death-instinct [Thanatos] expresses an innate tendency toward catabolism, i.e., any organism's fatal evolution toward stagnant inertia. (At certain levels, Freud makes little distinction between man and animal.)

Moreover, he considered that is the earliest state of an organism was an inanimate one, this regulatory principle of the aggression drive called for a return to the state of death" (Spero 1975, 101). The Black Dog is soaked in this motif: Man's psychological need for release from life, for the end, is fueled by torpor and ennui over time, but which in its still-state cannot go through with a psychological Ragnarok and chooses to adhere to following the harbinger of this end, the domesticated dog. W.M.S. and Clair Russel point to an interesting biological distinction between domesticated dogs and wolves: the tail. A wolf's tail is upturned, while a dog's is sickle-shaped or curled; one points skyward, the other—the domesticated one—more earthbound (Russel 1978, 161). Symbolically, earth-awareness—as in the case of Cerberus, discussed below—overlaps with the knowledge of inevitable death and burial. The werewolf is, therefore, the wish to escape the knowledge that there is an end. Animals are not aware of death-in-the-future as a concept, thus the emergence of Pausanias' werewolf: an oblivious shadow born from death-awareness.

The hidden knowledge that the human pushes to the back of their mind is the inevitability of death, and the "crime of education consists in the child not being prepared for the rule of the eternal battle between the two heavenly powers, that is, between Eros and Thanatos (see, Freud 1972; Haase 1999, 129)—a battle that determines human life as ruled by violence and war on many fronts:" against the forces of nature

(Haase 1999, 82), all other human beings (Haase 1999, 102), and "against itself, insofar as the ego is engaged in constant war with an id that tries to win back territory lost to the ego, and with an over ego, constituted by the invasion of the other into the sphere of the ego" (Haase 1999, 38). This battle between past and future occurs in the present (we tell ourselves this via myths), and the Black Dog is the singularity of those battle, of those hidden fears and a deep-rooted knowledge that we are mortal. The werewolf and the Black Dog are connected by another thread: the Freudian uncanny, which "does not arise from lurking monsters or witches or other fantasy threats from fairy tale, but is primarily an effect of profound disturbance sparked by something familiar, that is homely," such as the symbol of the dog, "which awakens a repressed memory of forbidden desire or trauma: 'something which ought to have remained hidden but has come to light" (Warner 2014, 120), like the wild form of the Pausanias' wolf that emerges from Man.

Illustration 4. "Werewolf or the Cannibal." Woodcut by Lucas Cranach the Elder, ca. 1512. The Metropolitan Museum of Art. CC0.

Robert Louis Stevenson's novella, *Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde,* is a great metaphorical and literary example of the animalistic 'wolf' making itself manifest as uncanny behavior. The character-as-threshold that is the Black Dog and Henry Jekyll is best expressed by Dr. Jekyll's musing on his duality. He states, "man is not truly one, but truly two. I say two, because the state of my own knowledge does not pass beyond that point…I hazard the guess that man will be ultimately known for a mere polity of multifarious, incongruous and independent denizens" (Stevenson 2002, 67). This multiplicity of human 'roles' would later be expanded by Jung with his evolution of the term archetype. I wonder if the Black Dog and its polymorphic uncanniness was a foreshadowing of that evolution?

Additionally, the German *Doppelgänger*, or double, "in all its nuances and manifestations—that is to say, the appearance of persons who have to be regarded as identical because they look alike" (Freud 2003, 141), added to the confusion between the doubling of form but not of action. As stated before, the Black Dog is nothing but a dog from afar, but once the distance between the viewer's eye and the beast shortens, fear and dread are evoked. The creature begins as "the homely and the domestic," but then "there is a further development towards the notion of something removed from the eyes of strangers, hidden, secret" (Freud 2003, 133), something not quite right. Hence the Black Dog, like the uncanny itself, "is that species of frightening that goes back to what was once well known and had long been familiar" (Freud 2003, 124). These comparisons lead "us back to the old *animalistic* view of the universe, a view characterized by the idea that the world was peopled with human spirits…the omnipotence of thoughts and the technique of magic that relied on it, by the attribution of carefully graded magical powers (*mana*) to alien persons and things" (Freud 2003, 147). In this sense, the uncanniness of the Black Dog relates to the witchcraft and mysticism discussed earlier, and alludes to the unfamiliar backdrop of Cerberus and the Dogs of Yama, discussed ahead.

The psychological triumvirate—id, ego, and super-ego—is a psychological representation of the three human fears: past, present, and future, which are represented in the form of the myth of the three heads of Cerberus, who is simplified further into the Black Dog. The uncanny three-headed dog becomes one-headed, yet what it represents continues to stay the same, and streamlining occurs. The werewolf may be the human want for forgetting the unavoidable outcome of life, but "Cerberus seems an ideal ego representation. He is a perfect antiauthoritarian especially within the religious sense being a hybrid born of a half-woman and serpent, and a fire-eating giant; the latter, his father, feared by the Olympian gods, and his mother representing two less favored creatures of Christianity" (Mystica 2017, 1), and acts at the perfect prototype for the Black Dog.

As an aside, Cerberus himself, while rarely referenced by the color of his coat, is noted in various translations of Seneca's *Hercules Furens* as "dusky" (by Frank Justus Miller) or "black" (by John G. Fitch) when led through the streets of Greece by Herakles (Seneca, *Hercules Furens*, 55-59). Furthermore, Cerberus is depicted as having a black body and one black head on a vase dated 530 BC, housed at the Louvre Museum, *Herakles and Kerberos* (item: Louvre E 701).

Cerberus and Black Dog as a Representation of Jung's Shadow

According to Homer, the underworld, Cerberus' home, "is vague, a shadow place inhabited by shadows. Nothing is real there. The ghosts' existence…is like a miserable dream" (Hamilton 2011, 39). The creature's home hints at its horrific and eerie existence while simultaneously suggesting the ever-changing, almost ungraspable, and murky duality of its symbolism. The shadow world, be it in fantasy or as a philosophically ambiguous location, plays on human emotions and doubts, and just like the Black Dog, who appears in the blanketing darkness of the night, it relies on human imagina-

tion and perception of the unknown to frighten and challenge. In this context, night, or the shadow—especially during the Witching Hour—is a gate, a curtain, between the concrete reality of the bright daytime and the infinitely abstract abyss of the moonlit world. The veil of night is a metaphorical doorway that gives birth to Man's infinite imagination and guards the unreal against the real in the form of the infernal sentinel, a mythological shadow onto which we as moderns can project our evils: Cerberus.

Much like the werewolf, Cerberus is a mythological variant of Jung's shadow: a monstrous manifestation of the id, ego, and super-ego as one, but now, when modern science expelled "gods and demons…from nature" they and Cerberus "have found a new, though less spacious, abode in the human psyche" (Avens 1977, 196). To those unfamiliar, a quick recap of Jungian nomenclature: the Jungian *shadow* is that ever-present but unknowable part of our psyche that often lashes out against self and the world, but which hides within it potential for overcoming; Jungian *archetypes* are the ancient and universal symbols that materialize themselves in often classical characters and motifs, such as the trickster or the end of times; these archetypes stem from the Jungian *collective unconscious* which is a shared omnipresent structure of instincts, systems, and ideas—in other words, it is the Platonic realm of forms. Circling back, what was once allegory is now psychology, and the symbolism is no longer strictly mythological but also psychological and oppressed by jargon. Cerberus acts as a compartmentalization of the complex, the wild, and domesticated nature of humanity, which yearns for ignorance in the haze of darkness, all the while forgetting its ever-galloping end. However, "modern civilization provides inadequate opportunities for the [psychological] shadow archetype to become individuated because in childhood, our animal instincts are usually punished by parents. This leads to repression: the shadow returns to the unconscious layer of personality, where it remains in a primitive, undifferentiated state" (Avens 1977, 199). The oral storytelling of the past provided an outlet for these shadows and gave them form via imagination. The fairytale, or 'the great mother of the novel,' sprang forth as a symbolic torch to tame the shadow, and as Jung would argue, "that what has been on everyone's lips for millennia, though repeated endlessly, still comes nearest the ultimate human truth" (Jung 2009, 224). Expression of the shadow was important, unlike today, where social and news media mask those specters, so when the shadow "occasionally breaks through the barrier of repression, [it] manifests itself in pathological ways, for example, in the sadism of modern warfare and the crude obscenities of pornography" (Avens 1977, 199). Cerberus was a guardian of the unconscious and a mediator of the real and the unreal fantastic. In that sense, Cerberus "through many [symbolic] transformations and even a long process of more or less conscious development," became a collective image "accepted by civilized societies" (Jung 1964, 83) as threshold keeper. The three-headed mythological shadow functioned as a filter for the fact that most human beings are far more malicious and self-absorbed "than they like to appear either to themselves or to others. The [psychological] shadow is the sum of these unpleasant qualities together with insufficiently developed functions; it represents…the contents of the personal unconscious…things we want most to deny," or repress during our lifetime (Avens 1977, 200). Psychology has a mythological scapegoat.

A similar motif is present in Norse mythology where Odin's war wolves, Freki and Geri, "represent the more sinister side of Odin as the god of the dead, as they are…animals that eat the corpses of battle" (Enoch 2004, 33). They are the mythological shadows that consume the psychological shadows that hope to make themselves present in one's life. The mythological shadow in the form of the wolf/dog exists in an unconscious and timeless territory, which both Freud and Jung acknowledge as containing all of being, "even the so-called conscious mind is not separated from the unconscious in any absolute way and contains opposites existing side by side" (Golden 1985, 204), which suggest that Cerberus is timeless, the guardian of the boundary between tangible reality as expressed in action and the intangible, unconcise world within, expressed in thought and fantasy. Thus, what Jung "means by acceptance of the shadow (or integration of evil) is not an approval of "sin" or compromise with wickedness, but new freedom to act out of one's inborn wholeness" (Avens 1977, 204), to make the real and the fantastic merge in us, a reverse werewolf where the potential in the unconscious can manifest. However, Jung also reminds us that "consciousness is a very recent acquisition of nature, and it is still in an 'experimental' state. It is frail, menaced by specific injuries, and easily injured" (Jung 1964, 6). Thus, we must be ready to struggle even when guided by the Dog of Thresholds, because even though he may lead us along, the steps and actions taken along the path must be willed by the traveler, much in the same way as Dante in *The Divine Comedy*.

Much like the Black Dog, "it is important to realize that the shadow is not necessarily nefarious or wholly bad. It also displays good qualities-normal instincts, creative impulses, and realistic insights. The shadow is "negative" only when seen from the viewpoint of consciousness" (Avens 1977, 201). This means that when the psychological shadow overtakes the scapegoat of the mythological shadow, and the harbinger of the future is not a mythical self but an inert self, then we dispose of Argos, our silent guide, replacing him with nothing. The Black Dog that has been guiding us along to Thanatos is ignored, and we descend into an abyss of our own making: depression, addiction, unfulfillment, or self-harm. Thus, a strong will is necessary during descent (be it Herakles fetching Cerberus, or Tyr placing his hand in the maw of the Monster of the Ván) to be able to climb out.

Cerberus and the Dogs of Yama: Duality of Gatekeeping

Cerberus' relationship to duality is vital to the formulation of the Black Dog, so let us unearth Echidna-spawn's dichotomy by exploring its origins and links to the Dogs of Yama. Professor Max Müller noted in the Preface to *Contributions to the Science of Mythology* (p. xvi) that Kerberos (a variant on Cerberus' name) is a stem from Vedic *Çarvara*, "from which is derived *Çarvari*" or night (Bloomfield 1904, 539). The Vedas, ancient Indian holy texts, declare that the "sun and moon are the Cerberi" (Bloomfield 1904, 540). Thus, our first hint at the three-headed dog's duality.

Cerberus was the offspring of the Olympian terror Typhon, "a huge fire breathing dragon said to have glowing red eyes, a hundred heads, and a hundred wings," and the mother of all monsters Echidna, "a half-woman, half-snake creature known as

the "mother of all monsters" (Hilliard 2015, 1). According to Hesiod, Cerberus' parents came from unlike worlds: Typhon from the heavens and Echidna from the deep. Therefore, in "heaven…and not in hell, is the likely breeding spot of the Cerberus myth" (Bloomfield 1904, 540). Serpentine symbolism of cunning and sin—a crucial aspect of Christian mythology—is present in Cerberus' heritage. From Hesiod to Plato to Virgil and Ovid, serpents are always a key component of the creature, be it "his neck is bristled with serpents" or that his mane is "shaggy with serpents" (Bloomfield 1904, 525). However, the symbolism of the serpent in Greek mythology is that of hidden wisdom (Minoan snake goddess), healing (Staff of Hermes), and rebellion (The Gorgons); concepts associated with the Black Dog concerning it being a threshold guide between the real and fantastic. However, the serpentine association is connected to Egyptian mythology and the concept of *eternal recurrence*. Marie-Louise von Franz, a Jungian psychologist, notes

> Isis swears first in the name of Hermes, which is probably the Greek translation for Thoth, the moon god…then in the name of Anubis, which has not been translated and therefore is recognizable in its Egyptian form, and also in the name of Kerkoros— the howling of Kerkoros, referring to the howling of the dog Kerberos. In the parallel text the name is Kerkouroboros. Ouroboros is the snake which eats its own tail, so it must refer to a doglike demon which has been confused with this snake and is here described as the snake and the guardian of the underworld. So this is a mixture of the figure of Kerberos, therefore 'Ker' in the first syllable, with certain guardian figures of the Egyptian underworld, among which we very often find the snake that eats its own tail. (Franz 1980, 69)

Thus, the acts of destruction and creation associated with the Egyptian Ouroboros are also, by accident or intention, part of Cerberus' heritage. Furthermore, the symbolism of Ouroboros as eternal cyclical renewal fits with the above-mentioned allegorical meaning behind both Argos and Anubis, suggesting to me that the connections of time and recurrence to the mythological dogs may have a lot to do with collective human imagination and pattern creation.

Another fundamental association, subtler than that of the serpent, and one of great importance later in our discussion, is earth. Cerberus, who is regarded as 'flesh-eating,' is described by numerous commentators of Dante Alighieri's *Divine Comedy* and Vergil's *The Aeneid*, such as Pietro and Iacopo Alighieri, Bernard Silvester, Benvenuto de Imola, and Boccaccio, as 'earth eating' and associate the creature with *terra* (Savage 1949, 408). Cerberus is both a creature of *terra* and shadow and until Herakles dragged him out of Tartarus, he was beyond the grasp of Man. Furthermore, Earth, a plane of existence, is, mythologically speaking, the middle ground between the divine (Sun) and the mystical (Moon)—see the symbolism present in Greek (Apollo, Dionysus, and Hecate), Egyptian (Ra, Thoth, and Khons) and Norse (Sunna, Máni, and Odin) gods and their relationship with the divine and mystical of their respective mythologies. Earth and shadow are critical in funeral proceedings: incense smoke flowing from a thurible accompany the buried. During Ancient Greek burials, "the deceased was

Illustration 5. "Cerberus" from *Illustrations to Dante's 'Divine Comedy.'* Graphite, ink and watercolor on paper by William Blake, 1824-7. © Tate. CC-BY-NC-ND (Unported 3.0).

brought to the cemetery in a procession, the ekphora, which usually took place just before dawn" (Department of Greek and Roman Art 2003, 1) when the moon was still present, and the sun was soon to overtake it—passing from the mystical shade to the otherworldly divine via the earth, or in some cases fire. It is no coincidence that the Black Dog is often sighted in shadow around churchyards. Mark Norman points out that people believed "that the first burial in a churchyard must watch over the other dead and so a dog was sometimes buried instead of a human for this purpose" (Norman 2015, 132), both to watch and to guide.

The duality of the dogs of the Hindu god of death, Yama, is central to Cerberus' dichotomy. The dogs, symbolizing Light and Darkness, the Sun and the Moon, are mentioned in prayer for long life in the Hindu holy text, the *Atharvaveda*: "The two dogs of Yama, the dark and the spotted, that guard the road (to heaven), that have been dispatched, shall not (go after) thee!...Remain here, O man, with thy soul entire! Do not follow the two messengers of Yama; come to the abodes of the living" (Bloomfield 1904, 529). The prayers describe the will to live in the light, away from the depths of the earth and shadow-death. The dogs, named *Çyama* and *Çabala*, are representations of Night and Day, respectively. Their symbolic messenger is the werewolf.

Çyama, the moon dog, is black, and along with his spotted brother, leads the deceased along the path of the dead into the Netherworld. The Milky Way acting as that path. Yama's dogs have similar symbolic roles as Anubis or the Black Dog; however, they also act as caretakers and "guard the way [into the afterlife] and look upon men

favorably; hence they are ordered by Yama to take charge of the dead and to furnish them such health and prosperity as the shades happen to have use for" (Bloomfield 1904, 533). The dogs of Yama are often compared to Odin's twin wolves, Geri and Freki, mostly because Freki is noted to be the night hound of violence and because of philologist Maurice Bloomfield's comparative mythology work. However, unlike the dogs of Yama, Odin's wolves, are associated with greed and violence, and in that sense, also act as hidden metaphors for Odin himself, a benevolent father with a hunger for the horrid (Ragache 1988, 42). Again, duality presents itself. Enter Egyptian mythology and Anubis once more: Rwti, or the double lion, with a sun disc between its backs "is how the god, or the word Aker, is represented. He is shown as the double lion, or the double dog, or as Yesterday and Tomorrow because in Egyptian mythology, this whole picture represents the moment of the resurrection of the sun god. Yesterday he was dead; tomorrow he will be alive again" (Franz 1980, 70-71). Interestingly enough, when the lions are depicted as "two Anubis' jackals, two doglike animals…then the inscription below is: 'These are the openers of the way, the agents of resurrection" (Franz 1980, 72). So once more, an allusion to eternal reoccurrence and the Ouroboros.

Before I continue, Brown mentions a curious sighting of a two-headed Black Dog: "Two Heads. At Kildonan, Sutherland, a treasure hidden in a pool is guarded by a two-headed dog. Cf. Orthrus, the two-headed dog of Geryon (Brown 1958, 180). In Greek mythology, the two-headed Orthrus was the son of Typhon and Echidna's and Cerberus' brother and was killed by Herakles. Orthrus, much like his more famous sibling, was a guard dog, in charge of keeping Geryon's cattle safe, i.e., keeping the household's wealth and health secure. So, much like Yama's dogs, he was to "furnish them such health and prosperity… [as they] happen to have use for" (Bloomfield 1904, 533). Thus, it seems that Çyama and Çabala's caretaking attribute is more in tune with Orthrus and Cerberus than Odin's wolves.

With all of these mentioned, let us look at Cerberus' gatekeeping. Edith Hamilton, an American Classicist, points out that "on guard before the gate sits Cerberus, the three-headed, dragon-tailed dog, who permits all spirits to enter, but none to return" (Hamilton 2011, 40). The role of Cerberus—the one who permits and *recognizes* heroic shades as they enter the imagined and fantastic realm—is symbolic of the narrative framework of the Campbellian hero's journey, which is a sort of glimpse behind the veil of the solid and dull world we live in, and as the presence that shields the hero from the intangible: his unconscious. Thus, Cerberus stands outside of the gates of the dream-like Netherworld as a wall between the hero and his return to the concrete realm. In other words, the sentinel, by force, wishes the hero to stay as a spirit in the world of fantasy so that he may escape from the difficulties of life. Thus, like the dogs of Yama, the hellhound wishes for the hero to stay in a comfortable daydream. Whether he is aware of this odd benevolence is unclear.

In this context, daydreams are a space for fantasy and imagination to take intangible form before entering reality; they are the space of Gods and act as ambrosia in the Elysian Fields, i.e., a creative spring for writers, artists, musicians. Hence, it adds up that "[a]s the guardian of the gates of hell Cerberus also keeps spirits from entering

hell; in this sense, he protects those striving to deify themselves from influences that want to degrade them, make sacrificial lambs of them. Cerberus… [and Orthrus] safe guard the fortitude of the ancient gods" (Mystica 2017, 1). This is a popular theme in fairytale tradition and seen in *Peter Pan*, *Wizard of Oz*, or *The Earthsea Cycle*.

Therefore, it is interesting to see this theme in an allegorical and comical story by Georges Agadjanian, *In the Footsteps of Cerberus*, about the daydream of a house dog named Fido, who wishes to be Cerberus. The secondary theme is the pressure and responsibility of being a guardian between the reality and fantasy of life. I think the themes in the Fido story are significant to this analysis, hence the following summary: After Fido dies, he comes before God and asks to become the next Cerberus, but since Fido was a good dog, God wishes for him to stay in heaven. Nevertheless, Fido is determined, so God sends him away to deliberate the request and, in a dream, shows Fido what Cerberus is surrounded by in Hades: fire and brimstone and death. Fido asks God why this is so, and He tells him that His Hell is incomplete, much like Man. Man suffers, and Hell reflects that suffering. Once Man comes to gain suffering-born wisdom, he becomes complete and gains the insight to emerge from the darkness of Hell and into the light of Heaven. Fido wakes up and realizes what God meant by the dream: Earth is Hell and that there is not one Cerberus but many:

> "Therefore, there is no Hell except on Earth—where you have come from. And now answer me: do you still want to be a Cerberus?"
>
> "What dost Thou mean?" asked Fido, who could hardly follow.
>
> "I'll have you reborn as a man and you shall be caretaker of a building. Or, if you are ambitious, you could be a banker, the prosperous, incorruptible guardian of enormous funds. Or again, a politician, avowed defender of a certain social system…"
>
> "Oh no!" howled Fido. "I'd rather stay a dog."
>
> "Your choice is judicious," said the Almighty, "and you really deserve to be kept in Heaven."
>
> <div align="right">(Agadjanian 1952, 143)</div>

The daydream is often greater than the reality needed to house it, thus the need for the guard of the gate through which the ideal can become tangible.

The importance of the gate guard of daydreams is best exemplified during times of cultural chaos. When cultural paradigms shift and the threshold of fantasy is embraced as reality, psychosis, and moral panic ensue. Past guidance is interpreted as suppressive of future progress. The individual within this chaos retreat into a dark variant of fantasy because reality "is too strong for him. He becomes a madman, who for the most part finds no one to help him in carrying through his delusion" but who manically wishes to correct "some aspect of the world which is unbearable to him by the construction of a wish and introduces this delusion into reality" (Freud 2010, 51). During times of cultural chaos, the dog's symbolism takes on the duality of a messenger of and protector from incoming danger. Scholar Richard Cavendish notes that dogs "are uncanny because they howl in the dark outside when all right-minded

creatures are asleep" (Cavendish 1975, 62), but they do so to warn and scare away. In this sense, Cerberus had a singular function of preventing the living from entering the underworld and the dead from leaving it (Cavendish 1975, 62), or to keep the living in reality while keeping the madness-inducing specters of the past from shaping the future. However, the guardian dogs sometimes fail to keep the mighty dead at bay, and when that occurs, a—usually violent—cultural rebirth transpires.

The powerful dead, or "saviors" as Osiris, Tammuz, Orpheus, Balder or Herakles are often of divine or semi-divine birth, flourish, are killed, and are reborn (Jung 1964, 99), act as the metaphorical rejuvenations after the completion of the cycle of cultural chaos. In these instances, a peaceful cultural rebirth transpired, but as noted above, that is usually not the case; the paradigm shift is violent. It begins with the increase of society-wide anxiety, which "describes a particular state of expecting the danger or preparing for it, even though it may be an unknown one" (Freud 1961, 11). When the supporters of either side of the threshold—fantasy and reality—have nothing to offer to one another, "except narcissistic satisfaction of being able to think oneself better than others" (Freud 2005, 146), then the guardian dogs turn on both. In these cases, folklore provides us with the violent packs of spectral dogs, be they the Wild Hunt, the hellhounds of Welsh lore, or the 'wisht hounds of Dartmoor.' Here the "terror of them lies largely in the reversal of normal roles. The hounds…hunt man to his own death. They…are linked with the image of the devouring Death, the eater of men" (Cavendish 1975, 63). Through this violence, they leave humanity to "stands upon a peak, or at the very edge of the world, the abyss of the future before him, above him the heavens, and below him the whole of mankind with a history that disappears into primeval mists" (Jung 1933, 196). Through this violence, there arrives an epoch of mass cultural forgetfulness whose past achievements remain only as flickering wisps in the collective unconscious. The threshold guardians, tasked with being watchful of the gate, became false and attacked the living, so it is "perhaps not surprising [that do to their duplicity] no dogs are allowed into the heavenly city, New Jerusalem, in the book of Revelations" (Cavendish 1975, 63). Thus, through Cerberus' role as a gatekeeper, we can see, too, the Black Dog's numerous allegiances: the real, the fantasy, and the self, all connected by the thread of laboring toward cultural equilibrium.

Cerberus as Labor and Symbolism

The metaphor of the twelfth labor of Herakles—arguably the most difficult of the bunch—exemplifies the strain of the journey into one's subconscious imagination. The wounds that Cerberus inflicts on Herakles are reminiscent of the disillusionment experienced by those who return to reality after being engrossed in a good book, film, or a session of focused creation, or as Carl Jung called it, the madness of the creative spirit, be it inventing, writing or painting. However, to indulge in one's creative spirit, a strong will of perseverance is needed, which is why Jung believes that "[t]his is why we find self-discipline to have been one of man's earliest moral attainments" (Jung 1933, 33). The myth goes that Eurystheus, king of Tiryns, orders Herakles to kidnap Cerberus. Optimistic that the task is physically impossible, Eurystheus is gleeful at

Illustration 6. *Hercules and Cerberus*. Oil on panel by Peter Paul Rubens, 1626-37.
Museo del Prado. CC-PD-Mark.

the prospect of finally coming up with a labor that Herakles will not complete. Three things stand in Herakles' way: the descent into the underworld, Hades, and Cerberus himself.

Metaphorically, the labor is symbolic of entering one's immeasurable psychology, and Herakles does just that and more by venturing into the psychological beyond the imagination. An aspect of human nature is such that it strives for pleasure, and once Man tastes the sweetness of fantasy, of the ambrosia of imagination, he is reluctant to escape its clutches. This nature is similar to "the actual dog, it simply obeys its inner urges. And to it, every urge is 'good" (Hannah 2006, 71). Those who struggle to return to reality must turn toward the sentinel at the gates: the superego, a self-policing, self-perpetuating Cerberus whose three heads are symbolic expressions of Man's body (his physical existence), reason (his rational existence), and imagination (his fantasy/pleasure-driven existence). So, when Eurystheus sent Herakles to kidnap the "unspeakable Cerberus, who eats raw flesh / The bronze-voice hound of Hades, shameless, strong, / with fifty heads" (Hesiod, *Theogony*, 311-313), he sent him to venture into his imagination and retrieve from it the rational side of passion.

As mentioned before, Cerberus is often described as flesh-eating or a physical manifestation of gluttony. For example, as noted by Bryan Hilliard, "Cerberus appears in Dante's *Inferno*, guarding the third circle of Hell rather than the entire underworld. This is the circle of gluttony, and Cerberus is used to personify uncontrollable appetite" (Hilliard 2015, 1). The metaphor is clear but is also worth reiteration as it applies to the ominous side of the Black Dog: a person, much like Don Quixote, can become too entrenched in fantasy only to wither away mentally or physically. Through the constant consumption of fantasy via books, philosophies, films. The feeding of one's wants on the wishes and illusion of another's perception, the superego can devolve, becoming an id. Thus, the creature's flesh-eating attribute is one of warning that we should not spend too much time along with the great beast of gluttony as it may itself become hungry for our sanity, as was the case with Friedrich Nietzsche, Nikola Tesla, or Lord Byron. Furthermore, the creature's serpentine origins—which rear their head again via a note by Henry Riley, a translator of Ovid's *The Metamorphoses*, state that,

> There was a serpent which haunted the cavern of Taenarus, in Laconia, and ravaged the districts adjacent to that promontory. This cave, being generally considered to be one of the avenues to the kingdom of Pluto, the poets thence derived the notion that the serpent was the guardian of the portals. Pausanias observes, that Homer was the first who said that Cerberus was a dog; though in reality, he was a serpent, whose name in the Greek language signified 'one that devours flesh.' (Riley 1899, 274)

In this context, the symbolism of the snake is representative of an umbilical cord between Deep Earth and High Heaven, or relatively grounded reality and lofty fantasy, which alludes to the sub-context of the Dogs of Yama. Cerberus's original imagery and connotation can be connected to that of the Biblical serpent: creativity, transformation through consumption, and rebellion are all tied to the unknown and the *potential of failure*.

As mentioned in the story of Fido, individual perception of the role of guardianship may result in the misconception of what the reality of guarding something entails. Both Cerberus and the Black Dog guard the threshold between reality and fantasy, a theme adopted by Hecate, the goddess of entrances and keys to hidden truths, among other things. Brown notes that Roman Diana, the triple goddess of the hunt, crossroads, and underworld, is a "deadly Hecate owning the three-headed Cerberus," who began his life as a fifty-headed canine (Brown 1958, 190). Brown continues that the "later reduction to three heads matches Hecate, who also had three heads, representing [H]eaven, [E]arth and [H]ell, as well as the ancient tripartite year, of which the dog-head stood for the dog-days of harvest" also known as the *Hecateias idus*, which took place on August 13th, a festival of Diana during which "Romans specially honoured (sic) their hunting dogs" (Brown 1958, 190). These honors stem from the belief that dogs are creatures of "the threshold, the guardian[s] of doors and portals, and so appropriately associated with the frontier between life and death, and with demons and ghosts which move across the frontier" (Cavendish 1975, 62). The symbolism of the goddesses and their association with dogs flows into a staple of English lore, as

"in the vision of Thomas of Ercildoune, near a triple-headed hill above the Monastery of Melrose, where the Queen of Faerie came with three hunting-dogs on a leash to convey him underground" (Brown 1958, 190). The mythological Queens of crossroads and hidden things all had their triple-headed guard dog, which I argue became diluted into that of the Black Dog.

Before returning to Herakles, it is essential to discuss the symbolism of the three heads, which in contemporary psychology is represented as the ego, id, and super ego—bound by the body of time, among a plethora of other meanings. "Commonly the heads have represented (Cerberus' psychic ability to see into) the past, present, and future or birth, life, and death," the three ages of Man (Mystica 2017, 1). Bloomfield also notes that "the three heads are respectively, infancy, youth, and old age, through which death has entered the circle of the earth" (Bloomfield 1904, 526). Cerberus, as earth or corpse-eater, is Earth itself: the giver of life and the final resting place from which new life, such as the Black Dog, emerge. In a way, the Black Dog is an emissary of the Cerberus. Savage parrots Bloomfield and sees the "three heads as symbolic of the three ages of man, *infanita*, *iuventus*, and *senectus*" (Savage 1949, 407). However, he also suggests that they might refer to the three continents thought of existing during the ancient times and notes that "Dante himself in his *De monarchia* (2,3,4f) develops in detail the conception of Aeneas's connections with all three continents both by birth and by marriage alliances" (Savage 1949, 409), creating a subliminal connection between the Hound and "Aeneas, who was guided by Sybil who drugged the dog [Cerberus] with opium and honey" (Rose 2000, 73). It is curious that in this rendition of Cerberus, pleasure overpowers the guardian: opium, honey & music, much like the Freudian trio, is always at a struggle with pleasure itself. The struggle is not a singular event, but one that persists throughout life: *infanita*, *iuventus*, and *senectus.*

Returning to the twelfth labor: after freeing Theseus from the Chair of Forgetfulness, Herakles came upon Cerberus, but before engaging the creature, he ventured forth and asked the master of the netherworld, Hades, if he may take his beloved pet to King Eurystheus. Impressed by his directness and civility, Hades gave the mortal permission to take Cerberus, but only if he used no weapon to overcome the fiend (Hamilton 2011, 234). Hades' inclusion is important because he represents a part of the Campbellian hero's journey known as the challenge to the father: the necessary scene of growth where the hero is permitted—be it by force or given willingly—to continue with his journey. Hades' permission is a metaphor for accepting one's fantasy, in a creative sense, by the contemporaries of one's age. If Herakles showed strength against the gatekeeper of his imagination, the beast itself would permit him to take it into the real world. The same logic applies for the Jungian shadow, and the shadows as perceived by primitive cultures, for example, "whoever steps over the shadow of another person conquers him…The shadow is not only unavoidable but, as superstition holds, a man without shadow is the devil himself" (Avens 1977, 201). Thus, for the conquering of Cerberus to be recognized as Herakles' success—fantasy given form—it was up to Hades (the contemporaries) to acknowledge it, even if it is through criticism. Hades is the baptism-by-fire of bringing one's fantasies into the realm of the tangible, for

example, a sculptor shaping a statue or an author publishing his work. In that sense, Hades' acknowledgment doubles overall society's consumption of tangible culture: art, literature, film.

Having conquered the beast, Herakles carried the hound out of the netherworld and into Mycenae, where he presented the beat Cerberus to Eurystheus, who "very sensibly did not want to keep him and made [Herakles] carry [the beast] back" (Hamilton 2011, 234-36). This last bit is vital because Herakles brought Eurystheus—who also acts as a Campbellian father figure—the sentry between reality and imagination, and he rejected it. Thusly, Eurystheus represents the man of strict reality, a man who is unimpressed by the fantastic, creative, and imagined, or to put it bluntly, a bean counter who cares only about the coin in his vault. Eurystheus is a man to whom Cerberus acts as a gatekeeper *into* the unreal, protecting the ego from disenchantment and creativity. Such men rarely encounter the Black Dog, for they rarely come to crossroads of risk and choice, safely situating themselves in the comfort of reason, represented by the court. It was there that "Cerberus felt the sunlight, he recovered [from the fight] and went into a violent frenzy, thrashing against the chains" (Rose 2000, 73), resulting in another struggle. The second battle against Cerberus proves that the dark parts of us must be hidden away. Otherwise, they go wild in the light. The boundary of real and fantasy is always in the act of balancing between ennui and violence.

Eurystheus act as a decent representation of the danger of imagination that is best described by the following four stanzas in Dante Alighieri's *Inferno*,

> Here monstrous Cerberus, the ravening beast,
> howls through his triple throats like a mad dog
> over the spirits sunk in that foul paste. /
> His eyes are red, his beard is greased with phlegm,
> his belly is swollen, and his hands are claws
> to rip the wretches and flay and mangle them. /
> And they, too, howl like dogs in the freezing storm,
> turning and turning from it as if they thought
> one naked side could keep the other warm. /
> When Cerberus discovered us in that swill
> his dragon-jaws yawned wide, his lips drew back
> in a grin of fangs. No limb of his was still.
> (Alighieri, *The Inferno*, VI. 13-24)

In the third circle of Hell, the beast stands above the multitudes submerged in the puddles of gluttony. The imagery suggests that Cerberus is not the guardian between life and death but rather the overseer of routine and the life of the gluttonous consumption of fantasy. Furthermore, the Men below the hound represent contentment with one's physical lot, but who live quiet lives of anticipation for glory, fortune, and psychological betterment without acting upon their wants. In other words, they imagine themselves in glory, but because they wallow in a literal and metaphorical Hell, they are unable to escape it and must retreat into their imaginations, resigning to a perpetual cycle of failure. The Men that Cerberus holds close are the most gluttonous

for illusion; they will never climb out of the Inferno because they indulge in a delusionary escape due to their proximity to Cerberus himself. That is why Cerberus 'rips the wretches and flays and mangles them' (Alighieri, *The Inferno*, VI. 18). He tears at their failures and spreads them to remind the wanderers—Dante and Vergil—of their potential: escaping Hell is possible if one does not indulge in the fantastic and imaginary for too long. Again, Cerberus acts as a psychological self-defense mechanism that shows the failure of contentment with one's fantasy while never pursuing that imagination physically into tangible creation, or, in the context of the *Inferno*, for Dante to keep on descending into the imagined to reach the bottom and begin climbing upwards beyond the grasp of Cerberus.

As the epic poem continues, the imagination-drunk failures shelter themselves under stone overhangs, piling onto one another, content with their sheltering fantasy while Cerberus watches their tameness with glee. This panoptical control is the rule and not the exception in Dante's Hell. Hence, when this rule is tested by the mere appearance of Vergil and Dante, Cerberus is quick to display his power: his tusks, form, and hellish self, and to keep the Hound at bay, Vergil gives the creature dirt, "My Guide bent down and seized in either fist, / a clod of the stinking dirt that festered there, / and flung them down the gullet of the beast" (Alighieri, *The Inferno*, VI. 25-27). In so doing, he calms Cerberus long enough for the duo to pass by, during which Dante points out that,

> As a hungry cur will set the echoes raving,
> And then fall still when he is thrown a bone,
> All of his clamor being in his craving, /
> So the three ugly heads of Cerberus,
> Whose yowling at those wretches deafened them,
> Choked on their putrid sops and stopped their fuss.
> (Alighieri, *The Inferno*, VI. 28-33)

The Hound is always loud, always in control of the cast-down shadows which never rebel because they are drunk on fantasy. The noise, the violent howls relate to the real place where Cerberus lived—the cave in Mycenae, off the Scythian shore—exemplifies the cliché of waves crashing against the shore and deafening the onlooker. Such is the danger of imagination that makes one deaf to the oncoming wave of reality and metaphorically drowns those too invested in the fictional. Thus, Cerberus is giving dual importance of both the superego and the id. When Vergil fed the beast dirt, it howled because it tasted *tangible* reality in *spectral* space.

Ovid, in his *Metamorphosis*, points out that the swamp and foam along the shore of Mycenae were born of Cerberus, "This poison, they say, came from the mouth of the Echidnean dog" (Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, VII. 408). While Herakles carried the beast, the creature "goaded into a mad frenzy, filled all the air with his threefold howls / And sprinkled the green fields with white foam" (Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, VII. 415-416). The thick foam, "men think, congealed and, nourished by / The rich rank soil, gained poisonous properties" (Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, VII. 417-418). This is a fantastic insight: it il-

lustrates that the fantasy that one creates through the taming of Cerberus—the taming of the superego—can have a reverse effect and transform itself into the id, becoming vile and unruly if, as a hedge, it is untrimmed. The imagined can become real if it is enriched and weeded like a field that became a garden. However, it is critical not to over-tend to the imaginary as it may take on the form of horror in its tangibility. Take the *Communist Manifesto*, the splitting of the atom, or energy-driven offshore drilling as examples. What I am suggesting here is that too much theoretical good (total peace, unhindered technical advancement, or ever-growing energy output, for example) can translate to bloody and violent practical results. On an individual level, this relation can be seen in a Man who works and gains in the satisfaction from wealth and material goods, but forgets his essence, family, and neglects to allot time for self-reflection, exemplified in the contemporary crisis of conscience and dwindling church attendance. The Echidnean foam, the drink of ambition and fulfillment—or its metaphorical representation via the Herakles story—is a sign of overcoming one's wickedness.

Foam itself relates to cultural chaos; it signifies a return to normalcy. Roland Barthes pointed out that while foam is associate with luxury and lacks any usefulness, modern humans subconsciously associate it with the liberation of an "object from its circumstantial imperfection: dirt is 'forced out" (Barthes 1972, 36) and the object returns to its original state of cleanliness. Furthermore, Barthes notes that "[f]oam can even be the sign of a certain spirituality, [since] the spirit has the reputation of being able to make something out of nothing" (Barthes 172, 37), a quality we discussed above: the dialogue between reality and fantasy which results in the madness of the creative spirit and creation itself. It is, thus, interesting to see foam associated with Cerberus, especially in the context of cultural chaos.

Vergil—the same one that acted as a guide in Dante's *Divine Comedy*—writes in *The Aeneid* about how Cerberus fell asleep by eating a sweet cake (similarly to Fluffy, the three-headed dog from in J.K. Rowling's *Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone*, who fell asleep because of sweet music). This tiny cake, a symbol of reward from hard work, acts as a hammer against the Hound,

> Great Cerberus barking with his triple throat
> Makes all that shoreline ring, as he lies huge
> In a facing cave. Seeing his neck begin
> To come alive with snakes, the prophetess
> Tossed him a clump of honey and drugged meal
> To make him drowse. Three ravenous gullets gaped
> And he snapped up the sop. Then his great bulk
> Subsided and lay down through all the cave.
> Now seeing the watchdog deep in sleep, Aeneas
> Took the opening: swiftly he turned away
> From the river over which no soul returns.
> (Vergil, *The Aeneid*, VI. 564-574)

To keep one's sanity, to exist and live simultaneously between the worlds of reality and fantasy, the hero must satisfy the self by medicating it with sweets: fun, joy, and pleasure, but also reflection and meditation. The slumber of Cerberus is a paradoxical example of calming the storm within each of us, and in turn, being the storm responsible for the tangible realization of fantasy.

Fenrir, The Many-Named Wolf

The secondary influence on Black Dog lore is the eldest son of the trickster god, Loki, and the giantess, Angrboda: the wolf Fenrir. Like Cerberus, the great wolf is a link between Man and the Gods. Of Loki and Angrboda's three children—the serpent Jörmungandr and the skeletal specter Hela being the other two—Fenrir was the most dangerous and even the All-father himself, Odin, thought it "best if the gods themselves kept an eye" on him (Holland 2007, 34). Unlike Cerberus—who represents the Freudian triumvirate—Fenrir is pure id, a dark and cunning side of Man that is strictly concerned with power, pleasure, and control. However, he was not born as id, but made so by the cunning of the Aesir, discussed below. The wolf is impulse and viciousness embodied. Unlike his father, Loki, Fenrir lacks cunning, patience, and prowess for manipulation, but as Ross Enoch points out, "Loki the trickster and his children, the serpent and the wolf, represented the…fierce instinctual nature that must be bound up so that civilization could prosper" (Enoch 2004, 11). In other words, the wolf is a sort of cleansing fire but also an exact representation, akin to Cerberus, of the veil between the real and fantastic. Folklorist Mark Norman notes that "in ancient Scandinavia, it was thought that dogs could follow the movements of the sinister death-goddess Hela. This makes the dog an intermediary factor between this world and the underworld" (Norman 2015, 127-28), thus making the wolf, a primordial dog, the masterless intermediary between the two worlds.

Illustration 7. "Anubis" (costume 86). Costume design from *Krewe of Proteus 1882 Parade*. Illustration by Charles Briton, 1882. Carnival Collection, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University. CC-PD-Mark.

Before continuing, a quick note on the many names of Fenrir. There are several hints that the many wolves in Norse mythology are Fenrir going under different names: one poem suggests that Fenrir will swallow the sun during Ragnarok, a feat

elsewhere reserved for the wolf of mockery, Sköll (McCoy/Fenrir 2018, 1). Elsewhere, there is mention of Garm, "who will break free from chains at Ragnarok," an act reserved for Fenrir (McCoy/Fenrir, 1). *The Prose Edda*, the Icelandic tome of Norse myth, suggests that "Garm could be another name for Fenrir" (Sturlson 2015, 146). Elsewhere, it is hinted that the moon-eating wolf of hatred, Hati Hróðvitnisson, "could be another extension of Fenrir—or at least of Garm, if Garm is not himself an extension of Fenrir" (McCoy/Fenrir, 1). Thus, just like the Black Dog, Fenrir goes by many names and iterations. Regardless of this, both the Black Dog and Fenrir act as "creature of the margin" (Frakes 1987, 485), the numerous names a clear indicator of their vagabond nature.

Garm, sometimes known as Garmr, the four-eyed guardian of the gates of Hel, was equivalent to that of Cerberus but also "Anubis, the dog that guarded tombs and conducted the souls to the underworld" (Hilliard 2015, 1). He was thought to be made of shadow and blood, and thus the perfect guardian, liquid. The symbolism here is similar to that of Cerberus, a guardian between fantasy and reality. However, in the 44th stanza of "Grímnismál," one of the poems in the Poetic Edda, "Garm is said to be to canines what Odin is to gods and what Yggdrasil is to trees – that is, the greatest among them, the exemplar" (McCoy/Garm, 2018, 1). McCoy continues that regardless of whether or not Garm and Fenrir "are the same figure, they certainly seem to be little more than multiplications of the same type of figure: a canine associated with the underworld and the forces of chaos who breaks free at the world's end as an omen of its destruction and in order to aid its destruction" (McCoy/Garm 2018, 1). Similarly, 'a harbinger of destruction' is a moniker also associated with the Black Dog.

Regarding the *Eddas*: because both the Prose and Poetic iterations "were written in the native language," Jesse L. Byock suggests "they were meant to be read aloud, enabling a single manuscript to speak to many, literate and non-literate alike" (Sturlson 2005, x). Thus, Fenrir and the Black Dog share in the oral traditions that have kept their legends alive. This detail is exhibited through Hesiod's or Homer's work, which were oral in origin then made physically manifest via written narratives. The *Eddas* also give us a proper glimpse at Fenrir and the many dogs and wolves associated with him. Of interest are the two aforementioned wolf twins: Sköll and Hati Hróðvitnisson, whose association and symbolism are similar to that of the Dogs of Yama. Sturlson notes that Sköll is chasing the Sun, Hati Hróðvitnisson the moon, and that "he runs in front of her trying to catch the moon. And, this will happen…he will gorge himself with the life of all who die, and he will swallow the moon, spattering blood through the sky and all the heavens" (Sturlson 2005, 20). Riley Winters reradiates this further by stating that the twins "follow in the footsteps of their father, swallowing the sun and the moon respectively, destroying the stars and all essence of time" (Winters 2014, 1). It is important to stress that the twins are responsible for the end of Earth's celestial bodies. Sturlson gives us a snippet of a poem referring to this end, "and there she bears / Fenrir's brood [the wolves]. / From all of them comes / One in particular, / The ruin of the moon" (Sturlson 2005, 20-21), only to later state that "The Lay of Vafthrudnir offers a different version of the destruction of the sun, in which Fenrir swallows it" (Sturlson 2005, 138). Varying accounts are a staple of folklore, and here they are on full display.

Having seen that Fenrir has a strong connection to the real and the fantastic world, he also has a deep symbolic relationship with the sacred in the form of Odin's wolves, Freki and Geri—both meaning *greedy one* (Holland 2007, 219). Snorri writes that Odin feeds them from his table as he lives only on wine, which as a side note, must be a later Christianization of the *Eddas* because wine was a Germanic import often associated with Christianity while mead and beer were associated with paganism. The function of the wolves is less clear than that of Odin's ravens—which act as his eyes of wisdom—but it can be ascertained that they serve as instruments of death and symbolic reflections of the routine of reality, obedient to the system of civilization embodied by the Norse gods. Meanwhile, Fenrir, being Loki's offspring, is an "extension of the enemy within, the only enemy that can affect and corrupt and finally destroy the spirit of the gods" (Holland 2007, 193)—the id. He is a significant part of the comparable symbolism between human psychology and the mythical dogs because he acts as the base of consciousness. The ego and superego stand upon the foundations of the id. The Norsemen had a metaphor for this foundation: "whoever lost in a fight, the wolf was always the winner" (Holland 2007, 193). In a literal sense, the wolf wins no matter which human faction prevails, simply because the corpses of the slain are sure to provide nourishment. Thus, the winner is always the one with the most skillful use of feral power. This belief goes back to the times of Beowulf, where no matter the peripheral problems, internal and external conflicts, the wolf was to be respected. Exemplified by this line from *Beowulf*, "but then the dark raven, / eager to feed on fallen warriors, will speak much, / telling the eagle of his pleasure in eating, / when he with the wolf both feasted on corpses" (McNamara, *Beowulf*, XLI. 3024-3027). The significance of Fenrir is such that he is the master canine, one beyond the gods who fear him and his infinite imagination, but one who is among them always, even when bound.

The Binding of Fenrir as the Taming of Cerberus
Physically, the great wolf "seemed no different to any other wolf," and unlike his siblings, who were banished, "the gods agreed that there would be no harm in letting him roam" the fields of Asgard unattended (Holland 2007, 34). As he roamed the field, the wolf grew larger and larger still. Inactively, the gods watched until the prophets envisioned this beast as responsible for the death of the All-Father. Only then did the Aesir decide that Loki's eldest must be culled, but without bloodshed, as they feared to stain the sanctuary of Asgard with foul blood (Holland 2007, 34). Instead, much like Man gags his id to fit into civilized society, they decided to bind him.

With the help of the dwarves, the gods tried many times. They used the chains Laeding and Dromi to hold the wolf, but the beast broke free each time. Using their cunning, the dwarves decided to make a silk ribbon: Gleipnir. The silk itself was a synthesis of all things unseen by Man or god: the "the noise of a cat's footsteps, the beard of a woman, the roots of a mountain, the sinews of a bear, the breath of a fish, and the spittle of a bird" (Sturlson 2005, 40). For the unseen—such as etiquette, culture, and morals—binds the id and shadow within. Presented with the challenge of breaking free of Gleipnir, Fenrir sensed that something foul was afoot, but his pride was more

Illustration 8. "Týr and Fenrir." Illustration by John Bauer, 1901. CC-PD.Mark.

significant than his reason. He pondered, "I don't want to be bound with that ribbon. But neither do I want to be accused of cowardice" (Holland 2007, 36), and thus he agreed to the Aesir's challenge, but only if one of them put their hand in his maw. A sacrificial hand acted as insurance if they did not lift the ribbon upon his completing of the task.

Týr, the god of law and glory, placed his hand inside the wolf's maw. Fenrir fought at length to free himself but only grew tired. Sensing the challenge was a trick, he bit Týr's hand clean off. All the Aesir, but Týr, laughed, for they knew that they bound Fenrir at last. Tied underground to a stone and gagged with a sword, Fenrir's "slaver streamed from his jaw" and became Van, the river of expectation (Holland 2007, 36). Other accounts note that the "wolf spent his life sealed away on an island far from other beings, kept in confinement until the fates of the gods could no longer be prevented" (Winters 2014, 1). Be it underground or on an island, Fenrir lay in wait for his revenge, and in so doing acted, much like the Black Dog, as symbolism for the future: death; and like the three heads of Cerberus, Jesse Byock, notes that Loki's three children act as pieces of time, with Hel being the Past and the Midgard Serpent the Present. (Sturlson 2005, xxi)

The binding of Fenrir is a precursor to the tale of Lucifer's rebellion, expulsion, and imprisonment in the darkness. Besides the animalistic representation of a self-conscious id, Fenrir is the physical manifestation of all that Man wishes to be: powerful, courageous, wise, vigorous, and decisive. Týr is the courageous side of Man: sacrifice in the face of horror, but that is not all; the unsung god is symbolic of blood spill during bondage. As noted by Enoch, "Bonds in Viking mythology were magical and held evil forces at bay until the power of fate released them" (Enoch 2004, 10). It is important to note that while Aesir laughed at Týr for his perceived stupidity, they did not realize that the placing of his hand in the beast's mouth made him a being of Heraklion status: one who enters the world beyond routine and expectations of real-

ity to sacrifice a bit of himself for a greater good found in fantasy. Through this flesh sacrifice, Týr and Fenrir represent the necessary dedication and perseverance that accompany the creation and fulfillment of art that writers, artists, or inventors often experience when entering the halls of posthumous glory.

The binding of Fenrir is also the first step to Ragnarok or the end of time. By binding the wolf, the Aesir unleashed their end: they decivilized him via imprisonment. Enoch points out that all the bonds and laws that hold society together break at Ragnarok because the world itself wills to expose and manifest evil so that it could be overcome; thus, when Fenrir kills Odin at Ragnarok, and Odin's son Vidar avenged him by killing the wolf, the ultimate sign of loyalty is espoused (Enoch 2004, 23). The strangeness here is that the wolf/dog is killed to prove loyalty; in other words, loyalty must be killed to manifest loyalty, thus suggesting that perishing is a part of becoming a theme present in many of the discussed dogs, especially the Black Dog. For as he appears, so too he disappears upon the death of his 'victim,' only for his legend to procreate in the collective human imagination to propel the tale into the cultural sphere. Furthermore, at Ragnarok

> Loki's opposition to the gods takes its ultimate form…that destroy the mythological cosmos; and his offspring destroy the representatives of two of the three functions [Wisdom, Courage, and Beauty]: Fenrir kills Odin; Jörmungandr kills Thor; Garmr kills Týr. Had Loki killed Freyr instead of Heimdallr…then Loki and his offspring would have been responsible for the destruction of all three divine functions. (Frakes 1987, 483)

Thus, Fenrir is, much like Cerberus and the Black Dog, a piece of symbolic doom necessary for Man to reflect upon the ever-changing whim and will of the Fates.

Conclusion

As expressed in the preceding pages, the Black Dog was not born in a vacuum, but through the osmosis of Argos, Anubis, Aesop's dogs, the werewolf figures, Cerberus, and Fenrir. Black Dog's lore goes back to "times of mourning…ancient associations with moonlessness and darkness, and with humankind's feeling of helplessness at night" (Norman 2015, 240). Its staying power in our collective consciousness stems from the creature's simple appearance, long history, and the power to jolt one's imagination. While popular culture sees the Black Dog as a narrative device or the omen of death, tradition "shows that at least half of the dogs are harmless. They are frequently protectors of lonely women and timid men walking along sinister roads" (Norman 2015, 21). In other words, the Black Dog is a mythical protector and guide to those undergoing a journey into inner shadow and acts as an imaginative veil on reality to those people who stray a bit too deep into their heavenly fantasy to get away from the drudgery of reality. The Black Dog is the feeling of being watched from afar made manifest.

Dedication
Formally introducing folklorists all over to the world to the Black Dog, Ethel H. Rudkin was responsible for bringing this haunting harbinger of the fantastic out of the shadows and onto the page. I dedicate this article to her.

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Response

The Dilemma of the Disappearing Devil

Willem de Blécourt

There are many legend texts in the Dutch language about a black dog. Here is one example:

> One day leaving Nijkerk by horse and cart, something happened. My mother saw something that startled her and warned her father, but he just drove on. Suddenly the horse reared and hit out in all directions. Then mother saw a big black beast appearing on the road. It approached the cart, and then the brute disappeared through the bushes at the side of the road. The bushes remained flattened, and it was clearly visible where the dog had gone through. It must have been the devil. Otherwise, the bushes would not have stayed crushed but would have righted themselves.This proved that it had been the devil. (Heupers 1979: 128, nr. 432, *my translation*)

This legend was told in September 1962 by a 65-year old former maid. She was a member of the Dutch Reformed Church who was born in Nijkerk but had lived at the village of Soest since 1921. She explained how her mother had helped her grandfather, who traded in calves and other small farm animals. She thought her mother very superstitious.

After Zmarzlinski's cross-cultural onslaught, I had the strong urge to place both feet squarely on the ground and tackle concrete, indigenous, and culturally specific cases of black dogs. I chose to source the collection of legends compiled by Engelbert Heupers; he cycled through the province of Utrecht between 1962 and 1969 and talked to mostly elderly people about their "folk-beliefs." Altogether he interviewed 318 people, resulting in a total of 3,754 texts. Seventy-three of these related to black dogs people had met at night and whom they thought to be manifestations of the devil; another 61 were about other dogs, including the so-called *tienuurs hond*, the "ten 'o clock dog." The last was mostly black but not associated with the devil. There is insufficient space here to go into further detail, for instance, about variations and discussions, nor can I dwell on the hundreds of other black dog texts collected elsewhere in the Netherlands or Flanders.

Zmarzlinski does refer to several English folklore texts, but our approaches differ in the way he is a detached outsider view, and I focus on the people who talk about black dog stories. From my insider point of view, references to Ancient Egypt, Greece, or the Vikings make little sense. A cross-cultural perspective needs its specific language, and in my view, it masks genuine expertise. As several authors remarked: "Freud knew nothing about wolves" (Stolar 2017, 114); this insight is easily extended to black dogs or Freud's colleague Jung. I suggest that the insider point of view is the only viable one when studying such cultural manifestations. Conjuring up tentative links with Argos, Anubis, Cerberus, or Fenrir is pure speculation and fantasy, even when it stays within European and Mediterranean, i.e. "white" forms of culture. Constructing

far-flung connections between all dog-like creatures would undoubtedly have been alien to not only the local informants but also folklorists and anthropologists studying them. The analyses of mythologists or psychologists can easily verge into cultural imperialism, even within their ethnicities.

Moreover, an indigenous approach also allows for a critique of folklore. Questioning its assumptions is necessary. Scholars of English texts rarely address criticism and may indeed not be in a position to do so in relation to black dogs. It thus remains unknown, at least for now, whether the informants of Ethel Rudkin knew anything about the devil, were asked about, or declined to dwell on him. Compared to Dutch folklore research, English research has been amateurish, episodic, and unsystematic. Within Dutch study, it is possible to carefully situate the texts, regarding to ethnicity, gender, class, age, space, and language. There is certainly an affinity between the material of, for example, English, Dutch and Flemish informants. Much further afield and in different cultures, this won't be the case. Comparative mythology or Jungian theory on Shadows would have made little sense to a narrator in Utrecht or Lincolnshire. I concede that informants might well have been able to exchange ideas if they kept it fairly general. Discussing dog sounds, ghost dogs, actual dogs, or completely different werewolves would, however, have phased them. A devil in the form of a black dog was indeed a familiar motif in most of continental Europe (Woods 1959) and will have migrated with the Europeans to the U.S.A. In England the satanic beast seems to have been on his way out in the nineteenth century (Harte in Trubshaw 2005), but the methodology of finding it is debatable.

All this shows that the devil is a vital omission in Zmarzlinski's essay. There were many examples when the black dog was the devil's creature, symbolizing sins committed. Thus the narratives are grounded in Christian culture. They do not belong to the pre-Christian people.

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"Consequences for Society as a Whole": Narrating Technology in the Norwegian Media Debate on Online Surveillance

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Abstract

Developments in digital technologies over the last decades have sparked new life into the surveillance debate. In this article, I present a close reading of the Norwegian media debate to suggest that the debate is not so much over whether to allow authorities surveillance capabilities but about establishing new stories about life in an increasingly digitalized world. Reading the debate through the lens of the concept of legendry, *I suggest that the arguments put forward draw on two sets of implied narratives competing for credibility.*

Keywords: surveillance, narrative, legendry, digital technologies, media debate

Introduction: Surveillance Narratives

In recent decades, developments in digital technology have changed the face of surveillance. All over the globe, particularly in industrialized, urbanized areas, people's lives are increasingly intertwined with digital technologies (Blank 2012). We continuously slip in and out of connected modes throughout the day, leaving detectable electronic traces of movements and communications that were once transitory. For law enforcement and intelligence services, the digitalization of everyday life represents a new arena for collecting information and evidence. Simultaneously, it represents a new arena for storytelling, actualizing in new ways the narratives inherent in the opposition between security and privacy that so often forms the core of arguments in the debate over the authorities' surveillance capabilities. Traditionally, those who call for expanded capabilities argue on the grounds of security, saying that such capabilities are necessary to keep citizens safe, while those who oppose expansion will argue that it encroaches on citizens' privacy and restricts their freedom. Although scholars and commentators have pointed out that this is a false dichotomy because one cannot have one without the other (Loader & Walker 2007), most arguments in the media debate are still polarized, with contributions framed as representing one of the two perspectives.

I argue that the debate about the authorities' use of surveillance capabilities in traditionally democratic countries draw on two diverging sets of narratives, following the lines of security and privacy. Security and privacy can be seen to constitute stable narrative structures for each of the two sides of the debate over time, security structuring stories about the state keeping its citizens safe from outside threats, privacy structuring stories about the state as encroaching on its citizens' freedom. The

security-story about surveillance capabilities could be summarized as the story about a society where criminals and terrorists have gotten the upper hand over the authorities. The authorities used to have the means to protect the people, but in recent times, criminals have started exploiting new technologies to commit their crimes. There are two possible endings to this story. One is that the authorities get the legal approval to utilize the new technology and can again prevent terrorist attacks and catch criminals. The other is that access is denied, or the legal process drags out in time, leading to terrorist attacks and increased crime. The privacy-story could be summarized as a story about a society where the population currently enjoys freedom, albeit freedom under constant threat from state authorities who want access to invasive surveillance measures. This story always ends with some form of totalitarianism, where the state, possibly as a side effect, introduces chilling effects by allowing its law enforcers access to invasive surveillance measures, leading to less, not more, security. Through changing contexts and despite the increasing acknowledgment that the security/privacy opposition is indeed a false dichotomy, this underlying pattern continues to structure the debate, with the result that the two sides of the debate do not talk about the same "reality" when they debate. They use the same language, but concepts such as "the state," "freedom," or "consequences" connote entirely different things when uttered on either side. For example, on the security side, freedom means being protected by the state; on the privacy side, freedom means being protected from the state[1].

In this article, I will explore how this plays out in the Norwegian media debate. I suggest that the arguments put forth in media texts, though seemingly dry and objective statements of facts, could be read as implicit narratives that draw on and re-create the worldview of either of the two narrative structures governed by "security" or "privacy." What characterizes the Norwegian media debate on surveillance is that it is performed almost solely by stakeholders. In general, those championing the security narrative are representatives of state authorities, while those who follow the privacy narrative are representatives of civil society. The populace's voice is only barely visible in my collected material, and as will be discussed below, studies suggest that the topic is not widely debated among the general population in Norway. However arguments are made concerning a concrete case, such as a legislative proposal, their power to convince lies in that they imply events, both past, and future. Most importantly, each side of the debate follows a chronological structure that tells diverging stories about contemporary society. I will read the empirical material through the lens of *legendry*. I will focus on how the participants use what Elliott Oring has termed rhetoric of truth to build credibility, and how the utilization of this rhetoric draw on and simultaneously reinforce and re-create these overarching narratives (Oring 2008). I will also employ the term "kernel" as a concept for exploring storytelling by way of reference (Kalčik 1975). What elements and techniques do the debaters employ to draw on and add to these narratives to make truth claims? How can this contest for credibility shed light on contemporary society's coming to terms with rapid developments in digital technologies?

This thesis is similar to Bruce Lincoln's investigation of the role of myth in establishing, upholding, or overthrowing social structures (Lincoln 2014). Lincoln proposes that we should classify these types of narratives "not by their content but by the claims that are made by their narrators and the way in which those claims are received by their audience(s)" (Lincoln 2014, 22), an understanding that resonates with Oring's focus on the rhetoric of truth. He divides the narratives and their functions into three categories: history, legend, and myth. The claim is that stories with persuasive power are regarded as history, while those that lack credibility are classified as legend. Myth describes the stories that possess both credibility and authority, thus being, in Lincoln's classification, the stories that have the power to shape society (Lincoln 2014, 23).

I am interested in exploring the process through which these positions are negotiated, how the categories Lincoln label "history" and "legend" are played up against each other in the media debate, competing for the state of "myth." In other words, how the debate over surveillance capabilities is also a negotiation over the story of contemporary society. Although I analyze my empirical material in light of legendry with the understanding that what defines legend is not whether or not the stories are true, Lincoln's categories help elucidate the positions of the debaters and their narratives. Using Lincoln's categories, we could say that each group in the debate considers their overarching narrative as history while treating the other group's narrative as legend. This indicates that there is currently no valid "myth" regarding digital surveillance capabilities in the society studied here—no one story holds both credibility and authority across the expressions made by each group in the media.

The concept legendry captures a range of expressions that gravitate around legends. These are often non-narrative in form but concern themselves similarly with matters of truth, such as beliefs, rituals, or rumors (Oring 2008, 128). I propose that media texts might also be read as legendry, especially in cases like debates over societal order, where they often navigate the border between fact and fiction, truth, and belief (Frank 2011). This approach is an attempt to pick up Oring's suggestion that one can fruitfully compare the study of legendry and its rhetoric of truth with "truth-making practices in various social and cultural groups and in other areas of discourse" (Oring 2008, 158). I am also inspired by Oring's comparison of legend and news in contemporary society, where he points out the paradoxical relation between legend and news (Oring 2012). News could be defined as the antithesis of folklore in its focus on fact and objectivity and coming from a managed source, yet at the same time, news has been an important source for contemporary legend for folklorists for many decades. In this article, I suggest that the rhetoric that makes news reports and other media texts appear factual and authoritative consists of rhetorical devices similar to those applied in legends, not reported as explicit narrative, but using a stripped-down form to make references.

This implicit storytelling is similar to stories identified by Tom Mould in a study of welfare legends in the USA (2016). Mould and his research team collected stories about welfare recipients that could be defined as legends. In addition to these, they found predominant use of storytelling through reference, where the speaker evokes a

whole story or corpus of stories using only a few words. Mould refers to these stories as "kernel stories," a term coined by Susan Kalčik to capture a narrative type that exists as reference, and that often does not develop beyond this state due to the audiences' familiarity with the full story (Kalčik 1975, 7). This way of evoking a larger whole through reference is similar to the media debate over surveillance powers. Although argumentative in style, the media texts debating surveillance capabilities typically make their claims to truth with reference either to a cause of events where the state authorities are falling behind and need expanded capabilities to protect the citizens, or where the state authorities are encroaching on the citizens' privacy.

While one can define the narrative technique of reference found in the surveillance debate as kernels, the reference point for the kernels of the surveillance debate diverges from Kalčik and Mould's definitions of a kernel story. In Kalčik's use, kernel stories refer to concrete, singular stories of an event that can be told in a relatively stable narrative form, while Mould expands the term to also include evoking a "corpus of stories," which I understand to mean larger sets of stories describing similar events (Kalčik 1975, 7-8; Mould 2016, 394). However, the reference points for the surveillance debate encompass stories about a wide range of events with one thing in common: they all draw on and confirm one of the two worldviews mentioned above. Stories referred to by those arguing for expanded capabilities follow the structure of a benign state that has lost control of the present and need access to expanded surveillance capabilities to reinstate security. They include references to known and planned terrorist events, events connected to criminals operating in free spaces online, or stories about the helplessness of police who watch crimes committed online as they unfold, being restricted by law from stopping the events even though they have the tools to do so at hand. Those who oppose expansion follow a structure where the present is characterized by a threat by state authorities who want to use technological developments to curtail their citizens' freedom. For instance, they might refer to a range of stories from totalitarian regimes; they can be connected to historical events from the STASI-regime or World War II, to events in Western democracies after 9/11. Although each kernel might refer directly to a kernel story—that is, a story about a defined event—the kernel's primary rhetorical use in this case is to establish a truth that goes beyond establishing the truth of the kernel story. I argue that the reference made in these media texts use kernel stories as rhetorical devices to establish the truth of a larger narrative framework. I, therefore, suggest the use of the term "implicit narrative" to describe how the narrative style described as kernels and kernel stories can be part of a strategy to connect events in order to build trustworthiness for a collective understanding of societal developments—how legend-like stories and their rhetorical devices are found in texts and communications throughout society as legendry.

In the following, I will first discuss the relevance of legends for understanding the surveillance debate before describing and contextualizing my empirical material. The following analysis is divided into two sections. In the first section, I will focus on the rhetorical devices employed to make sense of digital technologies. In the second section, I focus on how the debaters reinforce these understandings using pathos, mainly playing on citizens' fear of terrorist attacks in contemporary western culture.

Legend, Truth, and Belief

Legends are often concerned with the supernatural or the horrific, explaining natural formations through the involvement of historical figures or events or seemingly unexplainable events by the intervention of ghosts or aliens. They are often told as stories about other groups, describing their practices as bad or wrong, with the underlying effect of normalizing one's traditions and practices. Legends can thus have the function of drawing borders. Although legend is a well-known term in both vernacular and academic understandings, there is an on-going debate about how exactly the genre should be defined (see Oring 2008, 127–128). In this article, I follow Oring's notion that "legend is concerned with matters of truth" (Oring 2008, 128). This claim is proposed as an alternative to the common folkloristic definition that legends in one way or another are related to belief. This assumption is not wrong, Oring points out, though it is also not very precise; belief is part of so many parts of our communication that it does not effectively single out legend from other forms. He says that a legend makes claims about the truth of an *event* and is, or approximates, a *narrative*. Thus, his notion highlights three concepts that will be important for the analysis in this article: truth, event, and narrative. The debaters use reference to real events to build credibility, not for the events mentioned, but for the narrative that implicitly structures their argument, either promoting the worldview of security or privacy.

Linda Dégh has written that "Most legends are about spirits, witches, demons, monsters, lunatics, criminals, extraterrestrials, and abilities of certain humans who are empowered with precognition and magic that can identify these evil forces and protect us from their destructive power" (Dégh 2001, 4). She continues to clarify how legends belong to the realm of the extranormal, how they very often are the domain of the alternative voices of society. This claim connects to the contemporary surveillance debate in two ways. First, the rapid developments in digital technology over the last decades have opened up what seems like unlimited possibilities for surveillance. The scope and possibility of digital surveillance are difficult for most people to grasp, and the secrecy surrounding much of the state authorities' legislation in this field make it impossible for people to have precise knowledge about what is going on. This lack of transparency places the debate in the realm of the extranormal; even when state authorities speak out, they cannot relate concrete facts. The core topic of the debate is shrouded in mystery, making the arguments not only about convincing the listener about the pros or cons of expanded capabilities but also about what these capabilities are and what they do. Second, the voices of the media debate on surveillance are highly official voices, often representing state authorities like the police and members of parliament on the one hand, or academics, legal experts, and political commentators on the other. What connects this debate to Dégh's claim that legends often are the domain of alternative voices is that they disagree—both sides might harbor authority in society, yet in this particular discussion, they represent diverging worldviews. Depending on whom one has more faith in, each of the two sides could be said to represent alternative voices in this particular matter.

Oring connects the emphasis on the supernatural to the idea that belief is central to

the definition of legends (Oring 2008, 128). He points out that the distinct dimension of belief involved in stories about the supernatural becomes blurred in stories involving rational but unlikely events, such as tales about a series of accidents. On the surface, the contemporary surveillance debate analyzed in this article could be interpreted the same way; the media texts relate real things happening in the real world. However, there are elements of the surveillance debate within the domain of belief, such as the effects of new technologies. On the one hand, there is little knowledge among the general population about the exact methods used by police and intelligence agencies when performing digital surveillance. Do online surveillance capabilities make authorities omnipresent online? In fact, what is technologically possible is elusive to many; what the authorities are legally allowed to do is described only superficially in the Norwegian law due to a tradition of keeping legislation technology-neutral, and the capacity they have to utilize their covert capabilities is secret. Although I follow Oring in using the "rhetoric of truth" as my main analytical vantage point, I maintain that the dimension of belief is relevant for understanding the specific content of the material. While "truth" is a fruitful concept through which to understand form, "belief," at least in the context of the surveillance debate, helps make sense of content.

Debates over surveillance capabilities are usually sparked by mundane events such as legislative proposals concerning the introduction of new tools and capabilities. As Dégh has pointed out, there are several similarities between the legend process and the legal process, such as the polarization of opinions, viewpoints, and interests (Dégh 2001, 1). Referring to court cases, she claims that the antagonists in the legend process are less inclined to compromise than in the legal process, suggesting that this might be because the legal process is concerned with the individual level while legends treat universal concerns. However, the legislative side of the legal process looks much more like the legend process, in that it also treats universal concerns: what kind of society do we want? How will these laws affect our society? The concept of legendry foregrounds the performative aspect of this debate, highlighting the narrative techniques employed to increase credibility and frame the argument within a particular worldview. Oring writes, "Legends may lead to the discussion of belief beyond belief in the narrative incidents themselves. They may invoke discussion about the constitution of the world and the principles by which it operates" (Oring 2008, 128). I argue that these points also apply to the surveillance debate, mainly because the events referred to are *future* events: the object of the surveillance debate is not to establish whether or not something has taken place but to establish what will take place if/not. Establishing credibility for events that have not yet taken place is a venture involving a "belief beyond belief" in narrative incidents, as it instead becomes a question of forecasting. In general, there has been a shift in the discourse on surveillance capabilities in the digitalized society, from focusing on solving crimes committed in the past to prevent crimes from being committed in the future, where pre-emption and predictive policing take center stage (Amoore 2013). The arguments in the debate are full of stories about past events, yet the truth of past events is not the issue. In this debate, past events are no more than rhetorical devices used to establish the truth of

potential events that have not yet taken place. In other words, the debate concerns the causal link between uncontested past events and possible events in the future. It is not a question of convincing listeners of material facts, but about narratively establishing a trustworthy link between what has happened before and what will happen later, or in other words, narratively conflating past and future.

Surveillance Context

The background for this article is a documentary analysis of the debate on digital surveillance in Norwegian news media, print, and digital, from 2009 to 2017. I initially collected the material to prepare a more extensive Q-methodological study mapping the surveillance debate in Norway, Finland, and the UK. The analysis presented here results from subsequent narrative analysis of the collected material, independent of the Q-methodological study's concourse. In Q-methodology, the primary purpose of the initial documentary analysis is to extract as many existing statements about the topic as possible. Throughout this work, I became increasingly aware of how those arguing for or against expanded capabilities seemed to use the same language to talk about different things. This awareness inspired me to perform a more in-depth narrative analysis of the material, which constitutes the groundwork for the analysis presented in this article.

I present a close reading of a few selected contributions to the public debate as it intensified in Norwegian media, leading to a legislative proposal in 2016. The texts chosen are typical examples of the argumentation in the material studied. The collected material for the overarching project encompasses printed and digital news media, broadcast and streamed debates, as well as blogs and social media. The examples analyzed in this article are collected from national newspapers, and all appeared both in print and on their digital platform. In other words, the debate as a whole is not restricted to a single platform, but exists across media and communicative forms. The participants in the debate analyzed were mainly representatives of state authority such as politicians and the police, and independent debaters such as lawyers, journalists, academics, and representatives of civil society. When analyzing media texts in this article, I understand narrative mainly as a property of the text. I use the authors' names in the discussion primarily to mark context, not to make claims about authors' intentions or ownership. This does not mean that the authors are insignificant; it is instead a methodological choice that highlights texts as actors and separates their lives from the lives of those who produce them, asking questions about what texts and documents do in the broader context. Every text is a negotiation between common understandings and individual interpretations (Bakhtin 1986).

I have chosen to focus on one isolated, legislative debate to provide clarity for the reader so that all texts cited relate to one specific topic. The immediate context of the chosen debate was a suggested change to the legislation on covert surveillance and intelligence in Norway to allow equipment interception, known in Norwegian as "data reading."[2] Norway is a country with traditionally high levels of trust in the authorities, as shown, for instance, in the bi-annual European Social Survey (Kleven

2016). The Norwegian police service is under normal circumstances unarmed, their surveillance methods are regulated by court orders, and the service is characterized by transparency. Despite a minor scandal in the 1990s, when it became known that the Police Security Service had been keeping members of the Communist Party under illegal surveillance for several decades, trust in the police among the general population remained high.

However, the events of 9/11 and the ensuing rhetoric of the war on terror that became prevalent in the West meant that Norway, which is a member of NATO, inevitably started to reconsider its public security and capabilities. Several "anti-terror packages" were passed in Parliament, such as legislation criminalizing the planning of terror, in addition to terror acts (for example, in *Lov om endringer i straffeloven og straffeprosessloven mv.*, 2002). Even though the Snowden revelations of 2013 made it clear that Norway was still far behind countries like the USA and the UK in its invasive online surveillance capabilities, they also made it known which capabilities the Norwegian authorities lacked. The following years saw new debates concerning the expansion of surveillance capabilities, in particular online surveillance. The media debate that provides the foundation for this article must be understood within this context, as situated in a country that has historically been restrictive, though surrounded by allied countries with much more comprehensive capabilities and less transparency. However, I argue that even though the national contexts are very different—Norway is discussing expansion while the issue in its most powerful allies is restriction—the implied narratives of the debate are similar across countries.

Though characterized by seemingly irreconcilable views, the Norwegian media debate is played out in a society built on democratic values, free press, and high levels of trust. However, the global context in which surveillance narratives are actualized is not always so harmonic, as shown, for instance, by Anastasiya Astapova in her study of surveillance rumors in Belarus (Astapova 2017). From the outset, the context of Astapova's study diverges from my study, as the kind of direct critical debate that takes place in Norwegian media is not possible in Belarus but is instead seen as separate reports being given in either the official, state-controlled media or the underground media run by dissidents. In other words, the implied narratives of "security" and "privacy," arguing for or against surveillance capabilities, are recognizable as a framework, but the way it plays out in practice is highly context-specific. As Astapova points out, the lack of open debate prepares the ground for a highly developed tradition of rumor, legend, and jokes (Astapova 2017, 278). These types of narrative forms are not as widespread in the Norwegian context. A small interview study I performed with 17 employees and students at Norwegian universities and university colleges in connection to my research project on state surveillance indicated that those who do not have security or privacy issues as a part of their area of expertise have virtually no vocabulary for talking about the authorities' surveillance. Astapova emphasizes the need people in undemocratic states have for creating an outlet for their fear, and this need is not present among middle-class Norwegian citizens, if perhaps among minority groups.

Despite the contextual difference in who tells the stories and what forms they take, it is clear that truth and belief are central aspects for understanding both the Norwegian and the Belarusian surveillance narratives. Astapova highlights how she struggled with getting her work acknowledged as "rumor" by fellow Belarusian scholars, as they all claimed that the stories told were true. In the Norwegian debate, surveillance is predominantly debated by experts and authority figures in media forms that are associated with credibility, such as debate articles and op-eds, and printed in acknowledged media channels, all of them established structures of expressing trustworthiness. In other words, truth claims lie at the core, even if the narrative techniques vary vastly. Astapova clearly states that it is not the role of folklorists to establish whether these stories are true or not, and I will add, the aim of this article is not to establish which of the two narratives of the Norwegian media debate are correct. Rather, this close reading of one part of the Norwegian media debate will present a vantage point for understanding the surveillance debate as an area of contrasting narratives that under certain conditions are drawn on and added to by implication, rather than through explicit narrative.

Contributors to the current surveillance debate often speak about terrorism and technology, the latter often framed as digitalization. In studies of the authorities' surveillance capabilities, terrorism is often central to the argument, with 9/11 and the subsequent discourse on "the war on terror" as a threshold or starting point (Amoore 2013, Massumi 2010). Digitalization is most often actualized by the Snowden revelations, the rise of the Internet, or even the appearance of web 2.0 and smartphones (Lyon 2018, 2015). On the one hand, these are events that arguably have changed the way people in many parts of the world live and experience their lives. On the other, they are narrative actualizations of fears and possibilities that have a long history. The threats to our way of life from hostile groups (us versus them) or new technologies that might change life as we know it (for good or ill) can be seen as genres that people have tapped into for centuries to construct their collective identities.

In the analysis, I will focus on how technology is construed in the surveillance debate, with the digitalization of contemporary society as its material foundation. In the current debate, the development of digital technologies is a driving force, both for those who wish to utilize them for intelligence and investigative purposes and for those who warn against the intrusions into privacy they make possible. The narratives implied in the debate concern surveillance in a digital age, seeking to establish ground rules for the radically increasing possibilities of surveillance made possible by advancing digital technologies. For example, political commentator Marie Simonsen wrote in a national newspaper, "We all saw what proportionality means to the Police Security Service in the case of Ulrik Imtiaz Rolfsen. It ended with a crushing defeat in the high court" (Simonsen 2016). This kernel refers to an incident where the Police Security Service had a filmmaker making a documentary about terrorist recruitment in Norway illegally under surveillance. They ended up stopping him and two known radical Islamists on the way to the airport to send a recruit off to Syria, confiscating all of Rolfsen's material both from that trip and from his home. When they sought ap-

proval for their actions after the fact, they were in the end sentenced to return all of the confiscated material unused after appealing through all three levels of the Norwegian court system. This story's events connect to the terrorist threat, but that is not the underlying message, the implicit narrative that Simonsen uses this kernel to convey. Instead, she uses it to address the Police Security Service's sense of proportion. Her aim is to conjure the story about an overly eager authority that will use these new and invasive technological possibilities to further encroach on its citizens' privacy. Although ubiquitous in contemporary society, terrorism is, in this context, a narrative element used to increase the credibility of stories about digitized society. Technological development is the overarching issue that constitutes the common language used in the two narratives.

Previous critical scholarship on the discourse of expanded capabilities has mainly focused attention on the narrative of government authorities, a common point of view for critical social sciences whose main aim is to reveal power structures (see, for instance, Salter & Mutlu 2013). The discourse of those opposing expanded surveillance powers has not been subjected to as much critical scrutiny. The political nature of much critical social science means an overlap between academic scholarship and political argument on that side of the debate. The expansion narrative has arguably been the most influential in shaping global politics since 9/11, and hence the one that has had the most far-reaching practical consequences. The analysis in this article thus draws on prior critical scholarship that has shown how the discourse around the war on terror has given those arguing for expansion narrative tools to promote their story about what the world is like and how it could be made better (Altheide 2006, Amoore 2013, Massumi 2010). However, it is just as important to recognize how the opposing, privacy-focused line of argument is also a form of legendry—stories about another version of society, drawing on a set of shared assumptions about the effects of surveillance capabilities on society. When investigating the Norwegian surveillance debate narratives, my main aim is to highlight its communicative dimension as it appears to the public through popular media. Through a close reading of a few selected media texts from my material, I will aim to show that the two sides build their arguments around two completely different understandings of the issue that is under debate. It is not merely a matter of saying yes or no to specific surveillance capabilities but of making a case for one of two different worldviews.

Positioning: Crime, Human Rights and Digital Technologies

The rise of digital technologies and their role in conceptualizing the world is central to understanding the current surveillance debate. Although debaters regularly reference developing trends in crime and terrorism to support lines of argument, positions are always justified through technological possibilities. There are stories about technology enabling criminals and terrorists in new ways, as exemplified in an op-ed by a police officer who writes, "We have had events where the police have discovered indications of large amounts of child abuse material on a computer, but because of encryption, the police cannot access the material and use it as evidence. Worst case, the police will

have to return the computer to the perpetrator, with the consequences this has for the victims" (Røger 2016). There also exist success stories about technological solutions helping in the prevention of crime and terror. On the side of those who argue against expanded capabilities, there are stories about technological development opening a space for free speech while simultaneously being a possible door to an unfree surveillance society. The utilization of digital technology as a novel force to make things happen is central to the way those engaged in the debate build their arguments through connecting and conflating past, present, and future events.

In 2016, during the months before data reading was incorporated into Norwegian legislation about covert surveillance and intelligence, the view of technology as something inextricably connected to crime was prominent in the public debate. Technology was often personified, figuring as the protagonist of the story, who kept pulling evidence away from under the police's noses. "This is about giving the police access to information that they are entitled to have, but that technology is making unavailable to them," wrote Anders Werp and Ulf Leirstein, politicians from parties within the coalition government, in an op-ed (Leirstein & Werp 2016). "Technological development has outrun our methods," wrote the Minister of Justice and Public Security, Anders Anundsen (Anundsen 2016). Both these texts exemplify how those arguing for expanded capabilities often depict technology as an actor with the ability to affect society, almost of its own accord. Technology is narrated not as a tool but as an accomplice to criminals and terrorists. These are images from an implied narrative where the police have lost control. They frame the demand for more up to date digital surveillance methods as a response to a situation where "information we are entitled to have" is increasingly hidden by digital technologies.

The narrative implied in the texts arguing for expanded capabilities typically follows a linear, chronological structure. The past was a good time when the authorities were in control, the present carries the potential of mayhem, as criminals and terrorists might strike at any moment, and the future is a time when digital surveillance methods will once again keep criminals and terrorists at bay. In the text cited above, Leirstein and Werp begin by describing the present as a time when "the crime situation is changing. The threat of terrorist attacks is greater than before. Borderless crime is on the increase, with better-organized criminal groups." There is an imagined starting point in this argument, where "the crime situation" was in an original state: terrorist attacks were few, crime was, for the most part, kept within limits, and criminal groups were poorly organized. As shown in the quote above, the claim is that this has changed because technology is making it harder to fight crime and prevent terrorism. They present recent developments in digital technologies as the event that the reader is expected to evaluate. It is narrated as something that has happened, with visible consequences and a clear-cut solution: the capability of data reading. These stories seek to disrupt the present and promote digital surveillance methods as the remedy to reinstate a situation of control. The credibility rests mainly on the ethos of the debaters. Speaking from the position of state authority, they talk about the "crime situation" and "information we are entitled to have," invoking both empirical knowledge about

facts on the ground for the police and judicial knowledge about what the authorities are legally allowed to do.

This narrative interprets technology according to who has access to it. When in the hands of criminals, technology is one of the "bad guys." In the hands of the law enforcement and intelligence services, however, technology has positive connotations. Technology in this narrative can be interpreted as inherently neutral, but more importantly, it can take on the moral inclinations of the user. Technology in the hands of criminals will cause harm, while in the hands of the authorities, it will remove harm.

While arguments in support of expanded capabilities often build their claims to truth on the credibility of state authorities, the most common rhetorical strategy of those who want to limit surveillance is to undermine the credibility of those arguing for expansion. A political commentator in the national newspaper Dagbladet, Marie Simonsen, wrote, "The problem is that there is no documentation or statistics that show that the capabilities being requested work. The desire for expanded capabilities is based to an astonishing degree on anecdotal evidence (and of course secrecy) […]" (Simonsen 2016). What Simonsen does in this sentence is an example of "narrative positioning" (Oring 2008, 141). The text points to the narrative strategy of the opposing side, "exposing" it as storytelling rather than facts based on recognized measures of truth in modern society: documentation and statistics. In other words, arguments for expansion most explicitly rest on the position of the writer, their ethos, while the arguments against expansion more often position themselves using logos, building credibility not from an existing position, but through questioning the logic of the expansion narrative by playing to the reader's rationality. Accordingly, Simonsen seeks to increase her narrative's credibility by exposing that the expansion narrative is based on stories about random events.

Having brought the trustworthiness of the opposing narrative into question, Simonsen continues to bolster the credibility of her version by referring to several expert bodies who have opposed or warned against data reading official comments to the proposed legislation. She mentions that the Norwegian Bar Association, the Norwegian Union of Journalists and ICT Norway, an NGO representing the Norwegian private ICT sector, are all "extremely worried," thus including three crucial sectors of knowledge as allies in her narrative: the law, the media, and the ICT sector. In doing so, Simonsen shifts from applying logos to ethos, drawing on the authority of her sources to emphasize that several other sources support her reasoning. The voices selected are all representatives of civil society, which further serves to tie the text's claims to the implicit narrative that state authorities are the actual threat. She then condenses their answers into one headline: "The consequences of the proposed legislation have not been sufficiently assessed." As in the extension narrative quoted above, "consequences" are central to the argument, and I will return to this later. In Simonsen's narrative, "consequences" are something that will have a broad impact: "This applies to everything from source protection for the press to international trust in Norwegian trade and industry. Opening the way for the suggested surveillance, even purely technically, is a change that will have far-reaching consequences for society as a whole".

Referring to the official comment made by ICT Norway, Simonsen argues:

> If you base your arguments on technological development without boundaries, then you have to bear in mind that this is relevant in fields other than terrorism and criminality. Precisely because of technological development, the tools the police ask for are not limited to criminality. They touch all parts of society. (Simonsen 2016)

The reference to society concludes two consecutive paragraphs, both of which stress the idea that technology is all-pervasive. This narrative's logic is that if we change our laws and regulations of technology in one sector, this will have ripple effects far beyond that area, simply because today, technology is not confined to one domain. In this narrative, technology is not a tool that will take on the moral inclinations of its user, but an inherently independent force that has effects far beyond those intended by its user. Thus, the way they talk about technology reveals a significant discrepancy between the two narratives. The expansion narrative divides the world into clear-cut categories of good and bad, assuming a fundamental link between human morals and technological practice. The opposition narrative describes an unstable and unpredictable world, where humans are neither good nor bad, and where actions concerning technology are framed as having effects far beyond those intended by the actor.

It is not coincidental that she repeats the reference to "society as a whole" with such force. The focus on human rights, freedom of speech, and other liberties of free and democratic societies make up the core theme of the worldview construed through arguments opposing the expansion of surveillance capabilities. To discredit the expansion narrative's stories about the present, the arguments of the opposing side relate to a conflation of past and future, implying stories about what has happened in societies where authorities are allowed invasive capabilities. Rather than talking about the present, the opposition narrative talks about a possible future, building credibility for this future by referencing past events.

This is arguably the point at which it becomes evident that the two sides of the debate draw their arguments from different implied narratives: the insistence by those arguing for restriction that the discussion about surveillance methods is not about fighting or preventing crime and terror but about upholding a society built on freedom and trust. Their arguments refer to a completely different topic. This use of narrative positioning is most substantial in the arguments that oppose expanded capabilities. While the arguments for expanded capabilities are more often framed as a balance between the two narratives—considering stories about societal consequences but concluding that the fight against crime and terrorism is most important—the arguments against expanded capabilities frame the two narratives as contrasts.

In the text referenced above, Leirstein and Werp write, "Such a method [data reading] is of course controversial. But our view is that the consequences will be dire if we fail to face the challenges of crime" (Leirstein & Werp, 2016). Similarly, Anundsen writes

> Working to give the police good tools, the government is engaged in creating a bal-

ance between the need for expanded capabilities on the one hand, and the right to privacy on the other. To secure sufficient capabilities for the police and the Police Security Service, we recently proposed legislation in Parliament that consider both these aspects. (Anundsen 2016)

These are examples of the way expansion arguments build credibility through balance rather than contrast. However, the balance always tips slightly towards expansion. Leirstein and Werp admit that the methods are controversial but conclude that the challenge of crime is the most critical consideration. Anundsen states that the proposed law has achieved a balance, suggesting that you can have both surveillance and privacy, though without detailing what that entails in this specific case. With the authority of a Minister of Justice, he expects the population to trust him. As Oring has pointed out, proposing alternative interpretations is a common way of increasing the credibility of the narrator (Oring 2008, 144). By showing that they are aware of the opposing side and their view, the narrators give the impression of having considered all options and carefully landed on their solution, without going into details or attempting to deepen how they came to their conclusions.

Of course, the opposition will always base their arguments on the positioning; that is, after all, inevitable for those in opposition. Thus, they employ the same rhetorical device of considering alternative interpretations, yet rather than emphasizing the importance of their own view, this side is more likely to emphasize the shortcomings of the other narrative. What is notable about the surveillance debate is that the arguments are often not about opposing the use of specific surveillance capabilities but about questioning the truth of the other side's entire worldview, presenting an alternative future outcome rather than speaking about the present challenges. It is interesting to note how the two positions in the debate emerge as being "power" vs. "the people," independently of which side views the debate. All the people debating these issues in the media are representatives of either state authorities or expert groups—arguably groups that in different ways hold power and authority in society. However, the stories they tell and how they position these stories make the debate read either like one between an oppressive state and a people demanding liberties or one between a state eager to protect its citizens and a group of elitist experts wanting to protect their interests. In this way, the debate ties into another move that has characterized the discourse on security and privacy in Western societies after 9/11 (Friedewald et al. 2017). During the twentieth century, this discourse was characterized by the fear of totalitarianism, highlighting the need to protect the citizens from the prying eyes of state authority. With the war on terror, the opposite view is taking hold, where the need for state authorities to protect its citizens against an outer enemy is gaining ground. This shift is foundational for the two competing narratives that underlie the surveillance debate.

A way to conceptualize the differences between these narratives is to look more closely at how they express their understandings of technology through the chronology of the narrative. One side construes technological development as an answer to a threat (present unsafe, future safe), while in the other technology is a threat (present neutral, future in danger); this serves to place the technology of digital surveillance

methods in two different modes and create two different future scenarios. In the first instance, technology thematizes the development from an insecure present to a secure future. In the second, it thematizes the development from a secure present to an unsafe future. The narratives of what digital technologies might potentially do take divergent paths.

Leirstein and Werp's text employs framing to create credibility for their story of an unsafe present and the way forward. They write:

> There are several situations where criminals can organize the spread of information in such a way that the police are powerless to intervene. One example is when two criminals in the same room communicate without talking, by writing information on a PC in a document that is not saved. We have also seen cases where criminals have access to a common e-mail account, communicating by writing information that is saved as drafts. […] Using data reading, the police can register information that has not been saved, and can catch it before it is encrypted and becomes unavailable. Such a method is, of course, controversial. Nevertheless, our view is that the consequences will be dire if we avoid meeting the challenges of crime. (Leirstein & Werp 2016)

The text conjures the present through two stories about criminals taking advantage of technological tools to ensure no one gets hold of their communication and information. The stories are framed as "words-as-world," using phrases like "there are several situations" and "we have seen cases where," giving the impression of being references to fact rather than stories told these politicians by police officers (words-as-words) (Oring 2008,140). As we have already seen, Leirstein and Werp's story depict data as information the police are entitled to have. These examples, stories about what criminals can do today framed as facts, exemplify their claim about what technology has taken away from the police. The framing insists that this is not about implementing new methods but about adapting technological advances to existing legislation—not so much introducing new capabilities as reinstating capabilities that they have lost. By invoking the idea that this is something the police have always been allowed to do, the text claims authority by referring to the legal system; it is not about *changing* but about *adapting to reinstate*. Not moving forward into something new but moving forward in order to return to a past state.

Central to the narrative is the unknown but dire consequences that will come about if we *avoid* taking action in the present. In other words, that scary possible future is already present. Amoore, drawing on Massumi, calls this a pre-emptive temporality, pointing out that it is not about predicting or preventing a possible future but about the capacity to act in the face of uncertainty (Amoore 2013, 62). In this sense, the future is narrated as a present worst-case scenario. The only way to secure a safe future for citizens in this story is to allow expanded capabilities in the present: through data reading, the police can access the information that they have a right to, thus solving the challenge of technological development and reinstating the control that existed in pre-digitalized society.

The opposing narrative grounds its arguments in a less troubling version of the

present. Simonsen's text altogether refuses to recognize the present of the expansion narrative, claiming that its evidence is anecdotal. Instead, she tells a story about a present where the government seems to be staging a charade. She claims that there is no convincing evidence that things are as bad as the authorities claim. Simonsen's present, which is illustrative of that found in the opposing side's narrative, is one where technology is regulated, and it is regulation that keeps society secure. The temporality of the risk assessment inherent in this argument highlights pre-caution rather than pre-emption. For those opposing expansion, it is not a question of doing something now to avoid future events, but *not* doing something now because we are not sure how it will affect future events.

The word "consequence" is central to both lines of argument, and it is negatively loaded on both sides. For the expansion side, it is something that will happen if we do not expand. For the opposing side, it is something that will happen if we do expand. Neither side use the word "consequence" to describe the desired outcomes. This use of words implies that either narrative's desired effects are a natural move forward, while the effects that they warn against are "consequences," effects that disrupt the natural flow of society.

Both sides narrate consequences as a conflation of present and future. In the expansion narrative, they might well be playing out as we speak. The opposing narrative locate consequences materially in the future, yet although they are contingent on increased surveillance, they are narrated as a threat that is already felt. The main difference in this material is that, in the first narrative, consequences will be avoided using data reading while, in the second, consequences will be brought about by data reading. In the opposition narrative, something might change, but we do not know what. The foundation of this narrative is that this uncertainty could lead us either way. Technology is not a threat in the hands of the "bad guys" and a source of good in the hands of the "good guys," but an independent force that can have unintended effects. In other words, data reading has the power to change the future, but the problem is that we do not know how. On the other hand, the expansion narrative narrates data reading as a force that has the power to change the present, which is narrated as conflated with the future. Here, "consequences" are possibilities that might be playing out at any given moment, but that can and will be avoided if the police are allowed to make use of data reading.

Pathos: Fear, Terrorism and the Surveillance State
Above, I have shown how arguments in the surveillance debate employ strategies that draw on two different implied narratives to persuade people to support or oppose expanded surveillance capabilities. These strategies mainly relate to the ethos and logos of the debate: that which has to do with either speaker or events' trustworthiness and authority. I will now examine another crucial part of the surveillance narrative, which belongs rhetorically to the domain of pathos. These are the arguments performed to build credibility by making people *feel* that what is said is the truth, by playing to ideology or belief or existing emotions (Oring 2008, 157). In the debate about surveillance

capabilities, fear is the underlying emotional driver. In my material, both those arguing for data reading and those opposing it base their case on the fear created by conjuring up images of a threat. However, that does not mean that "fear" as a narrative element in the debate relates to the same stories. Rather, "fear" constitutes another element that highlights the discrepancies between expansion and opposition narratives.

The discourse of terrorism is a fundamental element in the expansion narrative in contemporary society. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 mark a threshold for the perception of threat in Western society, with ripple effects worldwide (Lyon 2003, Massumi 2010). As noted above, the discourse of state power has been the main subject of scrutiny for critical scholarship, and this discourse has centered on terrorism. Because of this, terrorism has emerged as a central topic of study. However, I would argue that terrorism is the central theme of only one of the two narratives that constitute the debate. As argued above, the opposition narrative is structured around an understanding of the state as a threat, such as the stories spelled out in Astapova's study on Belarus. In other words, the opposition narrative is characterized instead by the lack of stories about terrorism. Terrorism shows up in the opposition narrative as a device for narrative positioning, but it is not a central element of the narrative structure in the same way as it is in the expansion narrative. Here, the topic of terrorism is a driving force for constructing a worldview where the present is unsafe, and only the state authorities and their access to new surveillance technology can save us. However, for both sides, fear is an emotional driver. The narrators on both sides use pathos to make future events real by playing to the readers' cognitive and emotional expectations and connecting these to prevalent fears of terrorism.

David L. Altheide has argued that a discourse of fear in many respects won hegemony in US news coverage in the 18 months after 9/11. For example, he quotes the news anchor, Dan Rather, saying to a British journalist: "[…] one finds oneself saying 'I know the right question, but you know what? This is not exactly the right time to ask it'" (Altheide 2006, 10). Rather reportedly felt pressure from the authorities to report stories consistent with their narrative, thus drawing on and simultaneously recreating the media climate that Altheide calls a "discourse of fear," where most major news broadcasters backed the official narrative to gain support for the invasion of Iraq. Altheide concludes that the 9/11 terrorist attacks so inflated the expansion narrative that even those in the media industry who were initially critical of it felt it was the wrong time and place to speak up against it.

The discourse of fear remains a recognizable description of the surveillance debate almost twenty years later, though it takes slightly different forms. The nature of debate since the 9/11 attacks has inevitably changed, but terrorist threats are still a central part of the expansion-narrative regarding surveillance. In what follows, I will look more closely at how the discourse of fear in the Norwegian media follows these dominating narratives: those arguing for expansion draw on fear of terrorism, while those opposing expansion draw on fear of the curtailment of civil liberties and democracy in the wake of terrorism.

A significant issue in the public debate of post-9/11-society is whether it is appro-

priate to introduce expanded capabilities in the wake of terrorist attacks. A pertinent example of the juxtaposition of the two sides on this issue is found in a newspaper article published on 18 November 2015. This was six months prior to the passing of the legislation regarding data reading but, more significantly, only a few days after the terrorist attacks in Paris targeting a concert hall, a football stadium, and several restaurants, in which 138 people were killed and many more injured (Stensrud 2015). The protagonist in the newspaper article is Ulf Leirstein, a parliamentary politician and the author of one of the media texts discussed above. His message is that he is in favor of giving the police access to data reading. The first paragraph calls attention to the fact that the legislative proposal being drawn up by the Department of Justice and Public Security for consideration in Parliament early the following year was planned prior to the Paris terrorist attacks. However, the timing of the newspaper article is closely related to the terrorist attacks. Leirstein is quoted as saying: "When these things happen is precisely the moment that we should debate them. This is when we see the holes in our own system" (Stensrud 2015). This statement is balanced by a quote from the leader of the parliamentary justice committee and opposition politician, Hadia Tajik. She says: "It is important that we do not make the mistake that we have seen other countries make in the wake of terrorist attacks, where the boundaries of what is seen as right are moved because they are debated in a climate of fear" (Stensrud 2015).

Although such an overt call for expanded capabilities in the wake of serious events is not common in Norwegian media, I argue that the rhetoric of Leirstein's statement exemplifies how fear is thematized through the expansion narrative. What Leirstein is saying is not that it is good to take advantage of people's fear, but that terrorist attacks give us examples of things we should fear—and by extension, things we should take measures to prevent. It is an extreme version of the examples dismissed by the opposition as anecdotes: stories about real-life events narrated or referred to concretize the implied narrative of a society that needs extended capabilities. The Paris attacks function as a kernel story through Leirstein's reference to "these things" that "happen," pointing to events that everyone agrees have happened while simultaneously conjuring possible future events by referencing the overarching implicit narrative of a present where the Norwegian authorities need expanded capabilities in order to provide security for its citizens. Leirstein uses pathos not to establish the truth of the events he refers to but to establish the truth of events that might come, implying the story of an unsafe present and a possible safe future of the extension narrative. His arguments make a claim for belief beyond belief.

As established, the expansion narrative builds on a stable chronology—secure past, insecure present, reinstatement of security in the future. Invoking a past event to conjure present fear thus disrupts the flow of the narrative. Examples of disastrous past events introduce an alternative chronology, that narrate insecurity not as a conflation of present and future but as a conflation of past and present that differentiates between near and distant past. In using events of the near past as examples, the narrator introduces an alternative past that does not belong to the overarching narrative structure but rather works as a template for future action. The secure, distant past

evoking post-digitalized society is positioned against an insecure, near past narrated as stories about terrorist attacks or other serious events, with the effect not of dismissing the narrative structure but of building credibility for the claims for expanded capacities. In this way, Leirstein's use of the Paris attacks function as a secondary legend (Oring 2008, 153), using the story of a real event to build credibility for the existence of similar future events.

The quote from Tajik is illustrative of the opposition narrative. Her main point is that one should base fundamental societal changes on rational consideration, not decided upon in affect. She thus dismisses the emotional pathos of Leirstein's argumentation by playing to the cognitive expectations of the readers, acknowledging their fear, before invoking the modern ideal of the rational human. This move, which is a common rhetorical move among those opposing expansion, could be interpreted as a way of rationalizing the expansion side's focus on fear. On the other hand, there is a double effect to this claim, which also plays to a prevalent fear, albeit a different type of fear from the expansion narrative. As is usual in the opposition narrative, Tajik does not discuss possible terrorist attacks, apart from discrediting the push to expand capabilities in affect. Instead, she tells a story of a society that might be moving in the wrong direction democratically: "We have to avoid implementing invasive measures that might affect individuals who have done nothing wrong, in order for politicians to appear efficient in a demanding debate," Tajik states (Stensrud 2015). Politicians instill fear to win cheap political points, she claims. Nevertheless, in so doing, she points to a different threat: a lurking worry about the current democratic climate. Her statement refers to the story of a political climate where politicians might use terrorist events to scare people into allowing access to technologies that might compromise their freedom.

Tajik employs the same strategy of narrative positioning observed in the Simonsen text: building credibility for one's narrative by exposing the narrative of the opposing side as false. However, what becomes clear is that, strategically, this type of narrative positioning also comes within the trope of pathos. Discrediting the expansion narrative is the same as questioning the motives of the authorities: it might not create immediate fear in the masses, but it plays to those who are already critical of the current authorities, meeting both the emotional and cognitive expectations of the listeners by conforming to their ideology and belief (Oring 2008, 157).

It is interesting to note that one could even read Leirstein's statements as balancing between addressing cognitive and emotional expectations:

> We shouldn't get carried away and put up surveillance cameras on every street corner. Like Hadia, I too am worried that privacy is easily dismissed in the debate. Because of this, it is important that a third party, in other words the courts, should decide on each case when it comes to data reading. (Stensrud 2015)

Although employing the same terminology as Tajik to address privacy and independent control, Leirstein does not abandon his arguments about debating counter-terrorist measures in the wake of terrorist attacks. He is not saying that we have nothing to

fear. Indeed, he stresses the idea that we have something to fear, arguing for the implementation of invasive measures even when they pose a risk to privacy. Stressing the importance of privacy in this setting amplifies the threat—it is introduced not as an element to consider in its own right, but as a rhetorical tool to build credibility for the expansion narrative, connecting to the cognitive expectations of the listeners whose emotions have already been stirred by the fear of terrorist attacks. The conclusion is that, even though privacy is important, the current situation is, in fact, so dangerous that we need to allow these invasive capabilities.

The interplay between cognitive and emotional expectations is thus a rhetorical strategy used by both sides. In arguments drawing on the expansion narrative, this often takes the form exemplified above: an imminent threat is presented and exemplified by reference to crime or terrorism, followed by reassurances that the authorities can and will handle this if they only get the capabilities they are asking for. First, playing to a prevalent fear, and then presenting a rational solution through addressing the citizens' trust in state authorities. A particularly pertinent example of this is seen in the words of the Minister of Justice and Public Security, Anders Anundsen, from whom there is a brief quote in the above section. The text is an op-ed about data reading, published 13 May 2016, with the title "They shall never win." It was published a few months after the Department of Justice and Public Security circulated their legislation proposal about data reading for comment, one month before the Parliament was to vote on it, and, significantly, two months after the terrorist attack on Brussels airport. The first paragraph read:

> "It wasn't supposed to happen" was the refrain after terror struck Brussels in Easter week. Some claim the fight against terror isn't working. I don't agree. Even if we can never protect ourselves completely against terrorist attacks, we must not allow the idea to take root that we cannot win the fight against terrorists. Because we can. (Anundsen 2016)

The introduction loses no time: it goes through the full cycle of destabilizing the past/present by mentioning both an actual event and the assumed feeling of fear and hopelessness and then seeking to reinstate hope and trust through a call to arms. The final sentence is an appropriation of the 2008 Obama campaign "yes we can," alluding to the Norwegian interest in and dependence on US politics, while also conjuring the feeling of hope that was felt even in Norway with the election of the first African American president in the USA. In the context, however, the use of this phrase could be read as an inversion of the values connected to the original statement. While the election of the first African American president in the USA was undoubtedly a victory relative to a long history of state oppression, the Norwegian Ministry of Justice's fight against terrorists does not reflect the same power relation. In this way, the relative *distance* to US politics and history makes this allusion work in a Norwegian context; it alludes to the hope felt with the election, but it does not carry its historical implications. This distance allows Anundsen to employ emotions that arguably belong to the opposition narrative and use them to build credibility for the extension narrative.

The piece continues to focus on the work that is being done in Norway to prevent terrorism. "Terror is criminality, not a clash of civilizations," he writes, arguing that criminality can be prevented through international cooperation, stricter legislation, and intelligence. There is only one obstacle:

> To face the terrorist threat, the police and security services must have access to information and intelligence. The capabilities made available by current legislation are to some extent outdated. Today, the police and security service are allowed, within strict limits, to monitor communication between individuals, after a court order. The challenge is that criminals can easily use encrypted communication. This obstructs the police and security service in their work. Technological development has outrun our methods. (Anundsen 2016)

Even though the piece's dominant mood is one of hope, this excerpt makes it clear that hope will only be within reach with expanded capabilities. In the current situation, the police and security services are, in fact, "obstructed."

Here too, there is an interplay between addressing the emotional and the cognitive. While the text justifies the need for expanded capabilities with reference to events—real or imagined—the claim that the government has made a balanced assessment is merely stated. This is another example of how the expansion narrative balances alternative interpretations, as discussed in the above chapter, but in this case, it becomes clear that this use combines logos with pathos. It seeks to convince people of the value of data reading by alluding to stories about a shared fear: terrorist attacks. At the same time, however, that fear is framed by making statements that, on the one hand, radiate confidence—"we can!"—and on the other, play to an audience that already trusts the authorities. As Oring points out, the use of pathos to convince is arguably most powerful if one can manage to invoke emotions that are already being felt (Oring 2008, 157), and when representatives of state authority in Norway speak, they assume that they have the majority of the citizens on their side.

The piece ends with two pretentious paragraphs:

> The goal of terror is to incite fear and destroy our way of life. Terrorists will never succeed. We will stand tall in our democratic tradition and protect our values. We must never yield in the fight against terror, but even so, we must not let the fight against terror undermine the values we are fighting for. We must avoid a situation where we no longer dare to make use of our constitutional freedom of speech for fear of repercussions.
>
> Conflicts and societal differences must not lead to an increase in support for terrorists. The fight against terrorism is therefore also a fight against parallel societies and a new underclass. Knowledge about different social, cultural and religious groups, as well as dialogue with these, will be important factors in the fight against terror. A fight we will win. (Anundsen 2016)

The op-ed thus ends on the same note it started on, with the encouraging promise, "we will win!" Nevertheless, the premise of rhetoric encouraging us to fight is inevi-

tably a battle going on. The text is not written to calm and reassure; the pathos of the text rather reinforces that in the present, we do have something to fear. It draws on and reinforces the implicit narrative of an unsafe present and a possible safe future, arguing that if we make the right decisions now, we will overcome this situation in the future. Fear is the driving force of this text, as it confirms the presence of danger by presenting a solution to it. If there were nothing to fear in the current situation, why would we need a motivational text about fighting and winning? Framed as a story of hope, the narrative implies looming danger, the existence of possible terrible events that can only be averted if new capabilities are allowed. Although written using a markedly different language from that of the texts quoted above, which speak of "dire consequences" and "holes in our system," it nevertheless operates within the same rhetoric of truth to imply a narrative about a present that is unsafe, but that can be fixed if the police and security service get technology on their side.

Conclusion

The performers' intention to convince is a common feature of both public debate and legendry. Although the media debate on surveillance is not made up of legends in the traditional sense, the texts could be read as legendry. They are expressions that draw their claims to truth from relatively fixed belief systems, defined here as implied narratives. What connects the media texts studied in this project to legendry is not that they take the form of narratives but that they consistently make claims for the truth about future events—events that must be the stuff of imagination, of storytelling. It is not the events discussed or referenced in the texts that are up for debate; it is the consequences of these events and the foundation for imagining what would happen if surveillance capabilities were expanded or restricted. As exemplified above, the narratives implied by reference to past events are both stories about life in a society whose flow is disrupted by digitalization, but digitalization takes on two very different guises. One narrative is about an insecure society where the authorities need to re-establish control by having access to surveillance technologies. The other narrative is about a relatively well-adjusted society threatened by uncertainty as the authorities gain access to more and more invasive surveillance technologies.

These are narratives springing from an unprecedented technological development, seeking to define culture and society by competing to establish the truth about how technology affects our way of life. Will access to our online communications help the authorities keep us safe from a number of defined dangers, or should we restrict such access because it may be misused, even though we trust our current authorities? Should we fear terrorist attacks, or should we fear the fear that terrorist attacks instill in us? These texts negotiate how to deal with the elusive, new technologies that enable intensified surveillance of electronic traces and communications. The questions arise in the wake of legislative changes, as exemplified through the analysis above. However, when looking deeper into the rhetoric of truth employed in these contributions, it becomes clear that they raise another more fundamental societal issue. It is not just a question of being for or against a specific method. It is also a question of owning and

defining the story of what these new technologies can and will do to our society. Although using the same terms and language, a closer look at the rhetoric of truth of the debate indicates that the two sides of the debate do not relate to the same story. In this way, the media debate on authorities' access to digital surveillance provides a perspective on the more extensive debate in our society of how to understand and regulate technology, and most specifically in this context, highlights how the complexities and uncertainties of this issue make the debate and its argumentation rest on narrative.

Notes

1   Because the concepts "security" and "privacy" as descriptions of reality are highly contested, I will not use the terms as analytical concepts in the analysis. In order to distance my analysis from the debate over these concepts and avoid slipping into the language of a false dichotomy, I will rather refer to the positions of the debate: security expressed through arguments for expanding surveillance capabilities, privacy expressed through arguments opposing expansion.
2   Equipment interference, called "data reading" in the Norwegian debate, is a technique whereby the authorities enter a digital device covertly in order to monitor everything that happens on the device in real time.

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